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InTRODuCTIOn
My dissertation is about impact evaluation in the sphere of development and behavioral
interventions. The first part of my dissertation consists of impact evaluations; the second
part is about data collection and research ethics. Rigorous impact evaluations allow pol-
icymakers to make better, evidence-based decisions on policies to improve people’s lives.
These tools are specifically suited in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals,
which outline clear and measurable targets, and thus find increasingly wide adoption,
particularly in development economics. The randomized-controlled trial (RCT) is often
quoted to be the gold standard of empirical scientific inquiry. The Nobel prize committee
acknowledged this in 2019 when they granted the Prize in Economic Sciences to Abhijit
Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer ”for their experimental approach to allevi-
ating global poverty.” In chapters 2 and 3, we conduct impact evaluations based on an
RCT in Zambia, which is outlined in chapter 1. In most cases, RCTs require primary
data collections. Thus data collections are an integral part of development economics,
as it is practiced today, and hence deserves the attention of development economists.
Throughout my studies, I was involved in several data collections, during which I was
confronted with issues related to research ethics and data quality. Chapters 4 and 5
present experimental studies that aim to address some of these issues and provide an
empirical evidence base for further discussions.
The RCT described in chapter 1 consists of two cross-randomized interventions which
are only loosely related and therefore evaluated separately in chapters 2 and 3. In 2015,
Markus Frölich and Niels Kemper successfully applied to funds by the International
Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) to launch the project in cooperation with the Ru-
ral Finance Expansion Programme in Zambia (RUFEP). Further financial support was
provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through the Sonderforschungs-
bereich (SFB) 884, in particular for the phone surveys. Since 2016, P. Linh Nguyen
managed and supervised the implementation of the RCT and related data collections,
supported by a team of research assistants. A pre-analysis plan for this project was
prepared by Markus Frölich, Andreas Landmann, and P. Linh Nguyen in 2018 with the
support of research assistants. The study is registered on the AEA RCT registry as
AEARCTR-0002640 (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2640-1.0). Frölich and Nguyen (2020)
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report the initial findings of the RCT. While I only joined the project after the endline
data collection, I conducted three phone surveys for this project in April and November
2020 and Mai 2021. The impact evaluations discussed in chapters 2 and 3 built on the
work and support of all those involved in the past. Chapter 2 is joint work with Markus
Frölich and P. Linh Nguyen; and chapter 3 is joint work with Markus Frölich, Andreas
Landmann, and P. Linh Nguyen.
In chapter 2, we evaluate the impact of an intervention aimed at facilitating the linkage
between savings groups and formal financial institutions in rural Zambia. Four different
NGOs implemented the intervention with support from RUFEP across seven districts in
three regions of Zambia (for details on this background, see chapter 1). The goal of the
intervention was to increase the uptake of bank or mobile money accounts by savings
groups to provide them with safer storage technology and eventually increase their access
to formal financial services such as loans. We find that the intervention increased uptake
and usage of bank accounts for two of the four NGOs. However, we do not find effects
on outcomes further down the theory of change, i.e., we find no evidence of changes in
saving and lending activities nor welfare-related outcomes.
The evaluation of the second intervention is presented in chapter 3. This interven-
tion was aimed at strengthening the savings groups’ internal insurance mechanism. The
savings groups in our study usually maintain something called a social fund, i.e., a fund
to which each member contributes and which eventually is used for purposes that ben-
efit the group beyond saving and lending. Often these funds are used to support group
members in need. The social fund intervention aimed to strengthen this support by ex-
plaining concepts related to insurance and its benefits to the savings groups. Again, this
intervention showed only a few results. We find some changes related to the social fund
and risk-coping for one NGO, but the evidence is limited.
Chapter 1 provides a detailed overview of all the data collections conducted for the
impact evaluations discussed in chapters 2 and 3. During the endline data collection,
respondents were paid compensation. Our interviewers reported that some group mem-
bers believed that this compensation was unfairly distributed, causing disputes in some
savings groups. Group members reportedly thought it was unfair that some members
were selected for an interview receiving the compensation, while others were not. I im-
plemented a survey experiment to study fairness perceptions about survey participation
compensation and lotteries to investigate this issue. During the phone surveys after the
endline, we conducted an experiment to investigate how compensation affects the willing-
ness to participate in future survey waves. For this purpose, we compensated respondents
with a lottery. I took this as an opportunity to study perception related to the fairness
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of (unequally distributed) survey participation compensation. This study is presented in
chapter 4. I find that most participants appreciate survey participation compensation,
but that all, and not only some participants should benefit. Further, they reported that
lotteries are fair, but this opinion is considerably affected by the outcome of the lottery.
Since I conducted and supported several survey data collections over the time of
my studies, I became sensitized to the importance of data quality. When working with
primary data, one realizes how important this research input is and that there is too
little attention on data quality both in an economist’s education and many studies. Good
quality of survey data relies on, and research ethics dictate, the voluntary cooperation
of study participants. While, at least for survey data-based studies without coercion,
we might assume implicit consent of study participants, the topic of informed consent
is no trivial matter. With the rise of big data and ever more powerful computers and
statistical tools, data protection came to the forefront of policymakers’ minds around the
globe. Today, we understand that explicit and informed consent is essential. But it is
not trivial to inform and be informed when there are so many unknowable consequences.
In a field experiment with Alexandra Avdeenko, discussed in chapter 5, we study ap-
proaches to improve the informed consent process. This study is registered at the AEA
RCT registry under AEARCTR-0006829 (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6829-1.0). Along-
side a large survey data collection in rural Pakistan, we experimentally test to augment
the standard approach to obtaining informed consent. Usually, information about the
purpose, use, and storage of survey data and the rights of the participants is presented as
a text. This text is read by potential survey participants or read out by the interviewer
if the potential participant is illiterate. We augment this process in two ways: The first
approach shows the potential study participants a video that illustrates how their data is
used if they consent to participate in the interview. In addition to the video, the second
approach makes the standard process interactive. Instead of only reading the informa-
tion, the potential participant is asked questions about the information. Depending on
her answers, relevant information might be repeated. We study the effects of these two
augmentations on the consent rate, the informedness of the respondents, and measures of
data quality. We find that the second approach successfully increased the understanding
that participation is voluntary according to our objective measure. However, it decreased
overall understanding as subjectively reported across several aspects. Given that the sub-
jectively reported understanding is very high and unrelated to our objective measures, it
is unclear whether this is a worsening or an improvement. Further, we find that neither
approach affects the consent rate, and we find no effects on item non-response rates, alle-
viating concerns that such approaches might reduce data quality or the representativeness
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of the survey.
The remainder of my dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides back-
ground for the RCT conducted in Zambia and related data collections. It further outlines
the main empirical strategy for the analysis of the RCT reported in chapters 2 and 3.
The next four chapters describe one of the studies mentioned above in detail. In a final
chapter, I briefly reflect on these studies from a wider perspective.
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CHAPTER 1
An RCT In RuRAL ZAmBIA
BACKgROunD FOR CHAPTERS 2 TO 4
In chapters 2, 3, and 4, we study savings groups affiliated with four different NGOs
operating in seven districts in the Northern, Western, and Eastern Province of Zambia
(see Figure 1.1). We conducted a baseline survey on 534 savings groups that were active
at the time and formed at least one year earlier. After an assessment for eligibility, we
excluded 12 savings groups from NGO 3 as they were already benefiting from a different
program, leaving a total of 522 savings groups included in the studies.1
Savings groups are commonly distinguished by whether they distribute savings on
a rotating or accumulating basis. Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)
collect member’s regular contributions in a fund and issue the entire fund to a member in
each meeting on a rotating basis (Besley et al. (1994)). In contrast, Accumulating Saving
and Credit Associations (ASCAs) accumulate member’s regular savings and generated
interest from loans and distribute the fund to its members after a previously defined
period (Bouman (1995)). The savings groups studied in chapters 2, 3, and 4 are predom-
inantly one of three types of accumulating savings groups: Village Saving and Lending
Associations (VSLA), Saving and Internal Lending Communities (SILC), and Self-Help
Groups. While similar, there are differences regarding meeting modalities, administration
and saving, and lending activities.
Table 1.1 gives an overview of some characteristics of the savings groups and their
members. We can see that the members are predominantly women with an average
age of 46 years. The average household size is 5.7. On average, their monthly savings
contribution is 96 ZMW, and the monthly contribution to the social fund is about 5.6
ZMW. There is considerable variation across NGOs. For NGO 1, the averages are 99 and
4.9 ZMW, for NGO 2 91 and 3.1, for NGO 3 84 and 2.7 ZMW, and for NGO 4 101 and
8.8 ZMW for monthly savings and social fund contributions respectively. Most groups
meet once a week or once a month, while some meet every other week. The savings are
1Note that as only 74 savings groups were affiliated with NGO 2, too few for the planned cross-
randomization, these savings groups are excluded from the study presented in chapter 3, leaving 448
savings groups from three NGOs included in that study.
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Figure 1.1: Operating districts of implementing partners in Zambia.
primarily either mainly stored in a box or lend out to the members; almost no group in
the sample reportedly used a bank account for storage at baseline. Note that there are
remarkable differences across NGOs. Savings groups affiliated with NGOs 1 and 4 mostly
meet every week, whereas saving groups affiliated with NGOs 2 and 3 almost exclusively
meet once per month. Nearly all groups reportedly use a box to store their savings at
baseline for NGOs 1 and 2, a majority for NGO 3, and about half of those savings groups
affiliated with NGO 4. In contrast, almost all savings groups affiliated with NGOs 3 and
4 loan out their savings to members. A majority of those affiliated with NGO 2 do the
same, while only a few savings groups affiliated with NGO 1 do. Also, about half of
savings groups affiliated with NGO 4 are active in urban areas, whereas only a few are
for NGO 2 and almost none for NGOs 1 and 3.
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Table 1.1: Savings group and member characteristics
All NGO1 NGO2 NGO3 NGO4
mean sd mean mean mean mean
Village level baseline variables
Number of participating SGs in village 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.7
Urban or rural: Urban .2 .4 .02 .14 0 .53
Urban or rural: Rural > 250 .52 .5 .63 .6 .59 .35
Urban or rural: Rural <250 .28 .45 .35 .26 .41 .12
Mean score of additive food security index 1.2 .81 1.2 .94 1.1 1.5
Mean number of months with food scarcity across HHs 1.5 .82 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.9
Savings group level baseline variables
Meeting frequency: weekly .52 .5 .88 .013 0 .71
Meeting frequency: every two weeks .033 .18 .02 0 0 .074
Meeting frequency: monthly .45 .5 .1 .99 1 .21
Group uses box to store savings .74 .44 1 .95 .72 .46
Group loan outs savings as storage .68 .47 .1 .64 1 .96
Group uses bank account to store savings .048 .21 .02 .23 .0093 .021
Household level endline variables
Number of household members 5.7 2.2 5.4 5.3 5.8 5.9
Member level endline variables
Respondent is female .8 .4 .73 .73 .77 .89
Age of respondent 46 12 45 51 45 44
Relation to household head: Household head .43 .5 .43 .54 .41 .41
Respondent is married .73 .44 .8 .71 .8 .66
Member level baseline variables
Used mobile money in last 3 months .32 .47 .24 .45 .37 .31
Trust in financial institutions .49 .5 .56 .51 .47 .44
Measure of risk aversion 2.6 1.4 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6
Locus of control (average of z-values) .0042 .72 .046 -.08 .05 -.02
Monthly savings contribution to group 96 128 99 91 84 101
Value of current savings 702 1098 868 736 638 661
Monthly contribution to SF in ZMW (winsorized) 5.6 7.2 4.9 3.1 2.7 8.8
Notes. The table shows characteristics and outcomes at baseline of savings groups and members overall and by
NGO affiliation. Column (1) shows the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Columns (2)-(5)
display the means for each of the different NGOs. Variables that refer to values are in ZMW and winsorized at
the 1% and 99% quantile.
1.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The overall intervention is composed of three parts: (a.) general training, (b.) the linkage
intervention, and (c.) the social fund intervention. All groups in the study were offered
general financial literacy training. The goal of the general training was to enhance the
capacity of savings groups through financial education. Despite operating for many years,
savings groups face challenges following their principles. Therefore, the implementing
partners assessed the needs of the savings groups and trained them accordingly, e.g., in
record-keeping, member screening, interest rate calculation, and annual planning.
In addition to this general training, the two other interventions were cross-randomized
to be studied. The linkage intervention, discussed in chapter 2, had the goal of facilitating
the linkage between groups and financial service providers. The social fund intervention,
discussed in chapter 3, aimed at strengthening the groups’ informal insurance mechanism,
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the social fund.
The 522 savings groups were randomized separately according to their NGO affiliation.
We defined clusters of savings groups in proximity to avoid spill-over effects, resulting
in 351 randomization clusters. Most clusters consist of one savings group, but others
comprise up to 14 savings groups. For each NGO, the affiliated clusters were assigned to
one of the treatment arms offered by that NGO.2 To ensure balance across the treatment
arms, a re-randomization procedure was conducted: The savings group clusters were
randomized repeatedly until a pre-specified degree of balance of 26 variables was reached.
Table 1.2: Design: Cross-randomization within NGOs.
Control Linkage Social fund Both Total
NGO 1 35 35 52 30 152
NGO 2 30 44 - - 74
NGO 3 20 30 30 27 107
NGO 4 55 40 42 52 189
Total 140 149 124 109 522
The table shows the number of savings groups assigned to
each of the treatment arms by NGO affiliation. Note that the
number of groups differs across treatment arms for each NGO
due to different sizes of the randomization clusters.
Table 1.2 shows how many savings groups are affiliated with each NGO and were
assigned to each treatment arm. In terms of randomization clusters, the treatment arms
per NGO are of equal size, but the number of groups differs across treatment arms due
to varying cluster sizes.
The general training was conducted in the second half of 2017, whereas the social fund
and linkage interventions were implemented by the different NGOs at different times be-
tween the end of 2017 and mid-2018 (see Figure 1.2 for details during which period each
NGO reportedly implemented the training). To monitor the treatment implementation,
we collected attendance data. The four NGOs were supposed to keep account of atten-
dance at the training sessions. However, some NGOs did not implement attendance lists
due to negligence, while others mentioned other reasons for not providing this informa-
tion (e.g., loss of documents due to moving headquarters). Depending on the type of
training, the NGOs provided only up to 82% of lists, but often no lists are available for
the interventions. Hence it is difficult to assess fidelity with the randomization protocol.
2Due to a small number of groups, NGO 2 did not provide the social fund intervention, such that













































































Figure 1.2: Timeline of interventions and major data collections.
1.2. DATA COLLECTION
We take advantage of several data sources for the evaluation. Figure 1.2 displays the
timeline for the major data collections in relation to the interventions, for a more detailed
illustration refer to Figure A.1 in appendix A. Table 1.3 provides an overview of all data
collections, including sample sizes and types of questionnaires. A baseline survey was
conducted in June and October 2016, a midline in July 2018, and an endline in July
2019. We collected interviews with randomly selected savings group members and their
households during each of these survey waves. Further, we collected interviews with
community leaders during the baseline and representatives of the sampled savings groups
during the mid- and endline. In addition to the face-to-face interviews, we conducted
phone surveys with representatives of the savings groups in each month between April
2018 and April 2019 and in December 2019, April 2020, and November 2020.3
3While the response rates were high in December 2019 and the subsequent phone survey waves, we
reached only about half the groups in each wave of the monthly phone survey.
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Table 1.3: Number and type of collected interviews.
Savings group Adult Household Village
Baseline survey - 2,085 2,096 316
(June/July 2016) -
Midline survey 521 1,945 2,070 -
(June/July 2018) (79.1%) (83.6%) -
Endline survey 522 2,604 2,502 -
(June/July 2019) (76.4%) (72.2%) -
Monthly phone surveys
April 2018 251 - - -
May 2018 296 - - -
June 2018 274 - - -
July 2018 319 - - -
August 2018 296 - - -
September 2018 308 - - -
October 2018 352 - - -
November 2018 259 - - -
December 2018 259 - - -
January 2019 272 - - -
February 2019 270 - - -
March 2019 294 - - -
April 2019 284 - - -
May 2019 292 - - -
Phone surveys
December 2019 506 - - -
April 2020 515 - - -
November 2020 505 - - -
Notes. The table shows the sample size of each type of survey questionnaire.
Note that during the baseline survey, no savings group were interviewed, but
interviews with village leaders were conducted. During the phone survey, we
only called representatives of the savings groups to ask about the group’s activity.
The sample size for the savings groups refers to the number of savings groups
reached, regardless of whether they were active, on pause, or dissolved. While
we tried to interview the same savings group members and households, this was
not always possible; the number in brackets refers to the attrition rate relative
to the baseline. Additional households were sampled in both mid- and endline.
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1.3. ESTIMATION STRATEGIES.
Our main specification is a regression of the following form:
Yi = α + βDi + γXi + δNGOi + ϵi
where Yi is the outcome of interest, Di an indicator for treatment assignment, Xi are
covariates which may include outcomes measured at baseline, NGOi refers to NGO fixed
effects which in our context are also stratification dummies. The latter is excluded in the
case of estimations for specific NGOs. The standard errors ϵi are clustered at the level
of the randomization cluster.4 The reported parameter is the estimate of the average
intention-to-treat effect β̂.
Note that we do not fully saturate the model with respect to the treatment arms.
If not mentioned otherwise, in chapter 2, the treatment group refers to the treatment
arms which were assigned to the linkage intervention (”Linkage” and ”Both” in Table
1.2), while the control group refers to the remaining treatment arms (”Control” and
”Social fund” in Table 1.2). Whereas in chapter 3, the treatment group refers to the
treatment arms which were assigned to the social fund intervention (”Social fund” and
”Both” in Table 1.2), while the control group refers to the remaining treatment arms
(”Control” and ”Linkage” in Table 1.2). This is a valid approach as the two interventions
are, by construction, independently assigned. Since the two interventions target different
aspects and have different goals, we would not expect effects of one intervention on
outcomes targeted by the other. Further, we do not expect the interventions to have
complementary effects. We nevertheless conducted robustness checks including dummies
for all treatment arms. We concluded that our findings are robust with respect to this
specification and thus omitted this analysis from the discussion for brevity.
For the main estimation results, we either include no additional covariates or the
covariates Xi are selected using a LASSO procedure, taking into account potential unbal-
ance at baseline and selecting predictive covariates to increase power. Note that generally
few if any covariates are selected. The reported standard errors are adjusted for this type
of model selection (see Chernozhukov et al. (2015)). All variables used in the randomiza-
tion and savings group characteristics are included in this procedure for all estimations.
Household characteristics are included for estimations on the household and group mem-
ber level, and group member characteristics for estimations on the group member level
4Randomization units range in size from 1 to 14, with a majority consisting of a single group. We
also conducted the analysis on the level of randomization. For this, we replaced the variables Yit with
the randomization unit means.
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(for details see Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A.) 5
Throughout chapters 2 and 3 we make use of indices to analyze the interventions
effect on a set of related outcomes. We construct indices for types of outcomes to reduce
the number of hypothesis tests and thus avoid spurious findings. Our approach follows






Ỹji with Ỹji =
Yji − Ȳj0
sYj0
where Yi is the index, Ỹji the standardized value of related outcome Yji, Ȳj0 and sj0 are
the control group’s mean and standard deviation of Yji respectively, ni is the number of
non-missing standardized outcomes Ỹji for observation i.
Each index is the mean of related outcomes standardized to the control group such
that the control group mean and variance for each index are normalized to about 0 and
1, respectively. Thus the coefficient can be interpreted as a change in terms of standard
deviations. This approach increases power and is valid if the outcomes the indices are
based on are assumed to be affected in the same direction.6
5This is implemented using the pdslasso command in Stata.
6One pitfall when using indices can be if there are substitution effects. E.g., assume that the treatment
increases income which the household invests in animals and imagine the household would buy a chicken
and a pig if they are not treated, with the chicken being considered inferior to the pig, but can afford two
pigs (but no chicken) in case they are treated. In this hypothetical scenario there is a treatment effect,
but we would no find any effect based on the index. We therefore provide more details on the outcomes
the indices are based on in the respective appendices to confirm that such effects are not masqueraded
by the presented analysis based on indices.
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CHAPTER 2
LInKIng SAVIngS gROuPS TO BAnKS
WITH MARKuS FRÖLICH AnD P. LInH NguYEn
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Saving and investing is commonly believed to be a vehicle that helps households to get
out of poverty. At the same time, we observe low rates of financial inclusion among
the poor (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2012)). Evidence, however, suggests that the
poor under-save and have a substantial potential demand for financial instruments. This
observation might be explained by barriers to efficient adoption and effective usage of
financial instruments such as transaction costs, lack of trust and regulatory barriers, in-
formation and knowledge gaps, social constraints, and behavioral biases (Karlan et al.
(2014)). Therefore, increasing financial inclusion by offering or improving saving technolo-
gies is a widely implemented and tested approach for poverty alleviation. One crucial
question in this context is the role of formal compared to informal savings technologies.
Our work studies the potential for and of formal financial inclusion in the context
of savings groups in rural Zambia. First, we ask whether these savings groups or their
members can be formally included by linking them to formal financial institutions. And
second, we study the consequences of such a formal inclusion on economic activity and
household welfare.
There is extensive literature on the consequences of both formal and informal financial
inclusion of the poor in developing countries. While there are many studies investigating
barriers to uptake and benefits of formal financial services (see Dupas et al. (2018) for
a recent overview), the evidence is generally mixed, and findings seem highly context-
dependent. Our first contribution is to provide experimental evidence for a new context
regarding both the target population and country. To our knowledge, we are the first to
study this type of intervention in Zambia. While Jamison et al. (2014) already studied
a similar intervention in the context of groups, we are the first to investigate it in the
context of savings groups.
Our context is of particular interest as it highlights the distinction between formal
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and informal financial inclusion. The target population of our intervention is savings
groups which in themselves are informal vehicles of financial inclusion. Thus the second
contribution of our study is the focus on potential benefits of formal beyond other types
of financial inclusion.
In addition to analyzing intermediate outcomes on savings and lending activity, we
further investigate broader welfare outcomes and study effects over a longer time frame
than many previous experimental studies.
Further, savings groups in themselves have been subject to both a theoretical (e.g.,
Besley et al. (1994)) and an emerging empirical literature (e.g., Beaman et al. (2014),
Brunie et al. (2014), Ksoll et al. (2016), Karlan et al. (2017)) studying the workings
and benefits of such savings groups across the developing world. Given how widespread
savings groups are and the evidence that speaks to their benefits, studies started to
investigate specific features of these groups, e.g., Burlando and Canidio (2017) who study
how group composition matters. Our analysis also contributes to this literature in that
it investigates linking savings groups with formal financial service providers.
To answer our research questions, we implemented a randomized control trial. We
randomly assigned savings groups to receive what we call a linkage intervention. The
particulars of this intervention varied across four implementing partners, but the overall
goal was to facilitate linkage between the groups and formal financial service providers.
One example would be that a representative of a financial service provider visits the
savings groups, informs them about their products, and helps with the registration. The
experiment was an encouragement design, i.e., financial services such as bank accounts
were not offered directly or for free. Therefore we can only study the linkage intervention
directly and formal inclusion only indirectly as the likely mechanism of this intervention
on downstream outcomes. Since encouraging the uptake of financial services usually
goes hand in hand with increasing financial literacy, we tried to isolate formal inclusion
from financial literacy by assigning all the groups, including the control group, to receive
general financial literacy training.
In line with previous experimental studies on formal financial inclusion, we find (i) it
can be difficult to link savings groups to financial service providers, (ii) the effect of such
a financial inclusion is limited in terms of savings and lending activity, and (iii) there are
no effects on welfare-related outcomes.
We find that the intervention successfully increased the share of groups that open
a bank account by approximately doubling it from 15% and the share of groups that
actively use these accounts from 4.6% by 9 percentage points in the mid-term. We
further find that the effect on active usage dissipates in the long run. These effects are
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highly heterogeneous across NGOs, and we only find positive effects for two of the four
implementing partners. While these effects might be considered small in absolute terms,
i.e., far from linking a majority of savings groups, they are large in relative terms, in line
with what we would expect from related studies in many of which accounts are offered
for free or are substantially subsidized.
We do not find effects of the intervention on savings or lending activities, which might
not come as a surprise, given the limited results on active use of bank accounts, the most
plausible channel through which the intervention might affect these activities. While we
find negligible point estimates, the variance of all the various measures is too large to
conclude that there are no meaningful effects.
Given that we do not find effects on savings or lending activity, we expect to find
no effects on welfare-related outcomes. This is indeed the case, and we find that the
intervention has no meaningful effects on welfare-related outcomes as measured by our
survey instruments.
The remainder of this chapter is structured in three parts. Section 2 provides further
information on the background and intervention of the study. In section 3, we present the
analysis structured by types of outcomes alongside the theory of change. Finally, section
4 briefly concludes.
2.2. BACKGROUND AND INTERVENTION
While the Zambian financial sector has shown moderate development over the past decade,
lack of consumer awareness, low-cost products, and financial literacy keeps financial in-
clusion at low levels: 48.7% of the rural farming population is not financially included
(FSD (2015)). Savings groups could potentially be a vehicle that could help to increase
access to formal financial services.
From our baseline survey we get that less than 5% of savings group members have
any savings at a formal bank, reflecting low levels of formal financial inclusion in rural
Zambia. While including savings group members directly in the formal financial system
is challenging, it might be more feasible to include savings groups as a whole. The group
mechanism might surmount barriers for individuals to open an account. According to
FSD (2015), the most indicated reason for neglecting bank services is insufficient money
to justify using a bank. Opening an account as a savings group instead of individual
accounts could overcome this threshold.
The linkage intervention had the goal of linking the groups to formal financial service
providers by opening and using bank or mobile money accounts to deposit their savings.
Storing their savings at formal financial service providers could improve their safety and
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provide a commitment to save, leading to increased savings or investment activity by the
members. In the long term, this could further increase access to credit through formal
financial institutions.
While the overall concept was similar, there were substantial differences in implemen-
tation between the four NGOs. In addition to informational meetings conducted by all
NGOs, NGO 3 provided bank account opening forms and technical support. At the same
time, implementers of NGO 1 accompanied groups to registration offices and banks to
support the process pro-actively. NGO 4 decided to partner with and focus solely on
mobile money providers. But since these providers did not offer group accounts, the in-
tervention focused on individuals - breaking with the intervention’s design. As shown in
Figure 1.2, the linkage intervention was implemented by the different NGOs at different
times between the end of 2017 and mid-2018. Further note that while the implementation
differed across NGOs, their operating districts differ as well (see Figure 1.1). In addition,
the type of group also varies as the different NGOs established, trained, and supported
different concepts of savings groups (compare Table 1.1). So we want to keep in mind
that these highly correlated factors might also explain any difference in effect according
to NGO affiliation.
Based on monitoring data, we know of at least three groups that attended the linkage-
related training but were not assigned to the linkage intervention. Note that this number
reflects a lower bound. According to reports by the four NGOs, they implemented the
training following the agreed guidelines with a few exceptions, e.g., when savings groups
came uninvited to training sessions, and the field officer could not reject them.
2.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the analysis of the linkage intervention. We start with assessing
the balance of covariates between the linkage treatment group and the control group
followed by the analysis of outcomes ordered according to a theory of change. As first
set of outcomes, we discuss whether the intervention achieved its direct goal of creating
linkage between savings groups and formal financial institutions. We continue with trust
outcomes which can both affect and be affected by such a linkage. This is followed by
the analysis of savings and lending activity. Linkage is a purpose not in and of itself,
but only matters as far as it affects savings or other behavior. Finally, we investigate the
impact on welfare-related outcomes as the ultimate goal of the intervention.
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2.3.1. Balance
Table 2.1 shows t-tests between treatment and control group of selected characteristics
and outcomes measured at baseline to assess balance.1 While all differences are small,
the treatment savings group are statistically significantly less likely to have used a bank
account at baseline (3 percentage points), and respondents in the treatment group are
less likely to be female at endline (4 percentage points).
Table 2.1: Savings group and member characteristics
Control Treatment
mean sd mean sd β
Village level baseline variables
Number of participating SGs in village 1.5 1.89 1.5 1.34 -0.018
Urban or rural: Urban .21 0.41 .19 0.39 -0.014
Urban or rural: Rural > 250 .53 0.50 .51 0.50 -0.028
Urban or rural: Rural <250 .25 0.44 .3 0.46 0.042
Savings group level baseline variables
Meeting frequency: weekly .57 0.50 .46 0.50 -0.036
Meeting frequency: every two weeks .034 0.18 .031 0.17 -0.001
Meeting frequency: monthly .39 0.49 .51 0.50 0.037
Group uses box to store savings .73 0.45 .75 0.43 0.026
Group loan outs savings as storage .66 0.48 .7 0.46 -0.013
Group uses bank account to store savings .057 0.23 .039 0.19 -0.031*
Household level endline variables
Number of household members 5.6 2.22 5.7 2.19 0.089
Member level endline variables
Respondent is female .82 0.39 .78 0.42 -0.039**
Age of respondent 46 12.52 46 12.29 -0.507
Relation to household head: Household head .41 0.49 .45 0.50 0.035
Respondent is married .73 0.44 .74 0.44 0.009
Member level baseline variables
Used mobile money in last 3 months .32 0.47 .32 0.47 -0.013
Trust in financial institutions .49 0.50 .49 0.50 0.004
Monthly savings contribution to group 98 132.00 93 123.12 -3.626
Value of current savings 697 1058.25 708 1136.98 21.109
Notes. The table shows characteristics and outcomes at baseline of savings groups and members by treatment
status. Columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) show the mean and standard deviation for the control and treatment group.
Column (5) informs about balance by displaying the coefficient β from the regression Xi = α + βDi + δNGOi,
where Xi is the respective variable, Di treatment assignment, and NGOi refer to NGO dummies. Significance
of a t-test for β = 0 is referenced by + : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01. Variables that refer to values are
in ZMW and winsorized at the 1% and 99% quantile.
1Note that we conducted these t-tests for 19 additional variables for none of which we found statis-
tically significant differences and which are excluded for brevity.
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2.3.2. Linkage
The first thing we want to analyze is whether or not the linkage intervention successfully
linked the savings groups to formal financial service providers, i.e., whether or not the
groups opened bank accounts and used them. It is essential to distinguish in our analysis
the active usage from the opening of bank accounts (Karlan et al. (2014)). This analysis
is based on reported data, and as such, some issues need to be discussed.
We want to be careful with self-reported data as the group’s spokesperson might say
they opened a bank account, even if they did not. This can be especially problematic
when the intervention encouraged opening a bank account. Hence, to avoid experimenter
demand effects, we only ask about bank accounts indirectly.2 Respondents are asked
about all places their groups used as storage for savings in the past, instead of asking
about specific locations. But interviewers are supposed to probe for whether there are
multiple locations. Only if the respondent mentions a bank account in her answer to this
question, further and more detailed questions about the bank account are asked.
During the high-frequency survey (before the endline survey), this question was often
reportedly understood to mean where the group stored their money between the current
and last meeting. Thus this question might be more indicative of active bank account
use compared to having opened and ever used a bank account. If we look at the share
of active bank accounts of all bank accounts reported within a given survey wave, we
can see that more than 40% are reported to be in active use.3 At the same time, less
than 25% of all groups that reportedly used a bank account in any of the survey waves
use them actively in a given survey.4 This suggests that bank accounts are more likely
to be reported when they are actively used, which explains why we need to consider the
information from several survey waves to construct the outcome of ever using a bank
account, as probing techniques were not sufficient to collect this information.5
2During the monthly phone surveys, enumerators reported that respondents asked whether they
should use a bank account after being asked about it. This might indicate that directly asking about
bank accounts might already be a form of treatment, which would be undesirable from the researcher’s
perspective.
3Active use is defined as reportedly using the account monthly or more frequently.
4Note that this holds for midline, endline, and the phone survey waves in December 2019 and April
2020. In November 2020, we changed the survey instrument to account for this issue, and 33% of groups
to ever report a bank account reported active usage in this wave.
5This also has implications for empirical researchers in general, who rely on reported data subject to
recollection bias. High-frequency surveys inquiring about key variables might be an important tool to
alleviate issues of recollection bias.
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Opening of bank accounts. To account for the issues mentioned above when analyzing
the opening of bank accounts, we combine several data sources: The mid- and endline
surveys, the monthly phone survey in between, and the phone surveys after the endline.
If a respondent mentions a bank account as described above and further can give an
approximate date of when the account was opened, the group is considered to have
opened a bank account. In most cases, the bank account is mentioned several times, but
it is mentioned only once in a significant share. This might not be surprising, as there
was a year between the mid- and endline, during which the groups could have opened an
account, the respondent might have joined the group, or forgot these details. Further, the
high-frequency phone survey only had a low response rate in each given month (see Table
1.3), such that requirements such as several mentions might be too strict.6 From the
information about opening dates, we construct a dummy for whether the group reported
using a bank account that was opened during or before a given month for each month
since the baseline survey.7 This means if the group reported using a bank account which
was opened in November 2017, the indicator is 1 for November 2017 and all months that
follow and 0 for all months before. We then ran the following regression model to get








where T refers to the month since the baseline in July 2016, Di is a treatment indicator,
δi are savings group fixed effects. The index i refers to savings groups, and the standard
errors are clustered at the level of the randomization unit. Months T include each month
up to 3 years after the baseline, after which all dates are accumulated. β̂T can be inter-
preted as an estimate of the average ITT effect for a given month T and is the reported
estimate in the discussion that follows.
Figure 2.1 displays the raw information for treatment and control group separately
(Subfigure 2.1a) as well as the estimated β̂T (Subfigure 2.1b). The X-axis displays months
since the baseline survey. On the Y-axis, we have the share of groups that had opened
an account that was reportedly used and the treatment effect, respectively. The gray
shaded area around the point-estimates on the right respond to 95% confidence inter-
vals. We can see that the treatment was effective in the sense that groups opened bank
accounts after the treatment. We can see significant estimates from around November
6We conducted robustness checks considering only accounts that where mentioned at least twice with
similar findings.
7Note that the reported dates are sometimes imprecise, i.e. only the year is given, in which case July
is assumed. Further, sometimes the dates given across survey waves are contradictory. In these cases, as
a default, the oldest date was used if there were no good reasons against it.
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Figure 2.1: Opening of bank accounts
(a) Raw shares by treatment (b) Effect on likelihood
and December 2017 onwards, when NGO 1 implemented the linkage intervention. After
this, the treatment effect slowly but steadily rises from around 5 to 15 percentage points.
This implies that even up to 2 years after the intervention, the control group did not
catch up in opening bank accounts. The share of groups that opened an account in the
control group rises from less than 5% to about 15% over the three years, and thus the
intervention doubled the share of groups that opened a bank account. Note, however,
that this graph does not represent the use of bank accounts but only whether they opened
a bank account they ever reportedly used (remember that Yit ≥ Yis ∀ t ≥ s).
As already mentioned, the effect took off after NGO 1 started implementing the
intervention, so next, we will look at the effect over time for each NGO separately.
If we take a look at each of the NGOs (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3), we can see that the
effect of the intervention was mainly driven by NGO 1 (Subfigure 2.2b) and that there was
no effect for NGO 4 (Subfigure 2.3d).8 We can further see an effect for NGO 2 (Subfigure
2.2d) which is only realized slowly compared to the exemplary development for NGO 1.
The effect of the intervention by NGO 1 is estimated at around 30-35 percentage points
and was fully realized around the time of their intervention (from a control group mean
of around 10%). For NGO 2, the effect looks to be slowly increasing when they started
the linkage intervention. However, it took one and a half years to reach an estimated
effect of around 35-40 percentage points (compared to around 35% in the control group).
For NGO 3, we cannot detect a statistically significant effect, and the point estimates
are only at about 5-10 percentage points during the time of the intervention, after which
they taper off (Subfigure 2.3b). For NGO 4, we find no effect at all. The lack of an
effect for NGO 4 is expected since their implementation of the intervention focused solely
8While all NGOs drive the overall effect except NGO 4, NGO 1 and 2 have the largest effects, but
twice as many savings groups are affiliated with NGO 1 compared to NGO 2.
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Figure 2.2: Opening of bank accounts: NGO 1 and 2
(a) Raw shares by treatment: NGO 1 (b) Effect on likelihood: NGO 1
(c) Raw shares by treatment: NGO 2 (d) Effect on likelihood: NGO 2
on mobile money rather than bank accounts.9 Note that while these differences across
NGOs might be attributed to the differences in implementation, we have to keep in mind
that some group characteristics are highly correlated with NGO affiliation. E.g., both
successful NGOs operate only in the Northern province, whereas the other NGOs operate
in different provinces.
To put the effect sizes in perspective, we first look at studies that offered free bank ac-
counts. Take-up for free bank accounts was 69%, 54%, and 17% for unbanked individuals
in Malawi, Uganda, and Chile respectively (Dupas et al. (2018)), 87% for entrepreneurs
in Kenya (Dupas and Robinson (2013a)), 69% for households in Kenya (Dupas et al.
(2017)), 23% for unbanked individuals in the Philippines (Karlan and Zinman (2018)),
53% for MFI members in Chile (Kast and Pomeranz (2014)) and 85% for female house-
hold heads in Nepal (Prina (2015)). In a study in which crop proceeds were deposited
directly into the bank account, Brune et al. (2016) find a take-up of 20% for farmers in
9We discuss the use of mobile money later, but the intervention was unsuccessful for mobile money
uptake as there were no mobile money accounts available for groups.
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Figure 2.3: Opening of bank accounts: NGO 3 and 4
(a) Raw shares by treatment: NGO 3 (b) Effect on likelihood: NGO 3
(c) Raw shares by treatment: NGO 4 (d) Effect on likelihood: NGO 4
Malawi. While these studies all refer to bank accounts for individuals, Jamison et al.
(2014) find a take-up rate of 66% for group accounts offered to youth clubs in Uganda.
Considering studies that did not offer free accounts directly, bank account opening
rates are naturally lower. For accounts that are only subsidized, Cole et al. (2011) find a
take-up rate of 9% for unbanked individuals in Indonesia. Flory (2016) finds that sending
bank account promoters to villages increases account opening rates by 2 percentage points
among farmers in Malawi. Lee et al. (2017) find an increase in bank account opening of
10-20 percentage points due to promotion to high school youth in Ghana.
In light of the literature, the effect sizes of 30-40 percentage points of the successful
implementation partners (NGOs 1 and 2) are comparably large. They fall short of take-up
rates of free accounts but are considerably higher than other studies that only promote
bank accounts. However, most of these reference studies are based on administrative
data, whereas our results are based on reported data with the risk of misreporting. On
the other hand, accounts are likely only reported if they were ever used, whereas the
above numbers refer to account openings, regardless of whether any deposit was made.
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In the study by Dupas and Robinson (2013a) for example, only 60% of entrepreneurs in
Kenya made any deposit in their account.
Active use of bank accounts. Next, we have a look at the active use of bank accounts.
This analysis relies on the mid- and endline surveys and the phone surveys after the
endline. The monthly phone survey reached too few groups in each wave to allow for a
proper analysis. We define active use as reportedly using the account at least monthly
for deposits, withdrawals, or transfers.10 The analysis of active bank account use is
summarized in Table 2.2.
We can see from Table 2.2 that the intervention was not only successful in increasing
the share of groups to open a bank account for storage but also in increasing the share of
groups that actively use these accounts. Naturally, the effect on active use is smaller at
9 percentage points at midline, which then drops to about 5 percentage points in April
2020, after which we do no longer find a treatment effect. While these effect sizes seem
small in absolute terms, they are significant in terms of percentage of the control group
mean, which is about 5% for all survey waves until April 2020, i.e., active usage more
than doubles. This effect size seems to be stable over two years, suggesting sustained
long-term effects of the intervention for active bank account use. Note that while the
treatment effect vanished in November 2020, this is accompanied by an increase in the
control group mean, thus suggesting that the control group caught up rather than the
treatment group falling back to initial levels.11 However, upon closer inspection, the
effect seems to be less stable and to dissipate earlier. Only about one-third of the groups
that reported actively using a bank account in any of the five survey waves also reported
actively using it in a specific wave.12 Across the five waves reported in Table 2.2, 125
groups reported using the bank account actively. Still, only 28 groups did so in all of
the waves after they first reported actively using an account.13 If we take a look at each
NGO separately, we find that the effect is mainly driven by NGO 1, the only NGO for
which we find significant effects in three of the four survey waves for which we find an
effect overall. The point estimates of the effect size for groups affiliated with NGO 1 is
10Irregular usage, despite potentially being more frequent than monthly usage, is coded as inactive
usage. The findings are robust with respect to this coding. Further note that while active use can mean
deposits, withdrawals, or transfers, it usually corresponds to deposits.
11Given initiatives such as the Rural Financial Expansion Programme in Zambia and potential
spillover effects across groups, it might not be surprising that more and more savings groups in the
control group open and use bank accounts.
12Again, this differs for November 2020 with a share of 45%.
13These numbers only refer to active groups (gave an interview) at the time of a specific survey wave.
E.g., if a group reports actively using the bank account in mid-, endline, the December 2019, and April
2020 phone survey but was inactive in the November 2020 wave, it is considered using it actively in all
survey waves.
23
declining over time, from 31 percentage points in the midline to 16 percentage points
in the phone survey in December 2019, becoming insignificant and small after that. On
the other hand, as with the opening of bank accounts, the estimated effect for NGO 2
affiliated groups is varying over time. Though not being significant, it is large in April
2020. These opposing trends between NGO 1 and 2 can explain why the overall effect
seems to be stable even in April 2020. For both NGOs 3 and 4, we don’t find any effects,
and the point estimates are close to zero, consistent with what we saw for the opening of
bank accounts.
Again we can compare this effect size to other studies, which find effect sizes on active
use of 10, 17, and 3 percentage points for unbanked individuals in Malawi, Uganda, and
Chile respectively (Dupas et al. (2018)), 17 percentage points for entrepreneurs in Kenya
(Dupas and Robinson (2013a)), 15 percentage points for households in Kenya (Dupas et al.
(2017)), 8 percentage points for MFI members in Chile (Kast and Pomeranz (2014)), and
80 percentage points for female household heads in Nepal (Prina (2015)). These studies
are based on administrative data and define active usage by the number of deposits made
(4 or more for most of these studies), so it is difficult to compare these numbers directly.
However, we can see that while bank account take-up rates are high, usage rates are
comparably low in these studies. In our study, the discrepancy between opening and
usage is smaller both in absolute and relative terms, as one would expect considering
that the groups were not offered free accounts. Nevertheless, we also find that the groups
stop using the accounts actively over time. When we asked the groups, which reported
using an account in the past, why they stopped using it, they mention reasons such as
high fees (48%), high minimum balance on the account (38%), distance to the bank (11%),
or that the group would not get a loan (8%). Brune et al. (2016) also report distance
and Dupas et al. (2018) high fees as reported reasons for low uptake and usage of bank
accounts.
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Table 2.2: Active bank account use
Midline Endline Phone surveys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
July 2018 July 2019 December 2019 April 2020 November 2020
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
All NGOs
Linkage treatment 0.091∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.046+ 0.047∗ 0.0053
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.032)
Control group mean 0.046 0.042 0.059 0.043 0.12
Observations 518 519 463 459 455
NGO 1
Linkage treatment 0.31∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.16∗ 0.038 0.033
(0.076) (0.065) (0.071) (0.039) (0.059)
Control group mean 0.058 0 0.026 0.038 0.066
Observations 149 150 128 139 128
NGO 2
Linkage treatment -0.15 0.24+ -0.0072 0.21 -0.091
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13)
Control group mean 0.20 0.23 0.32 0.18 0.33
Observations 75 75 65 70 68
NGO 3
Linkage treatment -0.0025 -0.067+ -0.043 -0.023 -0.020
(0.026) (0.034) (0.030) (0.023) (0.090)
Control group mean 0.020 0.060 0.043 0.023 0.26
Observations 107 107 97 93 98
NGO 4
Linkage treatment 0.011 0.00057 -0.0098 -0.013 -0.024
(0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.023)
Control group mean 0 0.010 0.022 0.013 0.024
Observations 187 187 173 157 161
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcome in all estimations is active use of bank account. Active use is defined as report-
edly using the bank account monthly of more frequently for deposits, withdrawals, or transfers.
Different columns refer to different survey waves. For the phone surveys, only groups that were
active at the time of the survey, or in the months just before, are included. Upper panel includes
one estimation for the whole sample, lower panel includes four estimations, one for each NGO.
Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata. The included covariates can be found in
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A. For estimations on the whole sample, NGO fixed effects
are always included, but excluded for NGO specific estimations.
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Opening and use of mobile money accounts. Popular in many SSA countries, mobile
money could be another way to link savings groups with formal financial services. One of
the NGOs even focused its efforts on mobile money providers. However, these providers
did not offer mobile money accounts suitable for groups, such that individual accounts
would have to be used. In total, across all survey waves, only 16 groups reported having
used mobile money to store the group’s savings, and only two were categorized as actively
using the account. We, therefore, omit any analysis and conclude that the intervention
was not effective in promoting the use of mobile money by savings groups. One might
think that the approach by NGO 4 might have convinced some of the group members
to used mobile money. But we do not find positive effects on the usage of or knowledge
about mobile money of group members for the whole sample or NGO 4 (see Table B.2 in
appendix B). If anything, the treatment might have reduced the likelihood that a group
member reportedly used mobile money previous to the survey. We can further see that
mobile money was relatively widespread, with about 50% of respondents having used it
before and about 30% having used it in the last three months before the survey in the
control group. We also see an increase of about 5% between the mid- and endline of
both measures. This is consistent with findings that mobile money is mainly used for
remittances and as an insurance mechanism rather than for saving (see, e.g., Jack and
Suri (2014), Batista and Vicente (2018), Alinaghi (2019), or Wieser et al. (2019)).
2.3.3. Trust in safety of savings and financial institutions
One reason to open a bank account could be that it is perceived to be a safer way to
store the group’s savings. One obstacle to open a bank account could be a lack of trust in
financial institutions (Karlan et al. (2014), Dupas et al. (2018)). Table B.3 in appendix
B reports the treatment effect on these intangibles based on reports from the mid- and
endline surveys.
There is no change in how the members reportedly trust that their savings are safe
due to the intervention. Even for members who are part of groups affiliated with NGOs
1 and 2 that were successful in terms of increasing bank account usage (see Table B.3
in appendix B). This suggests that using bank accounts as storage did not increase the
safety of funds as perceived by the group members. Note, however, that the trust in the
safety of savings is already relatively high in the control group, such that there was little
room for improvement. Further note that trust declined between mid- and endline on
average. A plausible explanation for this pattern would be that the largest perceived risk
to the savings is defaulting members. For most savings groups in our sample, the largest
share of savings is given out as loans to group members. When every time a savings
group member defaults, the trust in the safety of the savings decreases, we would expect
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to see such a decline in trust over time. We would, however, not expect that using a bank
account as storage of savings would mitigate this decline in trust.
We further see that the intervention did not increase the trust in financial institutions
of savings group members. Note that we only collected information about trust for
financial institutions the respondent has experience with. We find that reported trust in
financial institutions generally tends to be lower than in the safety of group savings. Since
trust can both increase the willingness to open an account but simultaneously might only
be built after using an account, this outcome is hard to interpret. However, the fact that
trust in financial institutions seems comparatively low and that it was not measurably
affected by the intervention might explain the limited effect of the intervention in terms
of account openings and usage. Further building trust with the savings groups does not
seem to be the primary channel through which the intervention successfully increased
bank account uptake.
2.3.4. Savings and lending activity
While the intervention was to some extent successful in linking the groups to formal
banks, financial linkage in and of itself was not the goal of this intervention. Financial
inclusion only matters if it results in increased economic activity or improved financial
conditions and ultimately in higher welfare. In the following, we thus analyze whether
the intervention translated into more savings or lending activity of the group members.
Savings activity. We first want to answer the question of whether or not the savings
group members saved more and whether the groups were able to accumulate more savings.
We construct measures of the monthly value of savings within the group and elsewhere
from the adult questionnaires.14 And from the savings group questionnaire, we construct
measures of total savings within the group. We can see from Table 2.3 that for both
questionnaires and both survey waves, reported savings have a large variance, even condi-
tional on predictive covariates. While including covariates helps to reduce the standard
errors significantly (compare columns (1) with (2) and (3) with (4) of Table 2.3), it is not
enough to find significant effects or reject economically meaningful effects.
The first outcome in Table 2.3 is the reported monthly savings contribution as reported
by the group members. The treatment effect estimate is statistically insignificant and
small in size in both mid- and endline. As an alternative measure of savings, we asked
the members about the value they received at the last share-out.15 Since the share-out
refers to their or the group’s accumulated savings plus interest, it can be affected by both
14In case we see increased savings within the groups, we might be worried about the crowd-out effects
of other savings activities.
15Note that for some groups, this can refer to the same share-out for both survey waves.
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savings and lending activity. Again the point estimates are statistically insignificant and
small in size, measured both in midline and endline. Measuring total savings and the
value of the last share-out at the group level (Table 2.3 lower panel), we also do not find
significant effects. Since we do not find effects on within-group savings activity, it comes
as no surprise that we do not find any crowd-out effects on the members’ savings in other
groups or outside any groups (third and fourth outcome in the upper panel of Table 2.3).
The lack of findings on savings activity might be expected, given the limited results on
active use of bank accounts, the most plausible channel through which the intervention
might affect the savings activity. As we have seen in section 2.3.2, there are highly
heterogeneous effects on bank account use with respect to NGO affiliation, such that we
also analyze the savings activity separately by NGO. We find a sizable negative effect
for NGO 2 for the monthly savings contributions at midline and a sizable increase for
the value of the last share-out at endline (compare Table B.4 in appendix B). For NGO
1, we find a negative effect on contributions to other savings groups. While the point
estimates on the overall sample are relatively small, the variance of the various measures
is too large to conclude that there are no meaningful effects on the savings activity of the
group members. Particularly the findings for specific NGOs suggest that the intervention
might have affected the savings activity even though we detect no clear and consistent
patterns.
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Table 2.3: Savings activity
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monthly savings contribution to group
Linkage treatment 3.63 5.96 -5.65 -6.10
(6.38) (13.2) (6.11) (11.7)
Control group mean 105.6 105.6 124.3 124.3
Value received at last share-out
Linkage treatment 25.0 28.7 43.7 56.0
(70.4) (185.3) (117.1) (186.2)
Control group mean 1414.9 1414.9 1713.3 1713.3
Monthly savings contributions to other groups
Linkage treatment 2.20 2.41 -0.73 -0.21
(2.59) (2.90) (2.58) (2.52)
Control group mean 7.59 7.59 10.5 10.5
Value of savings outside of savings groups
Linkage treatment -48.8 -28.6 -1.67 23.0
(40.5) (47.8) (34.1) (45.2)
Control group mean 244.9 244.9 217.8 217.8
Observations 1945 1945 2604 2604
Total savings in group
Linkage treatment 2589.6+ 2346.6 623.3 82.3
(1516.5) (2214.6) (2172.0) (2836.2)
Control group mean 14095.9 14095.9 15762.1 15762.1
Value of last share-out
Linkage treatment 1424.6 1296.0 1228.7 2642.2
(2909.3) (4243.7) (2098.3) (3635.1)
Control group mean 24576.9 24576.9 23524.2 23524.2
Observations 519 519 520 520
PDS LASSO Yes No Yes No
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. The upper panel is based on savings group member’s responses about their savings be-
havior in and outside the savings group. The lower panel is based on responses from a savings
group representative about the group as a whole. All outcomes are in ZMW and winsorized
at 1% and 99%. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates
can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A)) or without any covariates. NGO
fixed effects always included. Observations refer to total number of observations available not
accounting for missing values, thus actual number of observations used varies with outcome.
Missing values: Total savings is missing for 69 and 89 and the value of last share-out for 40
and 3 savings groups at mid- and endline. Monthly savings contribution to group is missing
for 81 and 30 members at mid- and endline. Monthly contributions to other groups is missing
for 30 members at endline.
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Lending activity. Even if the savings contributions are not higher, it could be that
the bank account serves as an additional commitment device, such that the savings are
spent less on temptation and more on investment goods (Dupas and Robinson (2013b)).
We thus want to analyze whether we can find a difference in the lending or investment
activity of the savings groups or their members’ households. The results of lending and
investment activities related to the savings groups are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
From the first two outcomes in Table 2.4, we can see that the members of treatment
groups do not take out more loans, neither in number nor value, compared to the control
group in both the mid- and endline (Table 2.4 columns (1) and (3)). This is also true if
we only take a look at NGOs 1 and 2, which were successful in linking some of the savings
groups with the formal financial sector (Table 2.4 columns (2) and (4)). We can infer that
there was no economically meaningful change in the number of loans taken. On average,
the members take out less than one loan at midline and about one loan at endline. In
case of an effect on the loans taken from the group, one might expect displacement effect,
for which we included outcome relating to the number of loans from other sources in
Table 2.4. Further, one might expect that if the money is less accessible to the group
when stored in a bank account, members take out more loans from other savings groups
or other sources for which we find no evidence.
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Table 2.4: Loan activity
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Number of loans from savings group
Linkage treatment 0.015 0.026 -0.0090 0.0025
(0.040) (0.067) (0.061) (0.097)
Control group mean 0.64 0.69 0.95 1.03
Value of loans from savings group
Linkage treatment -36.4 -31.8 -59.1 -26.1
(35.1) (51.5) (57.1) (54.7)
Control group mean 379.4 385.7 561.4 528.5
Number of loans from all savings groups
Linkage treatment 0.025 0.013 -0.00080 -0.0038
(0.042) (0.070) (0.061) (0.093)
Control group mean 0.68 0.74 0.97 1.05
Value of loans from all savings groups
Linkage treatment -11.6 -78.4 -38.9 -25.1
(37.5) (65.6) (60.5) (57.7)
Control group mean 413.0 422.9 585.2 543.8
Number of loans taken
Linkage treatment 0.031 -0.010 -0.016 -0.019
(0.039) (0.069) (0.063) (0.093)
Control group mean 0.74 0.79 1.03 1.07
Value of loans taken
Linkage treatment 10.3 -81.6 49.1 -37.7
(44.3) (67.3) (79.5) (60.0)
Control group mean 450.6 455.3 640.9 572.3
Observations 1945 839 2604 1120
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations reflects
maximum number not accounting for missing values. Values in ZMW and winzorized at 1% and 99%.
All outcomes refer to the last 12 months before survey. Missing values: 22 missing for value of loans at
endline and otherwise 11 or less across all NGOs.
Savings group as source of finance of household expenditures. But how do the
savings group members’ households finance their expenditures? In addition to asking
about the value of their (agricultural) investments and medical, educational, and funeral
expenses, we inquired about the different sources of financing these expenditures. In Ta-
ble 2.5 we analyze whether the treatment affected to what extend the households finance
these expenditures through their savings group activity. We find no difference in whether
they finance through savings or loans from the savings group and not in the amount they
finance with either savings or loans from the savings group. This is consistent with the
observation that we find no change in neither savings nor lending activity related to the
savings group or overall.
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Table 2.5: Source of household financing
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Any financing from group savings
Linkage treatment -0.014 0.0041 0.0039 0.010
(0.019) (0.031) (0.014) (0.018)
Control group mean 0.43 0.40 0.19 0.19
Value of financing from group savings
Linkage treatment 58.4 21.0 1.50 2.35
(37.5) (56.6) (1.10) (2.57)
Control group mean 132.4 179.1 4.00 5.99
Any financing from group loans
Linkage treatment 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.025
(0.017) (0.027) (0.015) (0.021)
Control group mean 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.20
Value of financing from group loans
Linkage treatment -4.34 3.31 16.5 2.52
(13.7) (22.2) (14.4) (17.8)
Control group mean 73.3 67.5 64.1 66.9
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Values in ZMW
and winzorized within type of expenses at 1% and 99%. All outcomes refer to last 12 months before
survey. Outcomes are based on the information given by respondents for the source and value of
financing for (agricultural) investments, education, funerals, or health spending.
These findings are in line with what other studies find and do not find. A lack of
findings is not the same as finding no effect, and one needs to keep in mind that savings
are hard to measure and that savings measures tend to have a large variation, making
it difficult to detect changes. While savings groups, in general, are found to increase
savings and sometimes lending activity (see Beaman et al. (2014), Ksoll et al. (2016),
and Karlan et al. (2017)), there is little support that opening formal savings accounts
increases savings or lending. Mobile money accounts for example are mainly used for
remittances and as insurance mechanism rather than for saving (see e.g., Jack and Suri
(2014), Batista and Vicente (2018), Alinaghi (2019), or Wieser et al. (2019)). For bank
accounts, the evidence is mixed: some studies find increased savings, sometimes with a
caveat, and many do not find an effect of bank accounts on overall savings. In a small
study in Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013a) find increased savings only for the sub-
group of female market vendors. Brune et al. (2016) find increased savings of farmers
in Malawi at planting season when offered a bank account in which harvest proceeds
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were deposited. However, rarely are any deposits made after the initial deposit. Thus
it is more plausible that the bank account served as a commitment device rather than
a savings instrument (similarly to Dupas and Robinson (2013b)). De Mel et al. (2018)
and Buehren (2011) find increases in formal savings but not overall savings. In a group
setting, Dupas et al. (2017), who offered accounts to couples, find that both men and
women increase savings when given an account in their own name but do not increase
savings if only their spouse is given an account. For group accounts for youth clubs,
Jamison et al. (2014) do not find effects on savings from group accounts alone but only
coupled with financial education and only for savings in those offered accounts but not
on savings overall. Dupas et al. (2018) do not find effects of offering bank accounts to
the unbanked on savings in Uganda, Malawi, and Chile.
2.3.5. Welfare outcomes
As discussed in the previous section, we find no evidence of increased savings or lending
activity caused by the intervention. The same picture arises for welfare-related outcomes,
such as investment, income, and consumption, which is expected given the lack of find-
ings on savings and lending activities, the most plausible channels through which the
intervention might affect these outcomes. Table 2.6 gives an overview of treatment ef-
fect estimates on a range of investment and welfare-related indices, based on animals
purchased and owned, other agricultural inputs and assets, household expenditures and
measures of food security (for more details on these indices see Tables B.5, B.6, B.7, B.8
and B.9, B.10, and B.11 respectively in appendix B). Note that we look at indices rather
than each specific item to account for multiple hypothesis testing. E.g., for animals owned
at endline there is a small negative but statistically significant estimate for the number
of poultry owned, but this is one of thirteen categories we included and thus such find-
ings are expected due to chance. One downside is that we neglect potential substitution
effects, e.g., moving from one type of asset to another.
As can be seen from Table 2.6 we find no effect of the treatment on any of the
welfare-related indices. All of the estimates are small in size. If we take 0.1 standard
deviations of the control group as a size threshold for meaningful effects, we can conclude
that the treatment did not affect the group members’ household welfare in a meaningful
way.16 This is, of course, in line with the previous analysis in section 2.3.4 and we would
not expect downstream outcomes to be affected given that we do not find effects on
intermediate outcomes in line with related studies (e.g., Dupas et al. (2018)).
16Except for the animals purchased index at endline for NGOs 1 and 2, for which the 95% confidence
interval covers 0.1 standard deviations.
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Table 2.6: Various indices related to household welfare
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH animals purchased
Linkage treatment -0.034+ -0.043 0.0097 0.065+
(0.018) (0.032) (0.021) (0.038)
Index HH animals owned
Linkage treatment -0.013 -0.031 -0.0017 -0.0059
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.011)
Index HH agricultural inputs
Linkage treatment -0.020 -0.041 -0.016 -0.050
(0.029) (0.050) (0.028) (0.043)
Index HH agricultural assets
Linkage treatment -0.0060 0.016 -0.017 -0.0028
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
Index HH general assets
Linkage treatment 0.0070 0.017 0.0075 0.014
(0.016) (0.028) (0.013) (0.019)
Index HH expenditures
Linkage treatment 0.022 0.039 0.048 0.034
(0.029) (0.050) (0.036) (0.046)
Index HH food security
Linkage treatment 0.033 0.027 -0.016 -0.014
(0.021) (0.030) (0.015) (0.023)
Number of food insecure months
Linkage treatment -0.042 -0.079 0.049 0.036
(0.062) (0.099) (0.055) (0.077)
Control group mean 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.79
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations
reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. Missing values: 22 and 44 missing
for the food security index at mid- and endline. Indices are means of variables related to the
index standardized to control group values, thus the control group mean is by construction 0
and omitted. For details on the components for each index refer to Tables B.5, B.6, B.7, B.8,
B.9, B.10, B.11 in appendix B.
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2.4. CONCLUSION
Overall this chapter provides evidence for whether or not formal financial inclusion is
beneficial in the context of savings groups in rural Zambia. As previous studies show,
benefits from formal financial inclusion are highly context-specific, and we provide one
additional data point. In Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013a) find increased savings
for female market vendors. In Uganda, Buehren (2011), for MFI clients, and Jamison
et al. (2014), for youth club members that also receive financial education training, find
increases in savings in formal accounts but not in savings overall. While it seems that
financial inclusion can help some people to save more, most studies either do not look
for or do not find effects on welfare outcomes (De Mel et al. (2018), Dupas et al. (2017)).
Dupas et al. (2018) neither find effects on savings nor welfare outcomes in Uganda, Malawi,
and Chile. The cases in which financial inclusion seems to be beneficial in terms of
household welfare seem to work through remittances using mobile money in the context
of work migration (Jack and Suri (2014), Batista and Vicente (2018)). Our findings
are in line with the existing evidence but provide evidence for a new context. Like
previous studies, we find (i) it can be challenging to link savings groups to financial
service providers, (ii) the effect of such a financial inclusion is limited in terms of savings




STREngTHEnIng SOCIAL InSuRAnCE OF SAVIngS gROuPS
WITH MARKuS FRÖLICH, AnDREAS LAnDmAnn, AnD P. LInH NguYEn
3.1. INTRODUCTION
How households handle the risks they face is a widely investigated topic and gained par-
ticular attention in development economics as one potential explanation and driver of
poverty and poverty traps. For lack of sufficient insurance, households often engage in
risk-management and -coping strategies that might keep them in poverty. Ex-ante house-
holds might forsake more profitable income-generating activities, keeping them engaged in
low-risk but low-reward activities. Ex-post households might sell productive assets when
hit with a shock (see Dercon (2002) for an overview on the topic). Muyanga et al. (2013)
provide evidence that idiosyncratic shocks in the form death or illness are important
determinants that keep households in poverty and these shocks are among the greatest
concerns reported by households across low- and middle income countries (LMICs) (Co-
hen and Sebstad (2005), De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), Heltberg et al. (2015)). While
formal health insurance is associated with a decline in out-of-pocket expenditure (e.g., see
Jütting (2004), Dekker and Wilms (2010), Alkenbrack and Lindelow (2015)), fewer sells
of assets in case of a shock (e.g., see Scheil‐Adlung et al. (2006), Dekker and Wilms (2010),
Parmar et al. (2012)), and other benefits (e.g. Strobl (2017) finds a negative association
with child labour in favor of schooling), formal insurance coverage remains low in LMICs
(Dercon (2002), Cohen and Sebstad (2005), Alkenbrack and Lindelow (2015)). Instead,
households often engage in informal insurance schemes. For expenditure risks associated
with the funeral of a family member, burial groups are a widespread scheme (Cohen and
Sebstad (2005), Dercon et al. (2006)) and networks of friends and relatives play an im-
portant role (Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007)). However, a
large literature investigating informal risk-sharing suggests that informal risk-sharing is
incomplete and that there is room for improvement (see Townsend (1994) for a seminal
paper on the topic).
This chapter investigates if we can strengthen and formalize an informal insurance
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mechanism built into savings groups in rural Zambia: the social or emergency fund. The
function of the fund differs across savings groups, but generally, each member regularly
contributes money to the fund, which is then used to help members in need or to buy
things for the group. The social fund already functions as an informal insurance mecha-
nism (at least for some groups) but is often not governed by formal rules or depleted and
thus unreliable as insurance. We implemented an intervention to improve the social fund
as an insurance mechanism to expand the informal insurance available to savings group
members. This would allow us to investigate to what extent such an informal insurance
expansion affects risk-management and -coping of prevalent risks they face.
The contribution of our study is that we try to build upon a pre-existing informal
insurance mechanism and try to improve its functionality. If successful, this would further
allow us to investigate the causal effects of an informal insurance mechanism. Hence, our
study lies between the literature descriptively exploring what types of informal insurance
mechanisms exist and how they work and the literature studying the introduction of
(semi-)formal insurance mechanisms or products.
To answer our research questions, we conducted a randomized control trial. Savings
groups were randomly assigned to receive what we call a social fund intervention.1 The
particulars of this intervention varied across three implementing partners. Still, they
consisted primarily of training on what insurance is and how the social fund can work as
insurance against idiosyncratic risks.
We find evidence that the intervention successfully impacted the savings group infor-
mal insurance mechanism for one of the implementing partners. The contributions to
the social fund increase significantly, and members are more likely to use loans provided
by their savings group to finance the funeral expenditures they face. This falls short of
introducing or formalizing insurance against such shocks but suggests an improvement
in risk-coping strategies. A lack of findings for the savings group members’ attitudes
towards insurance suggests that more than our intervention is needed to convince mem-
bers to adopt and formalize insurance through their savings groups. Given the limited
effects on the usage of the social fund, it is not surprising that we do not find evidence
that members are indeed better at coping with risks as a result of the intervention. We
further do not find evidence for impacts on household welfare more generally, which may
have resulted as indirect benefits of insurance or improved risk-coping.
The chapter is structured in three main parts. In section 2, we provide background
information and describe the intervention. In section 3, we present the analysis for (i)
social fund usage, (ii) attitudes and reported impact of shocks, and (iii) welfare-related
1Note that this intervention was cross-randomized with another intervention. Further, all the groups,
including the control group, received general financial literacy training.
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outcomes. Section 4 concludes.
3.2. BACKGROUND AND INTERVENTION
Since many savings group members do not partake in formal insurance schemes, strength-
ening the savings groups’ insurance mechanisms could improve their risk-coping strategies.
Initial qualitative and pilot data suggest that grants provided by the social fund were in-
sufficient to cover funeral shocks, i.e., that funerals often impose costs of several hundred
ZMW, but savings groups only provide grants of about 50 ZMW.
The social fund intervention had the goal of strengthening the group’s informal insur-
ance mechanism by providing information on what an insurable shock is, how insurance
works, and how the social fund could provide such insurance. It was recommended that
savings groups formalize in their institutions that members regularly have to contribute
to the social fund and in return receive support in the form of a cash grant in case they
face the funeral of a household member or illness and that the ”insurance contributions”
are not used for other purposes. Funeral and illness are good examples of insurable shocks
and highly relevant in such contexts (Cohen and Sebstad (2005), De Weerdt and Dercon
(2006), Heltberg et al. (2015)). While many of the savings groups are located in rural
communities and their members are exposed to income risks from droughts or other un-
favorable weather conditions, group-based insurance cannot cover shocks that affect all
members at the same time. Instead, the focus of insurance should be on idiosyncratic
shocks that affect members independently, which is likely for both funerals and illness
in many cases. Further, the moral hazard should be considered, and shocks should be
observable and verifiable. The group setting plays an important role here, and funerals
and severe cases of illness should preclude moral hazard. Finally, the insurance must
be reliable. Therefore, the suggestion to formalize it through the group’s constitution
and discourage using the fund for non-insurance purposes. If in place, such an insurance
mechanism could alleviate the financial burden of funerals and illness and reduce the use
of (in the long run) more costly risk-coping strategies such as the sale of productive assets
or the take-up of loans with high interest.
As shown in Figure 1.2, the social fund intervention was implemented by the different
NGOs at different times between the end of 2017 and mid-2018. Further note that while
the implementation differed across NGOs, their operating districts differs as well (see
Figure 1.1), and the type of group also varies as the different NGOs established, trained,
and supported different concepts of savings groups. So we want to keep in mind that
these highly correlated factors can also explain any difference in effect according to NGO
affiliation.
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Based on the monitoring data, we know of at least twelve groups that attended the
social fund-related training but were not assigned to the social fund intervention. Note
that this number reflects a lower bound. According to reports by the three NGOs, they
implemented the training sessions following the agreed guidelines with a few exceptions,
e.g., when savings groups came uninvited to training sessions, and the field officer could
not reject them.
It should be noted that especially the implementation of NGO 4 is concerning. NGO
4 did not make us aware that they started their implementation such that we were not
able to observe any of the training sessions. Further, discussions with representatives
of NGO 4 and implementation documentation suggest that the training content was
not in adherence with the concept of the intervention.2 Compared to the other NGOs,
there is little correlation between training participation as reported by the NGO and by
the survey respondents. For NGOs 1 and 2, respondents in savings groups assigned to
the intervention are considerably more likely to report participating in training covering
aspects related to the social fund than respondents in savings groups not assigned to the
intervention. At the same time, this is not the case for respondents in savings groups
affiliated with NGO 4.
3.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the analysis of the social fund intervention. Recall that for this
analysis savings groups affiliated with NGO 2 are omitted as they were not included in the
randomization of the social fund intervention. First, we assess the balance of covariates
between the social fund treatment group and the control group followed by the analysis of
outcomes ordered according to a theory of change. We discuss whether the intervention
affected any of several aspects related to the usage of the social fund. This continue with
the analysis of outcomes related to risk-coping and attitude towards insurance. Finally,
we investigate the impact on welfare-related outcomes.
3.3.1. Balance
Table 3.1 shows t-tests between treatment and control group of selected characteristics
and outcomes measured at baseline to assess balance.3 The only statistically significant
difference is that slightly more savings groups in the treatment group meet every other
week than the control group.
2E.g. NGO 4 reports that the savings groups extended the use of the social fund for purposes such
as school fees and introduced loans.
3Note that we conducted these tests on 26 additional variables for which we found no statistically
significant differences.
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Table 3.1: Savings group and member characteristics
Control Treatment
mean sd mean sd β
Village level baseline variables
Number of participating SGs in village 1.5 1.40 1.6 2.02 0.100
Urban or rural: Urban .22 0.42 .2 0.40 -0.010
Urban or rural: Rural > 250 .54 0.50 .49 0.50 -0.055
Urban or rural: Rural <250 .24 0.43 .31 0.47 0.065
Mean score of additive food security index 1.4 0.78 1.2 0.81 -0.139
Mean number of months with food scarcity across HHs 1.6 0.84 1.5 0.78 -0.085
Savings group level baseline variables
Meeting frequency: weekly .64 0.48 .57 0.50 -0.065
Meeting frequency: every two weeks .019 0.14 .056 0.23 0.039*
Meeting frequency: monthly .35 0.48 .38 0.49 0.025
Household level endline variables
Number of household members 5.8 2.19 5.7 2.24 -0.075
Member level endline variables
Respondent is female .81 0.39 .81 0.39 0.005
Age of respondent 45 12.16 45 12.28 0.129
Relation to household head: Household head .42 0.49 .41 0.49 -0.015
Respondent is married .74 0.44 .74 0.44 -0.001
Member level baseline variables
Monthly contribution to SF in ZMW (winsorized) 6 7.41 6.1 7.71 0.292
Measure of risk aversion 2.7 1.39 2.6 1.40 -0.023
Locus of control (average of z-values) -.0032 0.72 .038 0.74 0.038
Notes. The table shows characteristics and outcomes at baseline of savings groups and members
by treatment status and NGO affiliation. Columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) show the mean and standard
deviation for the control and treatment group. Column (5) informs about balance by displaying the
coefficient β from the regression Xi = α + βDi + δNGOi, where Xi is the respective variable, Di
treatment assignment, and NGOi refer to NGO dummies. Significance of a t-test for β = 0 is referenced
by + : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01. Columns (6)-(10) show the means of the variables for each
of the different NGOs. Variables that refer to values are in ZMW and winsorized at the 1% and 99%
quantile.
3.3.2. Social fund contributions and usage
Contributions. For the social fund to work as proper insurance that significantly reduces
the impact of shocks and improves risk-coping, it needs to be large enough, in terms of
value, to provide sufficient payouts in case of a shock reliably. Thus the first indicator we
investigate is the members’ contributions to the social fund. From Table 3.2 we can see
that we do not find an effect on social fund contributions overall during mid- and endline.
Still, we detect a statistically significant and sizable increase of 2.6 ZMW in the phone
survey in December 2019 and an increase of 1.8 ZMW for savings groups affiliated with
NGO 1 at endline. These are meaningful effect sizes given the average contributions in the
control group of about 8-9 ZMW. Note that reported monthly contributions for NGO 1
and NGO 4 vary a lot across both savings groups and survey waves. Therefore, treatment
effect estimates are not precise, and we cannot conclude that there are no meaningful
effects. Overall the evidence is consistent with a positive effect of the intervention on
contributions to the social fund driven by savings groups affiliated with NGO 1.
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Table 3.2: Monthly social fund contributions
Midline Endline Phone surveys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
July 2018 July 2019 December 2019 April 2020 November 2020
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
All NGOs
Social fund treatment 1.40 0.93 2.62∗ -0.16 -0.14
(3.78) (0.81) (1.27) (0.92) (0.97)
Control group mean 12.2 8.75 8.08 9.52 9.45
Observations 424 424 384 379 375
NGO 1
Social fund treatment -6.54 1.80∗ 6.06+ 1.12 0.025
(8.98) (0.85) (3.61) (0.97) (1.22)
Control group mean 19.6 9.14 9.72 11.0 11.2
Observations 146 146 128 137 128
NGO 3
Social fund treatment 0.098 0.23 1.05 0.33 0.55
(1.12) (0.31) (0.67) (0.35) (0.36)
Control group mean 5.59 3.69 5.16 4.19 4.38
Observations 105 106 94 92 96
NGO 4
Social fund treatment 3.56 -0.76 -0.49 -1.75 -0.55
(3.76) (1.50) (1.44) (1.90) (2.19)
Control group mean 12.7 13.7 12.1 13.7 13.1
Observations 173 172 162 150 151
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcome for all regressions is monthly contribution to the social fund in ZMW. This is
calculated based on frequency and amount reported in the savings group surveys. Information from
the savings group member surveys is used to confirm and clean these reported values. Outcome
is winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included
covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). For estimations on the whole
sample, NGO fixed effects are always included, but excluded for NGO specific estimations.
Usage the social fund. While almost all groups have a social fund, how they use it
differs a lot. Generally, savings group members can get grants (which they do not need
to pay back) or loans (which they would need to pay back) from the social fund, both
in the form of money and in-kind. While in principle, loans need to be paid back and
sometimes even carry interest, they are not always fully paid back in practice. Table 3.3
shows results for whether loans or grants from the social fund were given to savings group
members in the last twelve months and for the associated value of these pay-outs. We find
neither effects on the extensive margin, i.e., whether there were pay-outs, nor the intensive
margin, i.e., the value of pay-outs from the social fund. Note that there is a substantial
difference in the number and value of pay-outs as measured by the in-person surveys
compared to the phone surveys. There are several likely sources of this discrepancy. For
the phone survey waves, we asked for the specific months and accumulated across various
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waves such that it is comparable to the twelve-month reference period used during the
in-person interviews. Another explanation for the significant difference in control group
means between mid-/endline, and phone surveys could be that the phone surveys covered
the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, there is potential selection into the phone
survey, as not all groups were reached (in contrast to the in-person-based surveys during
which all savings groups were reached), and some savings groups dissolved over the course
of the study.
For each social fund pay-out, we also recorded the purpose. Since the intervention
tried to strengthen the social fund as an insurance mechanism, we looked specifically at
grants given out for insurable shocks in the form of funerals or illness.4 We do not find
effects when restricting the analysis to pay-outs with these purposes (see Table C.2 in
appendix C) and also not when looking at each NGO separately (see Tables C.1 and C.3
in appendix C).
Social fund usage to alleviate shocks the households face. Further, we want to
measure whether the social fund is used to support the households’ financial needs in
case of negative events such as funerals, medical expenditures, or business-related shocks
on the household side. From Table 3.4 we can see that the social fund is rarely used
to cover any shocks. Mainly these shocks are financed by selling agricultural goods or
assets. We further do not find that the intervention increased the frequency with which
the social fund is used. But at midline households from savings group members affiliated
with NGO 1 increasingly used loans to cover shocks after receiving the social fund inter-
vention. Upon closer inspection, this effect is primarily driven by loans provided by the
savings group. While the intervention did not intend this, it indicates that some savings
groups increased their willingness to financially support their members who faced a shock
but not by providing grants. This effect is driven by loans to cover funeral costs (see
Table C.5 in appendix C). Looking at the different types of shocks separately, we further
find an effect on whether funeral costs were financed with the support of the social fund
for NGO 4 at midline (see Table C.4 in appendix C). Further, we need to note that the
sample size for any outcomes based on the occurrence of a shock is drastically reduced,
as only a share of households faces the specific shocks (less than 30%).
Overall we find limited effects of the intervention primarily driven by NGO 1 that
suggests that the intervention could improve the informal insurance mechanism of savings
groups, even though not entirely as intended. This is in line with literature that offers a
4An insurable shock means that the shock reflects individual rather than common risk and also that
there is not too much risk of moral hazard.
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lack of financial literacy and trust as an explanation for low take-up of insurance products
(e.g., Cole et al. (2013), Cai et al. (2015)) and Dercon et al. (2014), who show that training
sessions can impact the uptake of rainfall index insurance and informal insurance among
group members. While we find evidence that contributions to the social fund in groups
affiliated with NGO 1 increase after the intervention, this does not translate into higher
or more frequent grant pay-outs from the social fund. Instead, we find an increase in the
role the savings group plays in financing funeral expenditure through loans. Members in
treated savings groups affiliated with NGO 1 are more likely to report that they received
a loan from the savings group to finance their funeral expenditures. However, we only
find evidence for this in the short term after the intervention. This suggests that while the
intervention was not able to formalize and introduce the intended insurance mechanism,
to some extent, it affected the role the savings group play in risk-coping.
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Table 3.3: Various measures for social fund usage
(1) (2) (3)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019 Phone surveys combined
b/se b/se b/se
Any pay-outs from social fund
Social fund treatment -0.013 -0.045 0.034
(0.046) (0.047) (0.039)
Control group mean 0.47 0.53 0.82
Any grants from social fund
Social fund treatment -0.024 -0.027 0.024
(0.041) (0.046) (0.038)
Control group mean 0.33 0.43 0.79
Any loans from social fund
Social fund treatment 0.016 0.00013 0.027
(0.037) (0.035) (0.040)
Control group mean 0.18 0.14 0.29
Value of pay-outs from social fund
Social fund treatment 31.3 -2.90 57.5
(20.9) (18.5) (62.7)
Control group mean 94.53 105.75 422.76
Value of grants from social fund
Social fund treatment 12.6 7.46 9.18
(11.4) (12.4) (29.7)
Control group mean 45.15 59.02 221.37
Value of loans from social fund
Social fund treatment 16.4 -7.86 49.1
(15.5) (12.3) (47.6)
Control group mean 46.68 39.78 178.96
Observations 446 447 447
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes are accumulated over all reported pay-outs in a reference period of the last 12 months.
For phone surveys this is based on the report from several waves asking about each month separately for the
period of July 2019 to June 2020. Value outcomes are in ZMW and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimations
are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3
in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. For results for each NGO refer to Table C.1 in
appendix C. For results related to the reported purpose of funeral or sickness, the target purposes of the
intervention, refer to Tables C.2 and C.3 in appendix C for aggregate and NGO specific results respectively.
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Table 3.4: Finance sources of various shocks by NGO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Support from SF for any shocks
Midline Social fund treatment 0.024 0.027 0.028 -0.0015
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Control group mean 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.07
Observations 1094 304 331 459
Endline Social fund treatment -0.0049 -0.022 0.022+ -0.0069
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Control group mean 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.06
Observations 1809 532 483 794
Loans to cover any shocks
Midline Social fund treatment 0.024 0.12∗∗ -0.013 -0.0095
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Control group mean 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.22
Observations 1085 302 329 454
Endline Social fund treatment 0.017 -0.00098 -0.011 0.011
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Control group mean 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.19
Observations 1813 533 484 796
Loans from savings group to cover any shocks
Midline Social fund treatment 0.033 0.14∗∗ 0.027 -0.011
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Control group mean 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09
Observations 706 214 211 281
Endline Social fund treatment 0.0071 0.020 -0.016 0.016
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Control group mean 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.06
Observations 882 277 229 376
Sold goods to cover any shocks
Midline Social fund treatment 0.030 0.00073 -0.0089 0.024
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Control group mean 0.46 0.45 0.60 0.38
Observations 1137 328 339 470
Endline Social fund treatment -0.011 -0.028 0.016 0.0019
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Control group mean 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.25
Observations 1820 543 483 794
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes refers to reported source used to finance any shock such as funerals, medical
expenditures, or business related shocks. Details on the different shocks and the number of
times (in most cases this was once) they were reportedly financed with support from the social
fund, loans, and selling agricultural goods and assets can be found in Tables C.4, C.5, and
C.6 in appendix C respectively. Observations refer to households that reported shocks such
as funerals, medical expenditures, or business related shocks. Estimations are done using
pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in
appendix A). For estimations on the whole sample, NGO fixed effects are always included,
but excluded for NGO specific estimations.
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3.3.3. Attitude and reported impact of shocks
Knowledge and attitude towards insurance. The purpose of the intervention was to
strengthen the savings groups’ insurance mechanism. Still, social fund usage for the pur-
pose of insurance is hard to measure as households irregularly face shocks. However, the
intervention likely needs to change the savings group members’ attitude towards insur-
ance to be successful. We asked savings groups members whether they would participate
in insurance schemes, their trust towards insurance companies, and we asked questions
to assess their knowledge about and attitude towards insurance. Table 3.5 shows that a
majority of savings group members are willing to join a hypothetical insurance scheme,
but we do not find that the treatment affected this share. We find that about half of
the members trust insurance companies but do not find an effect of the treatment on
trust. We also do not find effects on knowledge about or attitude towards insurance as
measured with our survey instrument. This lack of an effect is in line with the lack of
findings that the savings groups use the social fund as insurance. If the intervention
did not impact the members’ attitudes towards insurance, we might not expect them to
introduce insurance to their savings groups.
Reported impact of shocks and locus of control. The primary purpose of insurance
is to alleviate the economic impact a shock has on the household. In the previous section,
we discussed whether the treatment affected how households react to economic shocks and
finance the costs associated with such shocks. Now we turn to the savings group members’
subjective perceptions about the severity of the economic impact any funerals or economic
shocks had on their household. The control group reports that on average 1-2 shocks in
the last twelve months had a profound economic impact5, suggesting potential benefits
from insurance. From Table 3.6 we can see that the number of shocks that reportedly
had a (serious) economic impact on the household does not differ between the treatment
and control group. Even in the absence of a shock, one might benefit from insurance.
Being insured could result in being less worried about potential shock and improve one’s
feeling of agency. We, therefore, assess both the internal and external locus of control
of the savings group members. A high internal locus of control corresponds to feeling
agency and control over one’s life and circumstances. In contrast, an external locus of
control corresponds to feeling as if external forces determine one’s circumstances. An
internal locus could be both cause and effect of having insurance, but we do not find an
effect of the treatment on either locus. If anything, the internal locus of control in the
5This is conditional on reporting attending any funeral or any of the following economic shocks:
bankruptcy, job loss, loss of harvest, house or equipment damage, loss of livestock, inflation, natural
events such as droughts or floods, loan defaults, legal suits, communal and political crisis, theft, divorce,
and other shocks.
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control group is smaller at midline (significant at the 10% level). This could be explained
by the intervention talking about external shocks, bringing uncertainty to participants’
attention. While we find limited evidence suggesting improved risk-coping, we do not
find evidence that this translates into reduced economic impact of shocks or feelings of
more control over life’s circumstances.
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Table 3.5: Knowledge and attitude outcomes
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Would participate in insurance scheme
Social fund treatment 0.014 -0.026
(0.018) (0.020)
Control group mean 0.85 0.74
Observations 1398 1889
Level of trust in insurance companies
Social fund treatment -0.058 0.0097
(0.083) (0.059)
Control group mean 2.30 2.24
Observations 748 1450
Trust in insurance companies
Social fund treatment 0.010 -0.0040
(0.033) (0.026)
Control group mean 0.46 0.55
Observations 951 1615
Knowledge about insurance
Social fund treatment -0.013 -0.012
(0.037) (0.028)
Control group mean -0.00 -0.00
Observations 1640 2114
Attitude towards insurance
Social fund treatment -0.044 0.012
(0.042) (0.044)
Control group mean -0.00 -0.00
Observations 756 545
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. While the hypothetical participation in an insurance scheme and knowledge ques-
tions were asked to everyone, the attitude and trust outcomes are asked conditional on
the respondent being familiar with the term insurance. Level of trust is on a 4 point scale
(1=complete, 4=none at all). Trust refers to the first two levels. Knowledge about and
attitude towards insurance are indexes, i.e. the mean of 5 and 8 items each of which is
standardized to the control group. For results by NGO refer to Table C.7 in the appendix.
Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included.
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Table 3.6: Reported economic impact of shocks and loci of control
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Average economic impact across shocks
Social fund treatment 0.012 0.023
(0.057) (0.036)
Control group mean 1.85 1.67
Observations 1001 1772
# of shocks with serious economic impact
Social fund treatment 0.025 -0.019
(0.082) (0.075)
Control group mean 1.02 1.72
Observations 1001 1772
# of shocks with economic impact
Social fund treatment -0.018 -0.044
(0.078) (0.084)
Control group mean 1.65 2.29
Observations 1001 1772
Internal locus of control index
Social fund treatment -0.055+ 0.031
(0.029) (0.030)
Control group mean 0.00 0.00
Observations 1640 2114
External locus of control index
Social fund treatment 0.000017 0.036
(0.031) (0.032)
Control group mean -0.00 -0.00
Observations 1640 2113
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Shocks comprises both business shocks and funerals. Impact was assessed on
a 4 point scale (1=serious, 4=none at all). Serious economic impact refers to the
first level, economic impact refers to the first two levels. Locus of control indexes are
the mean of 5 items which are standardized to the control group. For details on the
external and internal locus of control indexes refer to Tables C.10 and C.9 in appendix
C. For results by NGO and for business shocks and funerals separately refer to Table
C.8 in appendix C. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included




In previous sections, we discussed that we do not find effects of the intervention on the
usage of the social fund or the savings group members’ attitude towards insurance, the
two direct targets of the intervention. We can measure the reaction to shocks only for
some shocks and only for households that faced such shocks and do not find evidence
of reduced economic impact of shocks. From Table 3.7, we further see no effect on food
security. However, savings group members could adapt their behavior even in the absence
of a shock, e.g., if they feel better prepared to face shocks. We find evidence that savings
group members affiliated with NGO 1 increased their contributions to the social fund
and that more of the shocks their households faced were financed through loans given by
the savings group. This could potentially lead to a greater feeling of security which could
translate into more investment. Table 3.7 presents results of various measures related
to household investments and welfare. We do not find effects on assets, investments, or
expenditure and not on food security. Hence, while the evidence suggests some limited
impact on risk-coping, this does not seem to translate into improved living conditions of
the savings group members.
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Table 3.7: Various indices related to household welfare
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH animals purchased
Social fund treatment 0.14 -0.014
(0.090) (0.016)
Index HH animals owned
Social fund treatment 0.017 0.010
(0.022) (0.021)
Index HH agricultural inputs
Social fund treatment 0.018 -0.020
(0.030) (0.030)
Index HH agricultural assets
Social fund treatment -0.013 0.016
(0.017) (0.024)
Index HH general assets
Social fund treatment 0.026 -0.0078
(0.016) (0.014)
Index HH expenditures
Social fund treatment 0.038 -0.042
(0.031) (0.033)
Index HH food security
Social fund treatment 0.017 0.015
(0.022) (0.017)
Number of food insecure months
Social fund treatment -0.036 -0.015
(0.070) (0.062)
Control group mean 0.91 0.91
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included
covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). Obser-
vations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. Missing
values: 22 and 44 missing for the food security index at mid- and endline.
Indices are means of variables related to the index standardized to control
group values, thus the control group mean is by construction 0 and omitted.
For details on the components for each index refer to Tables C.11, C.12, C.13,
C.14, C.15, C.16, C.17 in appendix C. NGO fixed effects are always included.
52
3.4. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we study the effects of an intervention that aims to introduce or improve
informal insurance mechanisms of savings groups in rural Zambia. The intervention con-
sisted of training sessions explaining the concept of insurance and insurable shocks and
giving advice on how the savings groups could implement insurance through their social
fund. However, we find no evidence of increased usage of the social fund. While most sav-
ings group members reported their willingness to participate in insurance schemes, we do
not find that the intervention improved the members’ attitudes toward insurance. How-
ever, for one of the implementing partners, we find evidence for increased contributions
to the social fund and that members are more likely to finance their funeral expenditures
with the support of their savings group. While the evidence is limited, strengthened
support when faced with shocks could result in improved risk-coping. But we find no
evidence suggesting that members of savings groups who received the intervention are




FAIRnESS OF LOTTERIES AnD SuRVEY COmPEnSATIOn
4.1. INTRODUCTION
With increasing penetration rates of mobile phones in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), restrictions due to epidemics or conflicts, the need for rapid and high-frequency
information, and the interest in hard to reach, highly mobile or displaced populations,
phone surveys gain importance and are increasingly conducted in LMICs. One major
downside of phone surveys lies in their comparatively low response rates, which might
increase cost and invalidate research designs.
Numerous approaches to increase response rates in various survey modes have been
tested and there is considerable evidence showing that monetary incentives can increase
response rates across modes (for a recent review and meta-analysis see Singer and Ye
(2013) and Mercer et al. (2015)). Most of these studies are conducted in high income
countries and for mail based surveys, but compensation for phone survey participation in
LMICs received more and more attention from researchers in recent years (e.g. Hoogeveen
et al. (2014), Leo et al. (2015), Vashistha et al. (2015) and Leo and Morello (2016)). While
the primary goal of these approaches is higher response rates, other dimensions of data
quality and representativeness are frequently investigated. However, ethical issues are
barely touched upon (Singer and Ye (2013)).
With any form of compensation, there is a concern of whether people are coerced into
participation (Singer and Couper (2008)). Other ethical concerns arise only with specific
compensation schemes. Brown et al. (2006) and Zangeneh et al. (2008) link compensation
in the form of lotteries to gambling, elaborating on the potentially exploitative nature
of such an approach and how it might undermine informed consent. Further, lotteries
create ex-post differential compensation across respondents which raises ethical concerns
due to fairness considerations (Brown et al. (2006), Singer and Ye (2013)). This study
aims to inform this discussion with empirical evidence and include the perspective of
survey participants.
I investigate perceptions about survey participation compensation focusing on aspects
of fairness with respondents in a phone survey panel in Zambia. In particular, I study
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(i) how respondents feel about compensation that is determined by a lottery and thus
leads to ex-post differential compensation across respondents, (ii) how winning or losing a
lottery affects these perceptions, as well as (iii) appropriate levels of compensation based
on the respondents’ perspective.
To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate survey respondents’ fairness
perceptions related to survey compensation in the form of lotteries. The only closely
related study considers another common practice leading to differential compensation.
Singer et al. (1999) study refusal conversion payments, i.e., an offer of extra incentives in
case of an initial refusal to convert reluctant respondents and find that a large majority of
respondents deem this approach unfair. While there are similarities to lotteries, e.g., both
approaches lead to differential compensation, there are meaningful differences as well. In
the case of lotteries, the differential compensation is based on luck, whereas with refusal
conversion payments, it depends on the respondent’s actions, favoring uncooperative
behavior. Therefore it is worth investigating how fair or unfair respondents deem lotteries
as compensation, in light of Brown et al. (2006) who argue that fair compensation implies
equal outcomes.1 Another differentiating factor from previous studies is that respondents
in my study are asked questions about their savings group rather than themselves. This
raises additional questions relating to fairness because only the respondent, and not the
whole group, is compensated. The information collected in the survey belongs to the
group, and in principle, many of the members could provide this information.2
In addition to investigating fairness perceptions about lotteries, I try to elicit an
appropriate level of compensation from the respondent’s point of view. Previous studies
have investigated the effect of the level of compensation on response rates and data quality.
A meta-analysis conducted by Mercer et al. (2015) finds a non-linear relationship between
response rates and the size of the compensation. While these studies are essential for
data collectors regarding the cost-effectiveness of different approaches, they neglect the
respondent’s opinions. Kropf and Blair (2005) investigate what role norms of cooperation
play in achieving high response rates and stress their importance. This might be especially
relevant for panel survey respondents, such as in my study, who have experience and
1By ”equal outcomes,” they mean not arbitrarily different compensation; arbitrarily being the key-
word. E.g., respondents with a higher burden of participation can receive more compensation. Still,
the luck involved in a lottery would be arbitrary. Thus, such a procedure results in arbitrarily unequal
outcomes. Note that Brown et al. (2006) do acknowledge that sometimes unequal outcomes are necessi-
tated by research design (e.g., in case of experiments), which is also the motivation behind the lottery
compensation investigated in this study. In another study, coauthors and I investigate if respondents
in a panel survey develop expectations of future compensation after receiving compensation for the first
time.
2This would likely be a non-issue if the compensation only compensates for the respondent’s time
and effort, but in this context, at least for some of the respondents or their savings group members, the
compensation might well exceed the opportunity cost of participation.
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ongoing engagement, potentially leading to trust and feelings of reciprocity (as argued in
Callegaro et al. (2014)). Given the concern of financial incentives crowding out internal
motivation (see, e.g., Zutlevics (2016)), it is important to get an understanding of what
respondents deem to be an appropriate amount of compensation.
Further, while there is a long tradition and numerous studies investigating survey
compensation in high-income countries, evidence for LMICs is scarce. The practice of
providing survey compensation is not uncommon in LMICs, but there are practical issues
specific to phone surveys. In such surveys in LMICs, compensation is often paid in the
form of airtime (Hoogeveen et al. (2014), Leo et al. (2015), Vashistha et al. (2015), and
Leo and Morello (2016)) which might not always be appropriate or effective depending
on the context. I showcase that mobile money can be used to transfer payments which
might be a better incentive and more relevant in contexts in which respondents do not
necessarily own or rarely use mobile phones.
The basis of my research design is the exogenous variation introduced by a lottery
compensation. All respondents are offered a lottery in which they can win 80 Kwacha
with a 50% chance. Since the lottery draw is random, I can compare respondents who
won the lottery with those who lost to test whether perceptions about fairness and survey
participation compensation depend on an ex-ante fair lottery outcome.
To study the difference between ex-ante and ex-post perceptions of fairness, I ran-
domize when the respondents are asked about their perceptions. This cross-randomized
experiment allows me to contrast a benchmark, i.e., the respondent being asked before
the lottery, with their perceptions after winning or losing the lottery. Thus, in addition
to capturing the difference in perceptions between respondents who won or lost, I further
can investigate how perceptions are affected by the lottery rather than the outcome of
the lottery alone.
To investigate an appropriate level of compensation as perceived by the respondents,
I employ a survey experiment in which I randomly vary the amount the respondents are
supposed to judge. This way, I avoid priming and framing effects which might occur
when asking about different amounts in some order or at the same time. A compensation
level might be differently perceived when put in direct comparison to another instead
of when it is judged in isolation. The latter is more relevant in this context, as survey
compensation is usually set by the data collector before the data collection and not in a
negotiation. 3
I find that most respondents believe survey respondents should be compensated, and
3Responsive survey compensation, i.e., compensation offered only after refusal, to some extent re-
sembles a negotiation. However, it is more a series of predetermined one-time offers (mostly limited to
only one such offer), and the respondent is not necessarily aware of this.
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more than half think either all participants or none should be compensated. Further, in
an interview about a savings group and its activities, approximately half of respondents
believe that any compensation for the interview should be shared with the group. For the
lottery offered to the respondents, I find mixed opinions with respect to its fairness. About
50% perceive the lottery as fair, while 40% perceive it as unfair. These perceptions change
when respondents win or lose the lottery. Winning increases the share who perceive it
as fair by about 10 percentage points, whereas losing decreases it by about the same
amount. For an appropriate amount of compensation, I conclude that about half the
respondents deem it fair when there is no compensation. I find considerable non-linearity:
a compensation of 40 Kwacha is not perceived differently from no compensation, but a
considerable share deems 80 Kwacha as fair.
The chapter is structured in three main parts. In section 2, I provide background
information and describe the experimental design in detail. In section 3, I present the
analysis for (i) general perceptions, (ii) perceptions related to the implemented lottery,
and (iii) an appropriate compensation level. Finally, section 4 summarizes and discusses
the findings.
4.2. BACKGROUND AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This study was conducted alongside a phone survey targeting savings group representa-
tives in November 2020. The survey was one of several data collections for an impact
evaluation in rural Zambia.4 The savings groups were affiliated with one of four NGOs
in seven districts across three provinces of Zambia (see Figure 1.1). From June 2016 to
November 2020, several survey waves, both in person and on the phone, with members
of the savings groups were conducted (see Figure A.1 in appendix A). The phone surveys
target one representative of each savings group to answer questions about the group in
general. The purpose of the survey is to elicit information about the group. We did not
collect information about the respondent apart from the questions I analyze in this study.
Further, note that the respondent is not necessarily the same for each group across survey
waves. Previous respondents might not be available for an interview or no longer be part
of their group. During the monthly phone surveys between April 2018 and April 2019,
we usually reached less than three-quarters of the 520 groups, while in the surveys after
the endline, we managed to reach a representative for almost all of the groups (for more
details, compare Table 1.3). Since we knew that some of the initial 520 savings groups
dissolved, we tried to reach only 511 in November 2020.
4In the following I refer to we when talking about activities related to the impact evaluation, and
use I for everything exclusively related to this study.
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During the endline survey, the respondents were paid compensation for participating
in the interviews, but initially, there was no compensation for the phone surveys. In the
November 2020 phone survey, we offered potential respondents to take part in a lottery in
which they could win 80 Kwacha (or about 3.9 US$ at the time of the study5). We want
to investigate if such compensation can help to keep response rates high in the phone
surveys or whether there are adverse effects, e.g., respondents might form expectations
and require compensation for participation in the future, or such compensation might
lead to disputes within a savings group eventually leading to its dissolution.6 In the
following, I investigate fairness perceptions related to such compensation using survey
experiments.
4.2.1. Experimental design
The main purpose of the experimental design is to investigate if fairness perceptions about
survey compensation, especially in the form of a lottery, change depending on whether
respondents won or lost the lottery. To evaluate this, the fairness perception questions
are asked either before or after the lottery. Thus there are three groups to distinguish, (i)
those asked the questions before the lottery, which serves as a benchmark, (ii) those asked
after having won, as well as (iii) those asked after having lost the lottery. In addition,
I want to investigate the appropriate level of compensation. Since I do not want to
further7 prime the respondents, and since I am interested in potential non-monotonic
characterizations8, I employ a survey experiment asking the respondents to judge one
compensation level that was randomly selected out of three levels (no compensation, 40
Kwacha, and 80 Kwacha), instead of asking about several levels at once or openly asking
for an appropriate value. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the design.
Lottery incentive. Before the interview starts, when the interviewers inform the po-
tential respondent about the survey and ask for their consent, the interviewers explain
that there is a lottery at the end of the interview. The interviewers were instructed to
explain that there is a 50% chance to win 80 Kwacha and that any winnings would be
transferred to a mobile money account of the respondent’s choice but could not be paid
out in cash. Then, immediately after the main questionnaire, the interviewer is informed
by the CATI software whether or not the respondent won the lottery and passed this
5Three reference points: (i) this is the amount we paid the interviewers per interview, (ii) the average
monthly savings contribution to their savings groups is reportedly about 105 to 125 Kwacha, and (iii)
the average monthly income in 2015 in rural Zambia is about 1,800 (LCMS (2015))
6We had one report from an interviewer that this was the case for at least one group after the survey
compensation during the endline was not shared with the group.
7The winning amount of 80 Kwacha might prime the respondents and serve as a reference point.
8No compensation might be fine with respondents, whereas a small amount might be considered
inappropriate.
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Table 4.1: Design of the experiments
Won Lost Questions before Total
No compensation 40 41 81 162
40 Kwacha 42 42 78 162
80 Kwacha 41 43 85 169
Total 123 126 244 493
The table shows the number of savings groups representatives assigned
to each of the randomized treatment arms. All of the following were
cross-randomized with equal probability: winning or losing the lottery,
questions being asked before or after the lottery, and the compensation
level I inquired about. Note that the number of ”Questions before”
groups, the benchmark group, are roughly twice as large, as there is
no distinction between whether the respondents were selected to win
or lose the lottery as in the case for those asked the questions after the
lottery.
information on.
Since the survey was collected via phone, we faced the challenge of making payments
to the respondents. Previous studies (e.g. Hoogeveen et al. (2014), Leo et al. (2015),
Vashistha et al. (2015), and Leo and Morello (2016)) paid phone survey respondents in
airtime, but in our context, airtime did not seem to be useful to the potential respondents
and thus would not be a good incentive. Often respondents do not own the phone they
use or mostly use their phones to receive instead of making calls, in which cases airtime
would be of little use to the respondent. We, therefore, opted for mobile money instead.
The problem with mobile money is that not every potential respondent has access to an
account, and there is a withdrawal fee if they want cash.9 The respondents could therefore
also give the account details (number and name) for any account they want their winnings
transferred to. In few cases in which even that was not possible, the interviewers sent the
money to a mobile money agent from whom the respondents received cash. In the end,
every respondent who won the lottery received their winnings.10
We randomized the lottery winnings within strata with a probability of 50% before the
start of the data collection.11 The strata are based on the province and NGO affiliation
9While in principle, each mobile account can be used for mobile money (and all respondents have
access to one; otherwise, they would not be interviewed), in practice, these need to be registered, and
the money would first need to be collected from an agent to be of use for most respondents.
10At first, a few respondents were reluctant to take the money, but in the end, everyone did. As
payment confirmation, I collected payment receipts for every lottery winner from the interviewers, i.e.,
each transfer they made was documented and included the date, account number, and name of the
recipient.
11We used Stata’s (Version 16.0) random number generator to conduct the randomization and loaded
the allocation into the software. 50% is only approximate for strata of an odd size.
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of the group as well as the number of previous phone survey waves for which we collected
an interview.12 Each stratum was constructed such that it comprises at least 16 groups.13
Position of questions. As I want to investigate the respondents’ perceptions about the
fairness of the lottery and survey compensation in general, I included related questions
at the end of the interview. Since I expected these perceptions to change depending
on whether or not the respondent was lucky and won the lottery, these questions were
randomly placed before or after the information about the lottery’s outcome. The CATI
software independently randomized the position of the questions. With a 50% chance,
the respondent was asked the question before being informed about whether or not they
won and with a 50% chance afterward.14 Thus leaving us with three distinct experimen-
tal groups of interest: those answering the questions after they won the lottery, those
responding after they lost, and those answering before being informed. For details on the
questionnaire module, refer to section D.A in appendix D.
Compensation level in question. In a survey experiment, the respondents are asked
to judge how fair they feel a specific amount of money is as compensation for participating
in a survey. This specific amount varied randomly between three levels: 80 Kwacha (the
amount they can win in the lottery), 40 Kwacha (the amount that could be paid to every
respondent keeping the total amount spent equal), and no compensation (which was the
case in all previous phone survey waves in this panel). How the respondents interpret
fairness is left up to them.15 They can say it is fair, unfair, or neither. Further, they
are asked to distinguish between it being unfair because the amount is too high or too
low. This survey experiment allows me to get at the appropriateness of different levels
of survey compensation outside of a direct comparison which might cause framing effects.
While this comes at the cost of sample size compared to, for example, asking about all
amounts at once, I want to know whether 40 Kwacha is believed to be appropriate as such
and not when compared to 80 Kwacha or nothing. Asking about 80 Kwacha might change
the answer to the question related to 40 Kwacha, and one might expect that respondents
are nudged to give monotonic replies, i.e., if 40 Kwacha is reported to be unfair, then no
compensation is also reported to be unfair, whereas in isolation a different answer might
be given. Due to the lottery, respondents might already be primed towards 80 Kwacha
12The number of survey waves was generally divided into three categories: up to 5, 6-10, and 11-16
successful interviews. We chose to stratify across previous phone survey waves as the response rate is
the primary outcome of the investigation for which we implemented the lottery incentive.
13In two cases in which strata were too small, two neighboring categories of number of survey waves
were combined for these province and NGO combinations.
14I used ODK’s (Version 1.28) build-in random number generator for the randomization.
15E.g., they might take themselves, who so far did not receive any compensation, as a reference, or
they could judge fairness with respect to the time it takes to participate in a survey.
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(the winning amount). These priming effects might be more pronounced for those asked
after the lottery compared to those asked before.
4.2.2. Randomization fidelity and limitations
If everything were implemented according to instructions, respondents would not select
into sample based on the treatment. About 97% of the target population is part of
the sample, and I detect no differences across treatment arms. However, respondents
answering the fairness-related questions after having lost the lottery are 5 percentage
points more likely (significant at 10% level) to have had a full interview prior to the
experiment. The difference between any and a full interview is that there is only a full
interview if the group was active in the months since the last phone survey. I conducted
robustness checks including a dummy for full interview. Overall this does not affect the
results.
Further, since the position of the fairness-related questions and the compensation
level question experiment were independently randomized, I checked whether there is
evidence of dependence. I find no such evidence further strengthening the idea that the
experiment was implemented as designed and no adjustments are needed. The lottery
itself was randomized before the data collection and loaded into the CATI tool, such that
the interviewers were not able to affect which respondents win or lose the lottery.16
While the lottery treatment was stratified by group characteristics, the interviewer
might play an important role in this context. Since the interviewers were not randomized
to the groups, there is potentially a correlation between interviewer and treatment assign-
ment. This means that if interviewers affect respondent behavior or if they differently
document the respondent’s answers this could lead to spurious findings. Including inter-
viewer fixed effects tends to lead to small increases in precision and effect sizes.17 This
suggests that the interviewer indeed affects the respondents’ responses and that there is
a correlation between the interviewer and treatment assignment.
Since the purpose of this survey was to collect information on the respondent’s savings
group, I cannot associate any outcomes or effects with respondent characteristics. The
only information specifically relating to the respondent are their perceptions about survey
compensation studied in the following sections. I plan to remedy this limitation by
asking additional questions about the respondent’s characteristics and their perceptions
unrelated to survey compensation in a future data collection. While I expect this to be
fruitful, there is the possibility that not all respondents will be covered because they no
16This was also communicated to and by the interviewers that the outcome of the lottery would not
change if the interview is repeated and is not affected by the responses provided during the interview.
17Note that I present my findings excluding the interviewer fixed effects as the additional precision
does not result in more findings and the increases in effect sizes are only small.
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longer participate in the survey or are no longer part of the savings group.
4.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
My main specification is an OLS regression of the following form:




where Yi is the outcome of interest, DWon and DLost are indicators for whether they won
or lost the lottery before answering the questions, δj refers to strata fixed effects. The
standard errors ϵi are Eicker-Huber-White standard errors.18 The reported parameters
are the estimates β̂ and γ̂ of the average effects.
4.3.1. General perceptions about survey compensation
Table 4.2: General perceptions about survey compensation
Respondent compensation Either all or none Group compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Level Agree Strongly Level Agree Strongly Level Agree Strongly
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lost lottery 0.23∗ 0.03 0.13∗ 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08∗
(0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04)
Won lottery 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.15 -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 -0.09+ -0.03
(0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04)
F-test: Won=Lost 0.19 0.95 0.25 0.20 0.33 0.58 0.90 0.54 0.20
Adj. R2 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.42
Mean: Questions first 4.02 0.80 0.33 3.66 0.65 0.20 3.37 0.47 0.27
Observations 490 490 490 491 491 491 493 493 493
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Columns (1)-(3) refer to statement ”Survey respondents should be compensated for their
participation in a survey interview”, columns (4)-(6) refer to ”Either all or none of the respondents
in a survey should be compensated”, and columns (7)-(9) refer to ”When there is a compensa-
tion paid to a respondent for taking part in an interview about her/his savings group, then the
compensation should be shared with the group”. Respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point
scale from strongly disagree (=1) to strongly agree (=5). Level refers to the numeric value of the
scale, Agree refers to a dummy for whether the respondent answered agree or strongly agree, and
Strongly refers to a dummy for whether the respondent answered strongly agree. For more details
on the questions and distribution of responses refer to D.A. Number of observations varies due to
don’t know and refuse to answer. All estimations presented in this table include strata, but no
interviewer fixed effects.
Before going into more detail about the perceptions related to the lottery we imple-
mented, I first want to discuss respondents’ perceptions related to survey compensation in
general based on three questions relating to (i) should there be compensation, (ii) should
it be equal across respondents, and (iii) should it be shared with the savings group.
18I used Stata’s (Version 16.0) reg command with the robust specification for standard errors.
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The first question asked whether the respondent agrees that survey participants should
be compensated. The vast majority agree, and less than 10% disagree. From columns
(2) and (3) of Table 4.2 we can see that this belief is strengthened after losing the lottery.
When asked after experiencing the loss, 13 percentage points more respondents strongly
agree that there should be survey compensation. But I do not find an effect on agreeing,
indicating opinions do not change but rather are strengthened.
With the second question, I try to get a better idea about what matters in terms of
fairness. The respondents are asked whether they agree that either all or none of the
respondents of a survey should be compensated. Agreeing with this statement implies
(strong) preferences for equal treatment. Most respondents agree with the statement,
but it is a smaller share compared to the question about compensation, and about 20%
disagree. From columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.2 we do not find a difference depending on
whether they won or lost the lottery before being asked the question. One might expect
to see some changes, e.g., the winners having won but knowing that others did not, might
prefer this scenario compared to the situation in which no one got compensated. However,
this question was not about this specific survey, and all respondents had the chance to win
the lottery, so everyone was equally compensated from an ex-ante point of view. Thus,
based on stated preferences, equal treatment seems to matter to most of the respondents.
The third question inquires about sharing any compensation with their savings group.
Reportedly there were disputes in a few savings groups after respondents did not share
the compensation they received for participating in the endline survey with their groups.
Opinions are mixed, about 50% of respondents agree, while about 30% disagree and
20% neither agree nor disagree. Columns (7) to (9) of Table 4.2 seem to indicate that
being asked this question after the lottery makes respondents tend to disagree with this
statement. This might be explained by the lottery being more on top of their head,
making the trade-off between self-interest and interest for others more salient to them.
4.3.2. Perceptions about implemented lottery
The respondents were asked how fair they think that some respondents win 80 Kwacha
in the lottery while others do not. They were able to answer on a 5-point scale from
Very unfair(=1) to Very fair(=5). When asked before they participate in the lottery, the
average value of about 3 corresponds to neither fair nor unfair, but opinions are polarized,
with about 50% thinking it is fair and about 45% thinking it is unfair. Columns (1) to (3)
of Table 4.3 inform us about how this opinion changes when the respondents are asked
after winning or losing in the lottery instead of before. After losing, 11 percentage points
fewer respondents think that the lottery is fair, whereas after winning, 12 percentage
points more respondents hold this opinion. For the stronger opinion that the lottery
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Table 4.3: Perceptions about implemented lottery
Fairness Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level Yes Very Level Yes Very
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lost lottery -0.42∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.05+ -0.68∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.13) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04)
Won lottery 0.29∗ 0.12∗ 0.07+ 0.21∗ 0.01 0.26∗∗
(0.13) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05)
F-test: Won=Lost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 0.31 0.25 0.11 0.30 0.19 0.24
Mean: Questions first 2.92 0.49 0.10 4.04 0.87 0.23
Observations 492 492 492 491 491 491
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Columns (1)-(3) refer to question ”How fair do you think it is that some
respondents win 80 Kwacha in the lottery while others do not”, and columns (4)-
(6) refer to ”How satisfied are you that you had/have a chance to win 80 Kwacha
for your participation in the interview”. Respondents were asked to answer on a
5-point scale from very unfair (=1) to very fair (=5). Level refers to the numeric
value of the scale, Yes refers to a dummy for whether the respondent answered
fair or very fair, and Very refers to a dummy for whether the respondent answered
very fair. For more details on the questions and distribution of responses refer to
D.A. Number of observations varies due to don’t know and refuse to answer.All
estimations presented in this table include strata, but no interviewer fixed effects.
is very fair estimated effects are not significant at the 5% level. I find a decrease of
5 percentage points for those losing and an increase of 7 percentage points for those
winning. Considerable effects sizes, given the prevalence of 10% among those being asked
the questions before the lottery.
One concern is that fairness is a vague concept and can mean different things to differ-
ent people. To distinguish fairness from their satisfaction about winning, the respondents
were asked how satisfied they are about the fact that they have or had the chance to win
80 Kwacha. They gave answers on a 5-point scale from Very dissatisfied(=1) to Very
satisfied(=5), and when asked before the lottery, the average value was 4, which corre-
sponds to being satisfied. A majority of 87% reported being satisfied with being offered
the lottery, giving support to the idea that the measured fairness perception is about the
unequal treatment rather than the value of potential winnings. From columns (4) to (6)
from Table 4.3 we can confirm what we would expect that losing is dissatisfying while
winning is satisfying. Losing makes 30% of respondents unsatisfied and 12% not very
satisfied. On the other hand, winning makes 26% very satisfied, while it does not make
anyone satisfied. This suggests that the minority unsatisfied with the lottery cannot be
swayed from their opinion by winning. Whether this is due to fairness considerations, a
too-small winning amount or something else is not clear.
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4.3.3. Appropriate compensation level
In the survey experiment, the respondents are asked to judge a hypothetical compensation
for survey participation, the level of which is randomly varied between no compensation,
40 Kwacha, and 80 Kwacha. The outcome of interest is whether or not the compensation
level is deemed fair. Note that those that do not consider the compensation level as fair
do not necessarily perceive it unfair; about 10% perceive it as neither fair nor unfair. In
the following, I, therefore, look at both the comparison between fair vs. not fair and fair
vs. unfair. Since the sample size does not allow me to distinguish between the differences
of compensation levels based on lottery outcomes, I consider the following reduced model,
which only differentiates between whether the compensation was 40 or 80 Kwacha and
whether the question was posed after a win or loss but without interactions.19




where Yi is an indicator for whether the compensation is deemed fair, DWon and DLost
are indicators for whether they won or lost the lottery before answering the questions,
D40 and D80 are indicators for whether the question inquired about 40 or 80 Kwacha, δj
refers to strata or interviewer fixed effects. The standard errors ϵi are Eicker-Huber-White
standard errors.20
When asked about no compensation, 55-65% of respondents report that this is fair.
From Table 4.4 we can see that when asked about 40 Kwacha, there is no difference, while
when asked about 80 Kwacha instead, 20-30 percentage point more respondents deem
this level of compensation to be fair. So while a slight majority believe no compensation
to be fair, a significant share only considers it fair when there is a sufficiently high
compensation, where sufficiently high means higher than some cut-off between 40 and
80 Kwacha. Further note that respondents who lost the lottery before being asked the
question are about 10 percentage points less likely to believe the compensation level is
fair, while I detect no effects for those that won.
19For the analysis of a model including the interactions, refer to section D.B in appendix D.
20I used Stata’s (Version 16.0) reg command with the robust specification for standard errors.
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Table 4.4: Reduced specification of survey experiment
Compensation is fair vs not fair Compensation is fair vs unfair
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
α40 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
α80 0.28∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
β 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
γ -0.10+ -0.12∗ -0.11∗ -0.12∗ -0.09+ -0.10∗ -0.10∗ -0.10∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
F-tests:
α40 = α80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
β = γ 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.05
Model description:
Strata FE 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
Enumerator FE 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Adj. R2 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.28 0.19 0.32
Mean: no compensation 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63
Observations 490 490 490 490 448 448 448 448
Notes. Columns (1)-(4) refer to various specifications with an outcome that is 1 if the compensation
is deemed fair and 0 otherwise. Columns (5)-(8) refer to various specifications with an outcome
that is 1 if the compensation is deemed fair and 0 if it is deemed unfair, omitting respondents that
deem it neither fair nor unfair. Specifications differ depending on whether interviewer or strata
fixed effects are included. β and γ are estimates for the effect of having won or lost the lottery
before answering the questions, α40 and α80 are estimates for the compensation level being 40
and 80 Kwacha. The omitted categories are no compensation and being asked the question before
the lottery draw. Rows under F-tests display corresponding p-values. A more elaborate model
including all interaction terms is presented in Table D.1 in section D.B in appendix D.
4.4. CONCLUSION
To spotlight ethical aspects related to survey participation compensation in increasingly
more frequently conducted phone surveys in LMICs, I study respondents’ perceptions
about such compensation in a phone survey targeting savings group representatives in
rural Zambia. The survey under study is part of a panel, and respondents were com-
pensated with a lottery in which they had a 50% chance to win 80 Kwacha for the first
time in this panel. About 4 out of 5 respondents agree that survey participants should
be compensated, an opinion that is more pronounced in those who have lost the lottery.
From a survey experiment, I conclude that about half the respondents deem it fair when
there is no compensation. Compensation needs to be at least somewhere between 40
and 80 Kwacha for a considerable share of respondents to change their minds. This is in
line with Leo and Morello (2016) who do not find differential effects on response rates
across incentive levels in their experiment as the US$ value of their highest incentive
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level of 1 US$ was well below 40 Kwacha (approx. 1.95 US$ at the time of the study).21
Note that those who lost the lottery tend to report more often that any of the three
compensation levels is unfair, similar to the finding that they are more likely to agree
that there should be compensation. Further, more than half of the respondents report a
strong preference for fairness and equal outcomes by agreeing that either all or none of
the respondents should be compensated. This is similar to Singer et al. (1999) who find
that three-quarters of respondents deem refusal conversion payments as unfair. About
half of the respondents also agree that if a respondent gives information about their sav-
ings group, this respondent is supposed to share any compensation they receive. I find no
evidence that these opinions about fairness related to survey participation compensation,
in general, are affected depending on whether or not the respondent has won or lost the
lottery.
Random allocations, such as the common practice of experimental research, are sub-
ject to various criticisms. Many in the research community raise ethical concerns related
to the fairness implied by arbitrarily unequal resource allocation (Rayzberg (2019) sum-
marized this discussion recently). More information about how participants evaluate the
fairness of such research designs could inform these discussions. For perceptions directly
related to this survey’s lottery compensation, I do find that fairness perceptions change
depending on whether or not the respondent won or lost the lottery. While initially
opinions are mixed, with about 50% of respondents agreeing that the lottery is fair, while
about 40% disagree, winning makes it about 10 percentage points more likely that a
respondent agrees, whereas losing makes it about 10 percentage points less likely. Thus
the lottery creates a gap of 20 percentage points in ex-post perceptions. Note that a
respondent’s fairness perception is difficult to disentangle from their satisfaction with the
lottery outcome, and this should be kept in mind as a caveat to my results. This being
said, the evidence presented in this study indicates that respondents evaluate the fairness
of a lottery differently after its outcome. Extrapolating my findings to a case in which
study participants’ opinion about the fairness of an experiment changes after the study is
implemented might raise concerns about the validity of their initial consent. How should
we think about the consent to participate in an experiment when the participant’s opinion
about the fairness of randomization changes in a predictable manner after the random
draw? More research into the persistence of such changes and fairness perceptions in
different contexts is needed to evaluate such concerns more thoroughly.
21Leo and Morello (2016) implemented the experiments with varying incentives to study response
behavior in Tanzania and Ghana in 2015. Of course, it is difficult to compare US$ values across countries
and time. Still, the comparison might be justified as the GDP per capita of Zambia in 2020 lies between
that of Ghana and Tanzania in 2015.
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CHAPTER 5
HOW InFORmED IS COnSEnT?
WITH ALEXAnDRA AVDEEnKO
5.1. INTRODUCTION
With an increase in primary data collections and field research, the development of ade-
quate policies and practices to ensure scientific integrity is critical. Meeting high ethical
and legal standards continues to be among field work’s core challenges and requirements
and is essential to form stronger norms and trust in the results (Asiedu et al. 2021; Gueron
2017).
Formally, research and data protection guidelines command that the purpose of a data
collection and information about data processing need to be in clear and simple language,
understandable, and easily accessible. Research teams present this information when they
first encounter potential survey respondents. To acquire informed consent, the teams
usually follow specific procedures. After a short introduction, a standardized text lays
out the rights of the respondents and the risks of harm associated with participating in a
research study. The interview or intervention only proceeds if consent is given.1 However,
it is not clear whether these procedures sufficiently inform potential participants about
their rights and the risks with respect to data protection, especially in largely illiterate
populations often studied by development economists.
The topic of informed consent gained little attention in economics, despite its ethical
and methodological implications. Carefully explaining (legal) rights to individuals is a
core element of numerous empowerment programs in Low- and middle-income countrys
(LMICs). Yet less attention has been paid to raising awareness about the value of personal
information in this context. Acquiring genuinely informed consent to the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal data is essential for at least three reasons: (1) the ethical
1For more details on the process, read Glennerster (2017) on“The Practicalities of Running Ran-
domized Evaluations: Partnerships, Measurement, Ethics, and Transparency” which covers the practical
ethical issues a researcher conducting randomized evaluations must take into account when designing and
carrying out their research. For the far-reaching legal implications of providing consent, please refer to
Solove (2012), who also discusses the problems of “the uninformed individual” stemming from common
cognitive problems which undermine privacy self-management.
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aspects related to different levels of being informed, (2) the data quality, and (3) the
external validity of results and policies. First, ethical research requires informed consent
of its study participants, not only consent. Data collection, storage, and analysis may
expose the poor to a range of new vulnerabilities.2 Especially when surveys are collected
in countries with low literacy rates and low levels of education, practices like “consent
forms” might fail to fully and sufficiently inform the respondent.3 Presented with complex
and abstract concepts, terms such as “data protection” and “confidentiality”, the often
illiterate study population is asked to give consent potentially without fully understanding
the implications. Further, the survey may raise wrong expectations of immediate aid.4
A lack of understanding of the research purpose may effectively coerce vulnerable people
in need into participation. Second, methodologically, a better understanding of rights
may alter data quality. Yet, once accurately informed, low consent rates could present
a real risk to research studies, putting an additional burden on research budgets and
timelines. Requiring informed consent may also affect data quality and even conflict
with the study design. Finally, the topic is related to a highly relevant aspect of field
experiments: External validity. Alternative approaches to inform people about their
data protection rights and the purpose of collecting personalized information need to
consider potential implications for the representativeness of the research sample.5 In
essence, this study relates to the challenges to find regulations for the usage of private
data given the complexity of the topic and behavioral biases involved (Acquisti et al. 2007,
2016; Benndorf and Normann 2018) and to the debate on credibility, replicability, and
transparency of economic research which questions the standard economic approaches to
conducting empirical research (Asiedu et al. 2021; Christensen and Miguel 2018; Kaplan
2Hilbert (2016), for instance, argues that the caveats of the Big Data debate, such as privacy concerns
and human resource scarcity, would be aggravated in LMICs by long-standing structural shortages in
the areas of infrastructure, economic resources, and institutions.
3Even though the respondent is undoubtedly aware that she provides information during an interview,
it is not always clear whether she is aware of the consequences of doing so. And even if consent might
be assumed to be implicit in a survey setting, this implicit consent applies to the data collection itself,
but not necessarily to data storage and analysis.
4Instead of considering what happens to their data, respondents often expect that their lives will
improve directly or indirectly as an outcome of the interaction with the research teams (Alderman 2013).
The large majority of aid programs applies targeting which largely relies on surveys, and not surprisingly,
research participants may expect to become eligible for a program.
5Duflo et al. (2007) have a whole section on the topic “External Validity and Generalizing Randomized
Evaluations” laying out the relevance of the issue. They broadly define “external validity” as “validity
whether the impact we measure would carry over to other samples or populations”. If, in our setting, the
willingness to participate in a study is affected by the consent process, this indicates that requiring and
obtaining informed consent might create selection into the sample. If the provision of consent and being
informed is related to the characteristics of potential respondents, this could bias statistics derived from
the survey for the actual population of interest.
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et al. 2020; Ludwig et al. 2019; Olken 2015; Ravallion 2020).6
In this study, we ask the following research questions: Are potential respondents more
likely to decline an interview if the consent form is presented differently? How informed
are respondents, and can amended procedures improve understanding? Does it affect the
quality of their responses? The answers are hard to anticipate, and there is little to no
empirical evidence to go on. To shed light on this topic, we approach 3,964 potential
research participants in rural Sindh, Pakistan, in winter and spring 2021. The illiteracy
rates in rural Sindh are high, as are the needs of the people.7 We randomly varied two
alternative approaches of presenting the consent form and assessed their understanding.
First, instead of only reading out the consent form, the enumerator presented a short video
to the potential respondent, which visualized processes related to confidentiality and data
protection and the interview itself. 44% of potential respondents were assigned to this
treatment. Additionally, a second approach to increase informedness which combined the
video with an interactive scripted process, was assigned to 6% of potential respondents.
During this process, the enumerator read the consent form, but between paragraphs
asked questions about the information in the paragraphs to check whether the respondent
retained the information and to engage her. If the responses indicated misunderstanding,
the enumerator repeated the relevant information. This experimental design allows us to
study whether alternative approaches change response behavior and the understanding
of respondents and whether the two are related.
In the first set of results, we study the level of understanding of the consent form
content. Using objective measures, we find that overall, respondents are not sufficiently
informed. Less than 20% respondents are well informed, i.e., assess five out of six state-
ments related to informed consent correctly. On average, a respondent assesses only 58%
of the questions accurately, only 8 percentage points more compared to random guessing.
Study participants have particularly little knowledge related to the voluntary nature of
participation in the study, and only about every fifth person understands the purpose of
the data collection.
Second, we tested whether the procedures to acquire informed consent should be
amended. The goal was to find ways to improve information provision at the beginning
of an interview. We find that the combination of watching a video and being presented
the consent form in an interactive process improves the informedness of respondents.
6The debate has spurred the emergence of alternative approaches, the usage of pre-analysis plans,
platforms to predict research results, more piloting, and critical information to be added and discussed
in research papers. For example, intending to strengthen the norms, Asiedu et al. (2021) promote the
usage of structured ethics appendices in social science papers.
7According to the Bureau of Statistics, the literacy ratio in rural Sindh was 44.1% in 2017/8, and
Sindh had a (moderate or severe) underweight prevalence of 42 % Link.
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Compared to the control group, a treated respondent is about 9 percentage points more
likely to assess questions related to the voluntary nature of participation correctly. On
the other hand, self-reported understanding decreases with alternative approaches. Given
that self-reported understanding is not reflecting the understanding according to our ob-
jective measurement (i.e., it could reflect overconfidence in understanding), this detected
decrease might be preferred.
Third, we elaborate on potential implications for the survey data quality. While
researchers want respondents to be informed about their participation in a study, about
their rights, and what will happen with the data, it is well-known that humans - once
informed of being studied - might behave differently (the so-called Hawthrown effects).
Survey respondents might provide more accurate information or overall more information
during the interview, depending on whether the intervention increased or decreased their
willingness to provide information. We find that the augmented process of inquiring
consent does not affect consent rates, which are overall very high in our sample. Given
that the consent rate is close to 100% and not affected by the treatments, we do not
investigate any effects on sample composition. Finally, we investigate item non-response
rates, i.e., the share of questions for which the respondent did not respond. We find
no effects on response behavior on this intensive margin. This provides evidence that
concerns related to trade-offs between informing respondents and response behavior are
negligible for our process.
Our study contributes to a better understanding of how to improve the adaption
of survey research protocols to vulnerable populations, especially in field experiments.
The design of our study can be informed by evidence from medical sciences, yet it is
unprecedented in the field of development economics.8 In medicine, several studies look
at informed consent. For example, Stanley et al. (1998) compare a routine consent with
one that includes a comprehension questionnaire. The evidence indicates that one in
four patients have a poor understanding of the risks and complications of the procedures.
8Glennerster (2017) discusses the practical aspects of obtaining informed consent, yet this is based
on legal and ethical requirements and does not address empirical implications. Alderman (2013) address
practical concerns of how to collect consent in difficult situations, yet only by collecting and describing
anecdotal evidence. These discussions are critical as they discuss necessary conditions, but it remains
unclear whether they are sufficient. In medicine, see on this topic Fitzgerald et al. 2002; Hutton et al.
2008; Miller and Boulton 2007; Stunkel et al. 2010 and a meta-study by Falagas et al. (2009). Overall,
many practices in economic research are still behind medical sciences in terms of credibility, replicability,
and transparency. See a comparative analysis of the two disciplines by Favereau (2016) and Avdeenko
and Frölich (2020). An important distinction to medical science is that economists do often not design
the programs they evaluate, i.e., there is a clear difference between the policy content and the research
protocols applied, which is demonstrated in “randomizing religion” Bryan et al. (2021). The researchers
thoroughly discuss and address the ethical considerations of their research yet are not responsible for the
policy that would have been implemented anyway.
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Yet, medical science differs from social science in important ways which directly relate to
the provision of consent. For medical procedures, a lack of consent might mean that a
terminal condition remains untreated. In a situation with no real choice of alternatives,
patients might willfully ignore the information provided by the doctor as it might only
induce stress and worry without changing their choice. Further, despite being concerned
with the same question of “how much information is enough”, research in this field is
mostly conducted in high-income countries, and studies are often underpowered. Our
study also relates to the literature on the importance of privacy and data protection
(Acquisti et al. 2016), with its increasing relevance for digital economics (Goldfarb and
Tucker 2019). In their overview article, Acquisti et al. (2016) elaborate on the observa-
tion that consumers would rarely (if ever) completely be aware of privacy threats and
the consequences of sharing and protecting their personal information. Hence, market
interactions involving personal data would often occur in the absence of individuals’ fully
informed consent. Moreover, research on consumer behavior has found that opt-in con-
sent could benefit established firms whom consumers seem to trust more (Campbell et al.
2015). In several laboratory experiments, economists have studied whether data sharing
is a rational decision, starting with whether and how much people would value their pri-
vacy.9 For instance, Benndorf and Normann (2018) study the willingness to sell data and
find that only a minority of data holders are unwilling to sell their data for commercial
purposes. Benndorf et al. (2015) study the voluntariness of private information disclosure
and find that voluntary disclosure of private information might result in an unraveling of
privacy. Finally, Marreiros et al. (2017) show that study participants would disclose less
private information when exposed to information regarding privacy.
This is the first experimental study to investigate the understanding of privacy regu-
lations at a larger scale. We are the first to test whether and how informed consent can
be improved with several thousand data holders in a real-world setting. More specifically,
we work with a highly vulnerable population in a context of high levels of illiteracy and
poverty, describe a lack of an understanding of data regulations, and test modern means
of communication to improve informedness. We find that our study participants display
a poor understanding of their rights and risks and that this could be improved through
paying more attention and time to this topic. We also show that this improvement does
not come at a cost for external validity.
If individual consent to research is placed above the greater public good, which could
be generated from innovative evidence, access to services may suffer. Again, debates on
9See, e.g., Acquisti et al. (2007); Benndorf et al. (2015); Benndorf and Normann (2018); Beresford
et al. (2012); Fast and Schnurr (2020); Feri et al. (2016); Marreiros et al. (2017); Schudy and Utikal
(2017).
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the potential institutionalization of inequalities and evidence from medical research are
informative.10 In Canada, for instance, obtaining written informed consent for partici-
pation in a stroke registry led to important selection biases such that registry patients
were not representative of the typical stroke patient (Tu et al. 2004). Despite great mo-
bilization efforts to register individuals for a disease register, no general, valid scientific
conclusions could be made. In economics, this study relates to the work on selection into
surveys, specifically into lab or field experiments, and the credibility of such evidence.
Schulz et al. (2019), for instance, find that mentioning financial incentives boosts the
participation rate in lab experiments by 50 percent and that more selfish individuals and
individuals with higher cognitive reflection scores are more likely to participate in exper-
iments. Our findings further question the motivation for participating in research, which
can have clear implications for the external validity of the results generated. Furthermore
and more generally, the study is related to research that uses experimental methods to
identify biases in survey responses and develop methods to reduce them (Blattman et al.
2016; Karlan and Zinman 2012).
We believe that further investigations on improving the understanding of and deci-
sions about the costs and benefits associated with data sharing in this specific context are
far-sighted. The evidence from our work supports the usage of structures ethical consent
approaches, which are interactive and carefully adjusted to the population studied. Our
results have implications for the potential way ethics and quality of data collections could
be improved. First, using additional evidence from a pilot that preceded the study, we
show that even well-educated and experienced enumerators are little aware that the re-
spondents are free not to participate in the survey. Thus, the fact that study participants
are not aware of their rights starts earlier in the process and could be tackled already by
giving enumerators a more in-depth training on data protection, the purpose of use, and
processing. Far beyond the research conducted, this could help shape an occupational
curriculum that eventually would formalize the work of (often free-lance) enumerators.
Second, study participants need to be better informed about the purposes, consequences,
and the voluntary nature of their data provision. To explain their voluntary participation,
a more interactive and illustrative approach could yield higher levels of understanding
and informedness.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 5.2, we describe the back-
ground and experimental design. Section 5.3 describes our empirical strategy, data, lim-
itations, and findings. Finally, section 5.4 discusses the results further and describes
planned or ongoing additions to the study.




To design our intervention, we first conducted a review of relevant guidelines and examples.
We are interested in current practices of how informed consent is obtained during surveys.
We focus primarily on social sciences and, in particular, on the work conducted in LMICs
where illiterate and uneducated respondents are often targeted.
Systematically reviewing guidelines and legal codes, we first tried to distill principles
of what informed consent should contain in our context. While many guidelines are
tailored to medical and experimental research, some deal solely with data protection.
Considering the vast amount of different codes across disciplines and countries as well as
the great overlap of content, we focused on only three: An international code of conduct in
social science research published by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) (de Guchteneire 2014), the United States (US) code of federal
regulations on the protection of human subjects (45 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
46), and the European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Given that our study focuses on survey research, we narrowed the principles of what
the respondent should be informed about down to the following: (1) identity and con-
tact information of the research teams; (2) purpose of data collection and research; (3)
expected duration of participation, (4) risks, benefits, or consequences of participation;
(5) voluntary nature of participation and right to withdraw consent; (6) (limitations of)
confidentiality of records. We further divided the latter into (a) the recipients of data
(including the risk of transfer into other legal systems), (b) the duration of storage, (c) the
right to complain, and (d) the procedures to ensure confidentiality. This narrows in on
data protection issues and omits experimental protocols, which we deemed appropriate
in our context of data collection.
In addition to these theoretical guidelines, we wanted to conduct a reality check.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any database that consistently collects consent forms.
Thus we searched the Datahub for Field Experiments in Economics and Public Policy of
Harvard Dataverse for consent forms used by researchers in economics.11 On September
30th 2019, there was a total of 147 entries. We found 59 entries that provided access
to questionnaires, 39 of which included a consent form12 34 of which were available in
11Harvard Dataverse is an open-source research data repository. The Datahub for Field Experiments
in Economics and Public Policy is accessible via the following link: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataverse/DFEEP. Accessed on November 20th, 2019.
12Some of the remainders indicated the existence of such a consent form without giving direct access
to it.
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English.13 Of course, this might not be representative of all field research conducted by
economists but is a selection of rather popular studies. Further, we collected consent forms
from major surveys which are conducted in several countries such as the Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS) or Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS). We designed
the treatment arms based on this information, starting with the business-as-usual consent
form, which represents our reference group.
5.2.2. Pilot of survey instrument
With our survey instrument, we aimed to measure objective and subjective understanding
of the study purpose, voluntarism, data confidentiality, and rights w.r.t. data protec-
tion.14 We tested our survey instrument during an enumerator training for a different
data collection in the same geographical area. During the training, potential enumera-
tors had to answer questions related to the content of the training.15 While the survey
instrument was the same, the questions referred to a slightly different information text
which was used in the survey the enumerators were hired for. Results from the pilot
are presented in Table 5.1. For our objective measures of understanding, this might be
considered as a benchmark of what is possible. In our context, enumerators are usually
more educated and experienced with surveys compared to respondents. Further, they
answered these questions as part of a test, so arguably, they were motivated to get it
right. For our subjective measures of understanding, on the other hand, the potential
enumerators could have been concerned about admitting that they did not understand
certain aspects well.
From Table 5.1 we can see that the enumerators had problems with the questions
related to voluntarism. This is especially concerning since enumerators need to ensure
or facilitate these aspects during a survey. Only 6% of enumerators correctly assessed
both that the respondents (i) are free not to participate in the survey and (ii) can decline
to answer specific questions (20% and 13% correctly assessed the respective statement).
Only every third enumerator correctly understands the purpose of the data collection,
despite having participated in extensive training before. Our pilot is the first indicator
that even amongst enumerators, who are usually more educated and experienced with
surveys than respondents, a general problem with understanding the purpose, rights,
and obligations during a data collection exists. When asking about their subjective
13Note that there are duplicates, as several entries can relate to the same data collection.
14For more details about the questions, please refer to appendix E.B.
15We included our survey instrument in the test and, after the test, asked the potential enumerators
for consent to use their test data in a research study. A total of 115 potential enumerators gave their
consent. Whether or not the potential enumerators were hired depended, among other things, on their
performance on the test.
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Table 5.1: Understanding in enumerator pilot study
Overall Rights Purpose Voluntary Confidentiality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Objective understanding
Share of informed 2% 36% & 72% 29.6% 13% & 20% 99%
Subjective understanding
Share understanding 73% 87% 94% 85% 93%
Objective and subjective
High and high 1% 30% 29% 7% 92%
Low and high 72% 59% 65% 78% 1%
High and low 0% 4% 1% 0% 7%
Low and low 27% 7% 5% 15% 0%
Notes. The table displays a summary of responses to our survey instrument of 115 potential enumera-
tors participating in a training for a different survey but in the same region. Columns (2)-(5) each refers
to one of four aspects of informed consent we inquired about, and column (1) to a summary measure
across aspects. The objective understanding of the aspects rights with respect to data protection and
voluntary nature of participation (columns (2) and (4)) are measured based on two items the shares of
which are given in the respective columns. For details on the questions refer to appendix E.B.
understanding, the enumerators reported that they understood the different aspects well.
There is little to no relation between how well the enumerators felt they understood the
aspects and whether they answered related questions correctly.
5.2.3. Experimental design
In the following, we describe our intervention and treatment arms. The different ap-
proaches are integrated into the Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) survey
tool. At the beginning of each interview, the consent form is randomized to either the
business-as-usual, Audio-visual Supported Consent Form (ACF), or Audio-visual Sup-
ported and Scripted Interactive Consent Form (ASCF) approach described below. Since
the study is an independent add-on to a different study, we want to minimize any poten-
tial influence on the main survey. Therefore, 50% of potential respondents are assigned
to the control group, 44% to the ACF treatment, and only 6% of potential respondents
are assigned to the full ASCF treatment.16 Moreover, we undertook several efforts to
contextualize this research design in the local context. The exact phrasing of the vari-
ous approaches was decided after discussions with local experts and with feedback from
several Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). All content was translated into the
16The survey is collected using SurveyCTO, and the treatment is randomized using the build-in
random number generator. One could imagine that an enumerator with a preference over treatments will
create new forms to avoid specific treatment arms. However, before the randomization, the enumerator
already needs to fill in some information. The effort of creating a new form should keep her from doing
so if not necessary. Comparing the actual treatment assignment probabilities to the theoretical ones we
only find small differences.
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respective local languages.
Control Group: Business-as-usual Consent Form. Currently, the common practice
of obtaining informed consent for survey participation is asking the potential respondent
to read about one page of information, the so-called consent form. This shall ensure
that all aspects of informed consent are addressed. Depending on the survey and who is
conducting it, the procedure varies in length. Given that the respondents of surveys in
LMICs are often not literate, it is common practice that the interviewers read the consent
form to the respondents. Consent is then usually obtained either written, by a signature or
a similar practice, or oral. As the survey was collected during the COVID-19 pandemic,
consent was obtained through recorded oral statements. We want to test alternative
approaches against this benchmark in a real-world survey setting in this research project.
The information text presented to the potential respondent and further details for all
treatment arms see appendix E.A.
Treatment Group 1: Audio-visual Supported Consent Form (ACF). The first
experimental variation is an ACF. In our context, we expect most respondents to be
illiterate or to have low reading abilities.17 Instead of asking the enumerator to read
out the consent form, they will first be asked to present a short video to the potential
respondent. In addition to reading the text of the consent form, the video tries to visually
illustrate processes concerning confidentiality and data protection and the interview itself.
This part of the treatment has several potential advantages over the benchmark. The
process is normed such that each respondent receives the same information. Further,
being visually engaged might increase attention and can make abstract concepts more
available to the respondents.
Treatment Group 2: Audio-visual Supported and Scripted Interactive Con-
sent Form (ASCF). The second experimental variation is an ASCF. It combines the
ACF with a scripted and interactive reading of the consent form. Even though the re-
spondent is encouraged to ask questions during the benchmark approach, they rarely
take advantage of this. Both the benchmark and ACF approach tend to be passive. To
actively engage the potential respondent in the process, we include questions about the
content of the consent form between paragraphs to check whether the respondent retained
the information. If the responses indicate misunderstanding, the relevant information is
repeated. We expect this to encourage the respondents to listen actively and keep more
information presented in the consent form.
17A large-scale data collection was conducted in this area in 2016. Based on evidence from this survey,
we expect about 70% of the household heads to be without any formal education.
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5.3. ANALYSIS
In the following we describe our estimation strategy, sample and data, limitations and
omissions, and present our analysis.
5.3.1. Empirical strategy
Equation 5.1 outlines our main specification capturing the Intention to treat effects (ITTs)
of our treatments.
Y = α + βDV ideo + γDASCF + ξ + u (5.1)
Y is the outcome variable at the respondent level for all the respondents who provided us
with the consent or at the level of potential respondents for consent rates. The ITT for
either the ASCF or ACF treatment, i.e. showing at least the video, is captured by the
β. γ captures the differential of adding the scripted interactive approach of the ASCF
treatment arm. Additionally, ξ corresponds to enumerator fixed effects. The standard
errors are Eicker-Huber-White standard errors.
5.3.2. Sample and data
The experiment is implemented alongside an already planned data collection in Sindh,
Pakistan. Thus potential effects are established in a real rather than a laboratory setting.
To measure the potential respondents’ understanding of consent, we developed a survey
tool we piloted with enumerators (see section 5.2.2) consisting of a total of ten questions
(for more details, refer to appendix E.B). Since the study is an independent add-on
to a different study, we want to minimize any potential influence on the main survey.
Therefore, we chose to pose all questions only to 12% of respondents, the 6% in the
ASCF group and 6% from the control group. The remaining 88%, assigned to either the
ACF or control group, are asked only two questions at random (one of each objective and
subjective measure of understanding). This implies different sample sizes for different
outcomes and comparisons. Table 5.2 gives an overview of the (approximate18) sample
size for various types of outcomes and comparisons.
Table 5.2 further displays summary statistics of the respondent’s age, sex, and rela-
tion to the household head across different treatment groups. About 60% of respondents
are female, and the average age is 43 years. About 40% of respondents are the household
head (almost always male), about 50% are their spouse, and about 10% are in another
relationship to the household head. We can see that there are differences in respondent
characteristics between the ASCF and control group. Those assigned to the ASCF treat-
ment are about 9% less likely to be female and 10% more likely to be the head of the
18Due to the random assignment some questions are asked more frequently than others
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of respondents and sample sizes
Control Any video ASCF Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
mean sd mean sd mean sd V-C ASCF-C
Female .6 0.49 .59 0.49 .5 0.50 -0.010 -0.095**
Age 43 11.61 43 11.15 44 11.51 -0.130 0.677
Household head .39 0.49 .41 0.49 .5 0.50 0.022 0.105**
Spouse .49 0.50 .47 0.50 .4 0.49 -0.017 -0.082*
Other relation .12 0.33 .12 0.32 .098 0.30 -0.005 -0.023
Number of observations:
Meta indicators 2001 1963 215 3964 2216
Objective item level 515 502 215 1017 730
Subjective item level 685 656 215 1341 900
Full module 214 215 215 429 429
∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. The table displays characteristics of study participants as well as approximate sample
sizes for various outcomes. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to the control group, columns (3)
and (4) to any treatment group, i.e. either the ACF or the ASCF group, and columns (5) and (6)
to the ASCF group. Column (7) displays differences between the control and any video group.
Column (8) the difference between the control and the ASCF group. Meta indicators refer to
outcomes such as consent rates which are mostly observed for everyone. Objective and subjective
item level refers to one of the items of our objective and subjective measure of understanding.
Each item of the respective category was asked with the same probability such that this gives an
approximation for all items. Note that there are only four subjective, compared to six objective
items, explaining the discrepancy between the numbers of observations. Full module refers to
those who were asked all questions related to our measures of understanding. Note that all in
the ASCF, 12% of the control group, and no one in the ACF group was assigned to all questions.
For details on the questions, refer to appendix E.B.
household.19 We do not observe any difference between those assigned to any treatment
and those assigned to the control group.
5.3.3. Limitations
The survey was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, and thus the data collection
was subject to social distancing rules which could have made it inconvenient to properly
show the video to respondents. While the various approaches of obtaining consent were
trained, and their importance was stressed during the enumerator training, their proper
implementation could not be systematically monitored. Further, enumerators are, in
principle, able to manipulate the randomization of treatment assignment. For example,
if they want to avoid the ASCF treatment, they can check the treatment assignment and
delete the corresponding form and start a new one. However, this is cumbersome as all the
information about location needs to be re-entered, and it is doubtful whether this would
19Note that neither sex nor relationship to the household head are good predictors for any of the
outcomes we discuss in the following. Including these as covariates in our specifications does not affect
the findings presented in this chapter. Further, we investigated heterogeneous effects with respect to sex
and do not find differences.
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save the enumerators any time. We do not find any strong indication of manipulation
of this process. We observe that only 5.4% instead of 6% of potential respondents were
assigned to the ASCF treatment arm. While this difference is statistically significant at
the 10% level, it is negligible in absolute terms and small in relative terms.
Finally, since we wanted to measure understanding in a real-world setting at scale,
we had to compromise on depth. Most respondents are asked only one question to assess
their objective understanding, clearly not enough to give a complete picture. Further,
we measure understanding based on the assessment of whether a particular statement is
true or not. We found a tendency of respondents to assess a statement as true, regardless
of whether it is true or not. This implies that true statements are often by default
evaluated to be true, such there is little room for improvement according to our measure.
To remedy this limitation, we extended our survey module by including a statement with
the opposite truth value compared to the original statement (see E.B). Our extended
module will be used in the second half of this survey which takes place in another part
of the country and will allow us to investigate this issue further.
5.3.4. Rate of consent
A common concern for researchers is the representativeness of their studies and the num-
ber of study participants. Therefore, we test the effect of the treatment approaches on
the rate of consent compared to the business-as-usual approach. Are people more or
less likely to decline an interview if the consent form is presented differently? Generally,
there are two channels to consider. Firstly, the unusual approach might scare off some
people or even increase their interest, trust, and willingness to participate. Secondly, the
intervention accomplishes its goal to inform the respondents better, and better-informed
respondents make different decisions. They might become aware of the consequences
and no longer want to provide data because they thought the consequences were less
severe - or they might want to provide data in the first place because they thought the
consequences were more severe.
The data collection took place over two visits, an initial visit, during which the experi-
ment was implemented, and a second visit, during which a more comprehensive interview
took place. The consent is asked in both visits and the respondent in the second visit was
not necessarily the same as in the first visit. We collect information on which respondents
gave consent in both types of visits and record the number of potential respondents who
refused to be interviewed in both types of visits. Table 5.3 presents the results of our anal-
ysis. Almost everyone in our study provided consent to be interviewed, and there is no
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Table 5.3: Rate of consent
Consent rates Response rate
(1) (2) (3)
1st visit 2nd visit 2nd visit
b/se b/se b/se
At least ACF 0.00046 -0.00067 0.0059
(0.00046) (0.0011) (0.0058)
ASCF 0.000046 0.0016 -0.0033
(0.00011) (0.0011) (0.013)
Model description:
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.05
Control group mean 1.00 1.00 0.96
Observations 3964 3626 3963
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. The table displays different rates of consent. Column (1) is the
rate of consent asked during the first visit during which the interview took
place, everyone gave consent. Column (2) refers to a rate of consent asked
during the second visit. Note that this was only properly documented
after the data collection already began, such that 334 observations are
missing. Finally column (3) refers to the response rate, i.e. an indicator
for consent during the second visit conditional on consent during the first.
difference across treatment arms.20 Thus, a first finding is that the different approaches
do not affect the rate of consent in any meaningful way.
Note that the measured consent rate unlikely reflects how many approached people
gave their consent to be interviewed. There are two main explanations for this: (i) the
timing of measurement and (ii) incomplete documentation.
The timing of measurement is the correct one for this study. We are neither interested
in the usual response rate for this study, which also documents unavailable respondents,
nor in the overall consent rate. We are only interested in changes due to our intervention
and, thus, the consent rate conditional on being part of the experiment. Being part of
the experiment means that the formal process of acquiring consent is being conducted;
this only happens after an initial buy-in from the potential respondent. Before starting
the process, the enumerator already introduced herself and usually informed the potential
respondent about the purpose of her visit. The potential respondent agreed (or at least did
not effectively object) to start the formal process of acquiring consent. Given this initial
buy-in, it is less surprising that almost everyone gave consent. However, it still allows
20Only 3 out of the 3,626 potential respondents in the second visit did not provide consent. People
who did not provide consent are not directly included in our study, but we document the number of
potential respondents without consent by treatment assignment.
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us to measure the interventions’ effect on the consent rate and potential implications for
sample selection.
Incomplete documentation, on the other hand, would be problematic. There was
little incentive for the enumerators to document when they did not receive consent. While
there was little cost to documenting it, some enumerators might not have submitted forms
without consent as they might have feared that this would reflect poorly on them. If the
treatment affects the consent rate and forms without consent are not collected, this could
be reflected in the shares of the treatment groups and the composition of respondents.
We only found negligible differences in treatment group shares and discuss the difference
in respondents across treatment arms in 5.3.2.
Given that the two treatment interventions do not affect the rate of consent, we do
not need to consider whether the different approaches change our sample composition.21
Further, since there are no selection effects to consider in the analysis of the remainder
of outcomes, this facilitates the interpretation of results.
5.3.5. Understanding of informed consent
Objective understanding. First, we want to assess whether or not survey respondents
are informed. We hypothesize that the business-as-usual process of obtaining consent
is not sufficiently informative. To assess this hypothesis, we constructed a short ques-
tionnaire module consisting of six statements (for details, refer to appendix E.B). Each
statement is related to one or more principles of informed consent discussed in section
5.2.1. The respondent is asked to assess whether the statements are true or false; don’t
know is also offered as an answer option. Table 5.4 presents the results for each statement
separately, as well as a summary score and an indicator of being sufficiently informed as
measures across statements.
We can see that that on average, the respondents assessed more than half (58%) of the
statements correctly, and 18% of respondents assessed almost all statements correctly.22
About 90% assessed each of the statements related to their rights with respect to data
protection and confidentiality correctly, 25% and 33% for the two statements related to
voluntarism, and 18% for the statement related to the survey’s purpose.23 We note a
pattern here, that statements which are true are considerably more likely to be assessed
correctly (about 90%) compared to statements which are false which less than a third of
21Note, however, that we do find differences in sample composition as discussed in section 5.3.2.
22Note that the outcomes based on multiple items are only measured for about 12% of the sample,
half of which from the control and the other half from the ASCF group.
23As a comparison, in our pilot study (see section 5.2.2), similarly almost everyone correctly assessed
the statement to confidentiality. But a much smaller share of only 36% and 72% assessed the statements
with respect to the data protection rights correctly. Further, about 11% more got the study purpose
correct, and about 12% less got the voluntary nature of participation correct.
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the control group assesses correctly.
We do not find any effects of showing the video alone for any of the statements. But we
find that the ASCF intervention successfully improved the respondents’ understanding
with respect to voluntarism. The estimated increase is 8.6 percentage points for the
statement I have to participate in the study and 12 percentage points for When I give
consent, I have to respond to all the questions. These effect sizes correspond to a significant
increase of about one-third relative to the control group means. The tendency to choose
true as a default, i.e. regardless of whether the statement is true or false, might explain
why we only find significant treatment effects for statements which are false.
Table 5.4: Objective measures of understanding
Overall Rights Purpose Voluntary Confidentiality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Score Informed Item 1 Item 2 Item 1 Item 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
ASCF 0.0093 0.033 -0.016 -0.022 0.018 0.082∗ 0.12∗∗ -0.010
(0.015) (0.034) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.024)
At least ACF 0.0071 -0.015 -0.029 -0.020 -0.00051 0.022
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.018)
Model description:
Adj. R2 0.55 0.48 0.33 0.32 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.36
Control group mean 0.58 0.18 0.90 0.91 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.87
Observations 429 429 1017 1001 1016 1007 1028 1039
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. The table displays outcomes based on our objective measure of understanding of consent (see
appendix E.B). Column (1) is a summary score based on the average number of correctly answered
items. Column (2) refers to an indicator for having answered at most 1 of the 6 items incorrectly
or at most 2 with don’t know. These outcomes can only be measured for those receiving the ASCF
treatment and part of the control group, the ACF coefficient is thus omitted. Columns (3)-(8) refer
to the single items ordered by category and are indicators for a correct response (don’t know and
refuse to answer are coded as 0).
Subjective understanding. Next, we analyze our subjective measure of understanding.
It would be of concern if respondents feel they have understood, but they do not. Or
simply if they do not think they understand what they consented to. Using our subjective
measure of understanding, we assess whether the different approaches affect the share of
respondents who think they are informed. Again, ex-ante, it is unclear in which direction
the effect goes.
From Table 5.5 we can see that about 70% of respondents report that they understood
each of the four aspects of consent well, and 57% report that they understood all of the
aspects well. Given the low scores on our objective measures, this can be interpreted
as overconfidence in their understanding of these aspects. However, since the objective
measure is not very comprehensive and based on only one or two items, this subjective
measure might capture actual understanding beyond our objective measure in addition
84
to a subjective feeling of understanding.
We further see that the ASCF treatment decreased subjective understanding overall.
On average, the ASCF approach decreases the share of well-understood aspects by 6
percentage points (control group mean is 69%). This decrease is spread out across all
items, for each of which the reduction is too small to be detected with statistical precision.
We cannot disentangle whether this effect is due to the video in general or the ASCF
specifically, as we only measure one of the aspects for those respondents who were assigned
to the ACF treatment.
Given that the understanding was considerably higher based on the subjective as
opposed to the objective measure, which was low for most aspects, this decrease in sub-
jective understanding can be considered an improvement if it leads to an alignment of
objective and subjective understanding discussed in the following.
Table 5.5: Subjective measures of understanding
Overall Rights Purpose Voluntary Confidentiality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share All Score
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
ASCF -0.060∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.0051 -0.037 -0.032 -0.034
(0.025) (0.033) (0.053) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031)
At least ACF -0.0075 -0.030 -0.0015 0.018
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Model description:
Adj. R2 0.63 0.58 0.60 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.50
Control group mean 0.69 0.57 3.67 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.69
Observations 426 426 426 1293 1341 1343 1270
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. The table displays outcomes based on our subjective measure of understanding of consent (see
section E.B in appendix E). Column (1) is the share of the four categories (columns (4)-(7)). Column (2)
refers to an indicator that all categories are reportedly understood. Column (3) refers to a score based
on the average understanding across all categories from 1=not at all to 5=fully. Columns (4)-(7) refer
to a response of I undertstood this well or I undertstood this fully for the respective aspect.
Objective vs. Subjective Understanding. Using our objective and subjective mea-
sure of understanding, we assess whether the different approaches change the alignment
of these measures across respondents. We divide the respondents into four types for each
of the four aspects: Respondents who have both a high objective and subjective under-
standing, respondents who have a low understanding in both, and respondents for which
the measures are not aligned. We want to analyze whether these types are differently
represented across the different approaches.
From Figure 5.1 we can see a similar picture. For the aspects of rights with respect
to data protection and confidentiality, respondents with both high objective and subjec-
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tive understanding are the majority, and those with a high objective and low subjective
understanding are the second largest group, reflecting the fact that most respondents
answered both related items correctly. For the aspects of purpose of the study and the
voluntarism, respondents have a low understanding according to our objective measure
and a high understanding according to our subjective measure. This reflects the poten-
tial overconfidence pointed out earlier.24 The second-largest type of respondents is those
with both low subjective and objective understanding. The relation between objective
and subjective understanding is, however, mainly an artifact of the objective measures.
It turns out that the evaluation according to the objective and subjective measures are
barely related, i.e., those with high objective understanding are not more likely to have
a high subjective understanding and vice versa.
For each aspect, we conduct a Pearson’s chi-square test of independence between
assignment to ASCF and the distribution across respondent types.25 For the aspects
rights with respect to data protection, the purpose of the study, and confidentiality, we do
not reject the null of no difference, but only for the aspect relating to the voluntarism.
The change for the voluntarism is expected and reflects what we already discussed
earlier. The ASCF treatment increased the share of those with a high objective under-
standing of this aspect. Most of them are those that would otherwise have a low objective
but high subjective understanding, thus increasing the alignment between objective and
subjective understanding.
24Note that we do not find any difference in overconfidence between men and women.
25We only analyze this for the ASCF treatment, as for the ACF treatment, only two questions were
asked at random, reducing the sample size for outcomes based on three questions to zero and for outcomes
based on two questions to less than 5%. Note, however, since we only found effects for the ASCF
treatment for the individual measures, we want to look only at this measure in any case.
86
Figure 5.1: Objective vs. subjective understanding
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Respondent type objective/subjective
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ASCF
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high/high low/high high/low low/low
Respondent type objective/subjective
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p-value of Pearson's chi-squared test of independence:  0.04
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Respondent type objective/subjective
Confidentiality: 
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5.3.6. Item non-response rates
In addition to declining to participate in the interview, respondents can refuse to answer
any specific question the interviewer poses. We, therefore, want to assess the effect of
the different approaches on the item non-response rate and especially the non-response
rate to questions that might be sensitive. Again, the effects could arguably go both ways.
The approaches could increase or decrease trust, make respondents aware of the voluntary
nature of their participation or how their data is handled.
Since the ASCF treatment increased the share of respondents that are aware that
they can refuse to answer specific questions significantly, we might expect more of them
to make use of this right. However, we can see from Table 5.6 that this does not seem to
be the case.26 In the first visit, there were hardly any questions any respondent refused
to answer; in fact, only 4% of respondents declined to reply to any of the questions. In
the second visit, there are two distinctions to make. Respondents who participated in the
first visit always answered the household roster questions; however, only some answered
the entire questionnaire. For the roster and full interview, the share of those refusing to
answer any of the questions was higher at 7% and 11%, respectively. But we find neither
26This lack of finding is robust to an alternative definition that includes don’t know as non-response
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Table 5.6: Item non-response rates
1st visit 2nd visit roster 2nd visit full interview
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rate any rate any rate any
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
At least ACF -0.066 -0.0034 -0.00077 -0.0027 -0.029 0.00021
(0.11) (0.0057) (0.020) (0.0080) (0.040) (0.018)
ASCF 0.14 0.0071 -0.062+ -0.022 -0.080 -0.017
(0.23) (0.012) (0.034) (0.015) (0.072) (0.039)
Model description:
Adj. R2 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.12
Control group mean 0.72 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.23 0.11
Observations 3963 3963 3832 3832 1162 1162
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. The table displays results for non-response behavior. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to
the first visit, columns (3) and (4) to the roster during the second, and columns (5) and (6) to the
full interview during the second visit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) corresponds to the non-response
rate in percent among sensitive questions (i.e. 0.1 means the respondent refused to answer 0.1
percent of sensitive questions) and columns (2), (4), and (6) to an indicator of any non-response
to a sensitive question. A sensitive question is defined, as per pre-analysis plan, to be any question
at least one respondent refused to answer. Note that, to ensure robustness towards outliers, the
non-response rates are winsorized to 3 standard deviations from the mean.
that the video alone nor the ASCF treatment affects the share of respondents who refused
to answer any question, nor the frequency with which they gave refusals. Note that there
is a correlation between our measure of understanding and response behavior. More than
twice as many that correctly assessed that they do not have to respond to all questions,
refuse to reply to at least one question during the first visit. However, it is not the case
that those that incorrectly assessed that they have to reply to all questions do so, about
3% refuse to answer at least one question during the first visit.27
5.4. CONCLUSION
The 2019 Nobel Prize acknowledged the work that “laid a solid stepping stone for a new
generation of researchers in development economics and other fields” (The Committee for
the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2019). These developments
and the prize motivate and spur further research in LMICs. Acting like “plumbers”,
economists continue to take on responsibilities related to social engineering, carefully
assisting government to design effective policies to social challenges (Duflo 2017). With
27This is expected, as respondents can learn this during the interview when they are asked a question
they are reluctant to answer. To refuse to answer, they do not need to be aware of this option at all
times actively.
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increased attention on the whole discipline, greater attention will be paid to the many
ethical aspects of applying experimental methods with vulnerable populations.
Indeed, field experiments improve the credibility of economic research, and we observe
an ever-increasing number of experiments in developing countries. These studies are of-
ten based on survey data. This article focuses on a specific, little advanced and discussed,
ethical aspect: The consent to participate in surveys in LMICs. Research on the ethi-
cal aspects of collecting survey data remains scarce and is non-existent in development
economics. There is, however, a responsibility to engage with the ethical requirements
of survey data collection. We focused here on informational constraints to the consent
of potential survey participants. We tested whether survey participants are sufficiently
informed about what happens to their data and their rights and found significant gaps in
knowledge. Further, we experimentally tested whether an interactive, audio-visual sup-
ported approach could improve how well informed they are. In this approach, the content
of the consent form was presented in a structured dialog and illustrated with a short video.
We showed that augmenting the consent process can improve respondent’s understand-
ing without affecting response behavior. The improvements we detect are limited to the
aspect of voluntarism, and we detect them only for the full ASCF treatment and not the
video by itself. Finally, we also investigated implications on response behavior and data
quality. We find no evidence of changes in response behavior. On the extensive margin,
we find that the consent rate is not affected by either of our approaches. On the intensive
margin, we do not find an effect on item non-response rates.
Our study is the first set in the context of survey data collection in LMICs where
privacy laws are underdeveloped, and illiteracy further limits informed consent to the
collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. Our study informs an emerging debate
on the ethical and practical challenges related to conducting field experiments. As Asiedu
et al. (2021) argue, an improvement of the norms in the discipline. The authors argue
that it would be important for projects to integrate mechanisms to deal with such ethical
concerns throughout the project. Our study points to a good time to start this process -
the first encounter with the study participants and making sure that they are aware that
their participation is voluntary.
Moreover, we hope this study can become a starting point with much potential for
future research with high policy relevance. In particular, it is a common belief in develop-
ment economics that larger field experiments could help to improve external validity or
the accuracy with which the estimates of impact from a Randomized Control Trial (RCT)
predict the effects of some subsequent policy decision (Duflo et al. 2007; Muralidharan
and Niehaus 2017; Peters et al. 2016). Consequently, it is argued that tests of external
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validity and representativeness of the study sample should be as standard and taken as
seriously as tests of internal balance between treatment and control group. Given that
development research aims to alleviate poverty and improve people’s lives, we need to be
careful that this research does not systematically exclude vulnerable parts of the popula-
tion. Therefore it is crucial to know whether survey respondents differ in an important
way from non-respondents. If this difference is partly due to the process through which
consent is obtained, this puts the requirement for individual informed consent at odds
with the goals of development research. And researchers would need to be aware of this.
The high level of initial consent in our context had limited the insights we could gain on
this topic, but we believe it is worth further exploration.
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COnCLuSIOn
Throughout my studies, I was involved in several impact evaluations in various stages.
One common theme is problems with implementation. This is not only the reason why
some studies did not make it into my dissertation but is also reflected in the studies
discussed in chapters 1 to 3.
The linkage intervention discussed in chapter 2 was plagued with difficulties, as the
financial institutions were not ready and did not sufficiently design or offer products
viable for savings groups. For example, it is impossible to open a group account at
any of the mobile money providers. Similarly, for the social fund intervention discussed
in chapter 3, reports suggest that the training was improperly implemented, and some
trainers were not convinced or understood the concepts they were supposed to convey. To
make matters worse, incomplete information on the implementation made it challenging
to monitor the extent to which the intervention was implemented, which groups were
reached, and the adherence to the experimental protocol. There is considerable room for
improvement through sound monitoring systems, and evaluations should be flexible to
shift from measuring impact to diagnosing obstacles to implementation. In many projects,
there is no need to wait for rigorous evidence of no effect before investigating why a
project did not work. This focus on implementation could further help to understand the
discrepancy with respect to effects across implementers which we see in chapters 2 and 3
and is commonly observed in many empirical studies.
As it is with research and evaluations, monitoring relies on data, and thus good data
quality is crucial. I believe the topic of data quality needs to gain more traction in
economics. Particularly development economists increasingly conduct primary data col-
lections, but survey methodology remains essentially the domain of other social sciences.
Apart from data quality, processes of data collection can be a topic of investigation. With
chapters 4 and 5, I tried to generate empirical evidence related to the ethics of data col-
lection and hope that further research can shine more light on these processes. With
econometrics as a sub-discipline, the statistical processing of data is an integral part of
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Figure A.1: Timeline of data collections.
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Table A.1: Variables used in randomization included in PDS LASSO
N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Mean number of children aged 14 and younger per Household 522 2.56 0.79 0 5
Mean number of occupied rooms per Household 522 3.38 0.83 1 8
Mean number of Savings Group members in the Village 522 22.08 6.27 8 47
Mean contribution to Savings Group of members in the Village 522 49.92 60.48 2 600
Mean contribution to social fund 522 2.99 4.85 1 100
Mean Household Size in Village 522 5.90 1.06 3 10
Fraction of interviewees in the village that took a loan from the savings group 522 0.60 0.30 0 1
Total number of savings group members that took a loan from their savings group 522 38.13 46.95 0 198
Mean score of additive food security index 522 1.24 0.73 0 4
Mean number of months with food scarcity across HHs 522 1.47 0.77 0 4
Mean livestock value per household in the village 522 3163.10 4875.66 0 63469
Mean school attendance rate for children born after 1999 and before 2011 522 0.76 0.20 0 1
Mean value of agricultrual output sales per household 522 2871.94 10943.29 0 180443
Additive score of the questions about trust in government and private banks 522 4.28 0.89 2 7
fraction of female headed households 522 0.24 0.20 0 1
# participating SGs in village 522 3.27 4.14 1 19
Mean area of land connected to the household 522 8667.91 35185.54 0 803369
Mean value of loans per person 522 912.69 1787.05 0 17205
Mean value of loans per person for business purposes 522 584.33 1412.82 0 14583
Mean value of loans per person for agricultural purposes 522 32.00 89.78 0 1250
Mean value of loans per person for food purposes 522 40.26 86.31 0 983
Mean value of loans per person for educational purposes 522 100.68 239.87 0 1975
Number of Inhabitants in the Village 522 1002.54 3576.44 0 64683
Electricity in village 522 0.33 0.47 0 1
Urban or rural: Urban 522 0.18 0.38 0 1
Urban or rural: Rural > 250 522 0.56 0.50 0 1
Urban or rural: Rural <250 522 0.26 0.44 0 1
The table displays summary statistics on the savings group level of the variables used in the re-randomization and
included in the PDS LASSO procedure. All information was collected during the baseline and includes information from
the village questionnaire or from the household and member questionnaires which is collapsed on the randomization unit
(usually village) level.
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Table A.2: Variables based on baseline survey included in PDS LASSO
N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Meeting frequency (mode across surveys): weekly 522 0.52 0.50 0 1
Meeting frequency (mode across surveys): every two weeks 522 0.04 0.19 0 1
Meeting frequency (mode across surveys): monthly 522 0.44 0.50 0 1
Meeting frequency (highest across surveys): weekly 522 0.61 0.49 0 1
Meeting frequency (highest across surveys): every two weeks 522 0.08 0.28 0 1
Meeting frequency (highest across surveys): monthly 522 0.31 0.46 0 1
Meeting frequency (lowest across surveys): weekly 522 0.36 0.48 0 1
Meeting frequency (lowest across surveys): every two weeks 522 0.05 0.22 0 1
Meeting frequency (lowest across surveys): monthly 522 0.59 0.49 0 1
Year of founding: 2012 and earlier 522 0.34 0.47 0 1
Year of founding: 2013 522 0.11 0.31 0 1
Year of founding: 2014 522 0.30 0.46 0 1
Year of founding: 2015 522 0.22 0.41 0 1
Year of founding: 2016 522 0.04 0.20 0 1
Predominantely female group 522 0.33 0.47 0 1
Predominantely female lead group 522 0.29 0.45 0 1
Trained by NGO upon founding 522 0.78 0.42 0 1
Group was trained by NGO upon founding (favor 0) 522 0.57 0.50 0 1
Group uses box to store savings 522 0.74 0.44 0 1
Group loan outs savings as storage 522 0.68 0.47 0 1
Group uses bank account to store savings 522 0.05 0.21 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor loan out): in a box held by one of th 521 0.43 0.50 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor loan out): with one of the members wi 521 0.02 0.15 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor loan out): in a bank 521 0.01 0.11 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor loan out): all savings loaned out 521 0.53 0.50 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor loan out): 8 521 0.01 0.09 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor box): in a box held by one of the gro 521 0.54 0.50 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor box): with one of the members without 521 0.02 0.16 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor box): in a bank 521 0.01 0.09 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor box): all savings loaned out 521 0.42 0.49 0 1
Mode of storage reported by members (favor box): 8 521 0.00 0.04 0 1
Meeting frequency: weekly 522 0.52 0.50 0 1
Meeting frequency: every two weeks 522 0.03 0.18 0 1
Meeting frequency: monthly 522 0.45 0.50 0 1
Average monthly savings contribution in ZMW 521 107.45 196.78 5 3533
Average monthly savings contribution 521 101.04 121.34 8 887
Average value of current savings in ZMW (reported) 521 672.41 1002.08 0 13800
Average value of current savings 521 642.77 767.12 13 4100
Average monthly contribution to SF in ZMW 522 5.92 7.78 0 80
Average monthly contribution to SF in ZMW (winsorized) 522 5.72 6.39 0 35
The table displays summary statistics of variables on the savings group level included in the PDS LASSO procedure.
Information was collected during the baseline from the savings group member questionnaire or recall information from
the savings group questionnaire in later surveys and is collapsed on the savings group level.
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Table A.3: Variables from mid- and endline surveys included in PDS LASSO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max
Savings group variables
Savings group is dormant 521 0.07 0.26 0 1 522 0.08 0.28 0 1
Number of savings group members 521 19.80 7.20 4 60 522 20.05 7.09 5 68
Social fund accumulates 521 0.12 0.32 0 1 522 0.13 0.34 0 1
Member variables
Respondent is female 1945 0.80 0.40 0 1 2604 0.80 0.40 0 1
Ethnicity of respondent: Other 1945 0.19 0.39 0 1 2604 0.18 0.39 0 1
Ethnicity of respondent: Bemba 1945 0.31 0.46 0 1 2604 0.31 0.46 0 1
Ethnicity of respondent: Chewa 1945 0.13 0.34 0 1 2604 0.14 0.35 0 1
Ethnicity of respondent: Lozi 1945 0.10 0.30 0 1 2604 0.09 0.29 0 1
Ethnicity of respondent: Mambwe 1945 0.08 0.28 0 1 2604 0.08 0.27 0 1
Ethnicity of respondent: Nsenga 1945 0.18 0.39 0 1 2604 0.19 0.39 0 1
Denomination of respondent: Other 1945 0.35 0.48 0 1 2604 0.54 0.50 0 1
Denomination of respondent: Catholic 1945 0.35 0.48 0 1 2604 0.25 0.44 0 1
Denomination of respondent: UCZ 1945 0.12 0.33 0 1 2604 0.09 0.28 0 1
Denomination of respondent: Pentecostal 1945 0.10 0.30 0 1 2604 0.06 0.25 0 1
Denomination of respondent: New apostolic church 1945 0.08 0.27 0 1 2604 0.06 0.24 0 1
Age of respondent 1936 45.47 12.55 17 85 2578 45.60 12.40 17 91
Relation to household head: Other relation 1945 0.04 0.19 0 1 2604 0.03 0.17 0 1
Relation to household head: Household head 1945 0.42 0.49 0 1 2604 0.43 0.50 0 1
Relation to household head: Spouse 1945 0.54 0.50 0 1 2604 0.54 0.50 0 1
Respondent is married 1945 0.73 0.44 0 1 2604 0.73 0.44 0 1
Household variables
Number of household members 2070 5.90 2.28 1 15 2501 5.65 2.20 1 15
Number of household members aged 18 or above 2060 3.49 1.60 1 12 2471 3.08 1.43 1 11
Number of household members aged 5 or below 2070 0.53 0.69 0 5 2501 0.58 0.75 0 4
Average age of household members 2063 25.66 9.47 3 85 2487 25.74 10.67 2 90
The table displays summary statistics of variables on the savings group, member, and household level included in
the PDS LASSO procedure for respective estimations. Information was collected during the mid- and endline from
the respective questionnaires.
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.A. Characterization of linked groups
To better understand which savings groups are affected by the treatment, we look at
how these savings groups differ in terms of characteristics in Table B.1. To compare the
characteristics, we assume that the treatment effect is monotonic for each savings group,
i.e., Y1i ≥ Y0i ∀ i where Y1i refers to the potential outcome (e.g., using a bank account)
if group i is assigned to treatment and Y0i refers to the potential outcome if group i is
not assigned to treatment. Given random treatment assignment and this assumption, we
have:
P (Xi = 1|Y1i > Y0i)
P (Xi = 1)
=
P (Y1i > Y0i|Xi = 1)
P (Y1i > Y0i)
=
E[Yi|Di = 1, Xi = 1]− E[Yi|Di = 0, Xi = 1]
E[Yi|Di = 1]− E[Yi|Di = 0]
Table B.1 shows the ratio mentioned above of the prevalence of a covariate among
those savings groups affected by the treatment compared to the prevalence in the overall
sample for NGOs 1 and 2. Affected by the treatment refers to either reportedly using a
bank account in any survey wave (Table B.1 columns (2) and (5)) or reportedly actively
using a bank account in any of the midline, endline, or phone survey waves after the
endline (Table B.1 columns (3) and (6)).28
Before discussing Table B.1, please note that while the presented estimates are consis-
tent for their estimand, no measures of uncertainty are given, and we need to be careful
with any inference as the estimates are based on rather small sample sizes. For NGO 1
is seems that affected groups tend to be rather urban (less likely to be located in a rural
village with less than 250 inhabitants and more likely to be in villages or towns with
electricity). In contrast, for NGO 2, the opposite is true: affected groups are more likely
located in small villages and less likely in villages with electricity. The affected groups
are also more likely to meet monthly (compared to weekly) for NGO 1.29 There is again
28Given that we do not find a treatment effect for NGOs 3 and 4, we omit them from the table. Further,
since many covariates are strongly related to NGO affiliation, we want to compare within NGOs instead
of pooling them together not to pick up differences between NGOs with larger and lower treatment
effects.
29Since almost all groups affiliated with NGO 2 meet monthly, there is no difference for this charac-
teristic for NGO 2.
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a contrast between NGO 1 and 2 for the year of the founding of the affected groups. For
NGO 1, it tends to be older groups, whereas, for NGO 2, affected groups tend to be
younger. For both NGOs, the affected groups tend to have a female leader during the
years of study. There seems to be no notable difference between reportedly using and
actively using an account.
Table B.1: Characteristics of groups affected by the treatment
NGO1 NGO2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mean ratio ratio mean ratio ratio
covariate account active use covariate account active use
Urban or rural: Rural >250 0.520 1.02 1.00 .6 0.48 0.58
Urban or rural: Rural <250 0.327 0.69 0.77 .31 1.61 1.81
Electricity in village 0.267 1.50 1.25 .43 0.56 0.41
Meeting frequency: weekly 0.880 0.92 0.93 .013
Meeting frequency: monthly 0.100 1.56 1.71 .99 0.97 0.94
Year of founding: 2012 and earlier 0.100 1.78 1.56 .83 0.71 0.95
Year of founding: 2013 0.040 .12 1.32 -1.13
Year of founding: 2014 0.533 0.68 0.85 .04
Year of founding: 2015 0.320 1.18 0.90 0
Trained by NGO upon founding 0.727 1.09 1.07 .61 1.00 0.87
Predominantely female group 0.220 1.53 1.90 .24 0.83 1.17
Predominantely female lead group 0.173 1.50 1.66 .19 1.06 2.25
Group uses box to store savings 1.000 1.00 1.00 .95 0.83 0.78
Group loan outs savings as storage 0.100 1.25 1.37 .64 0.84 0.91
Notes. Each line refers to a different binary characteristic (covariate) of savings groups at baseline. Predominantly female
(lead) group is an indicator based on information of all survey waves about group composition and leadership with respect to
sex, a large part of predominantly is exclusively female. Columns (1) to (3) refer to NGO 1 and columns (4) to (6) refer to
NGO 2. NGOs 3 and 4 are omitted due to lack of treatment effect. Columns (1) and (4) show the mean of the covariate for
the respective NGO. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) show estimates for E[Y |D=1,X=1]−E[Y |D=0,X=1]
E[Y |D=1]−E[Y |D=0] , where X refers to the
covariate, D to the treatment assignment, and Y to ever using a bank account (columns (2) and (5)) or to actively using an
account in any of midline, endline, or phone survey waves after the endline (columns (3) and (6)). Under the assumption of
monotone treatment effects on Y , this ratio equals the ratio of the prevalence of the covariate among groups that were affected
by the treatment and the prevalence of the covariate among all groups. If there are less than 3 groups for a covariate and
treatment assignment combination, the respective ratio for that covariate is omitted.
B.B. Supplementary tables
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Table B.2: Mobile money use, trust and knowledge
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGO 4 All NGOs NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Used mobile money before
Linkage treatment -0.052∗ -0.074+ -0.038+ -0.0016
(0.024) (0.040) (0.023) (0.037)
Control group mean 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.57
Used mobile money in last 3 months
Linkage treatment -0.034 -0.0077 -0.034 -0.0025
(0.023) (0.036) (0.023) (0.040)
Control group mean 0.29 0.24 0.35 0.35
Uses mobile money at least once a month
Linkage treatment -0.010 0.014 -0.018 0.018
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.030)
Control group mean 0.14 0.091 0.23 0.21
Level of trust in mobile money agencies
Linkage treatment -0.031 -0.018 0.054 0.12
(0.065) (0.12) (0.054) (0.081)
Control group mean 1.89 2.14 2.03 2.01
Complete trust in mobile money agencies
Linkage treatment 0.0017 0.025 -0.028 -0.054
(0.031) (0.047) (0.022) (0.033)
Control group mean 0.43 0.35 0.36 0.44
Level of knowledge of of mobile money
Linkage treatment -0.031 -0.026 -0.018 0.041
(0.073) (0.11) (0.065) (0.087)
Control group mean 2.10 2.06 2.48 2.68
Full knowledge of of mobile money
Linkage treatment 0.043∗ 0.042 -0.014 -0.031
(0.020) (0.034) (0.019) (0.029)
Control group mean 0.20 0.18 0.33 0.35
Observations 1945 711 2604 941
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can
be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). For estimations on the whole sam-
ple, NGO fixed effects are always included, but excluded for NGO specific estimations.
Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. Missing val-
ues: negligible missing values (less than 5 for whole sample) for all outcomes except trust
related outcomes. Trust related outcomes have 410 to 560 missing values in the whole
sample. Level of trust is on a 4 point scale, level of knowledge refers to 0 to 4 correctly
answered questions. Complete trust and full knowledge refer to highest value for respective
level. NGO 4 is included separately as their intervention was tailored to mobile money, we
similarly find no effects for NGOs 1, 2 and 3.
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Table B.3: Trust in safety of savings and financial institutions
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Completely trust that savings are save
Linkage treatment -0.00076 -0.0028 -0.017 0.013
(0.019) (0.028) (0.023) (0.035)
Control group mean 0.82 0.84 0.63 0.53
Level of trust that savings are save
Linkage treatment 0.018 0.012 0.042 -0.0034
(0.030) (0.045) (0.029) (0.043)
Control group mean 1.22 1.20 1.42 1.50
Trust in financial institutions (index)
Linkage treatment -0.065 -0.039 0.0018 0.0014
(0.044) (0.066) (0.035) (0.051)
Control group mean -0.024 -0.33 0.0061 0.10
Observations 1945 839 2604 1120
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations
reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. Missing values: 91 and 17 missing for
level of trust at mid- and endline. Level of trust is on a 4 point scale, complete trust refers to highest
level (=1). The index for trust in financial institutions is the means of variables related to the index
standardized to control group values, thus the control group mean is by construction close to 0 for the
whole sample.
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Table B.4: Savings activity by NGO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NGO 1 NGO 2 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Monthly savings contribution to group
Midline Linkage treatment 3.70 -23.2∗ 19.8+ 8.62
(11.39) (10.69) (11.62) (13.09)
Control group mean 109.8 96.5 59.3 127.1
Endline Linkage treatment -14.0 -7.81 5.53 4.61
(13.45) (12.14) (10.37) (11.11)
Control group mean 141.2 99.9 77.5 140.5
Value received at last share-out
Midline Linkage treatment -43.8 10.3 108.0 -90.2
(121.13) (125.74) (121.70) (148.49)
Control group mean 1126.1 1803.4 1145.1 1698.8
Endline Linkage treatment -22.8 245.9∗ -171.3 196.8
(133.15) (123.05) (378.78) (232.21)
Control group mean 1362.3 1659.3 2221.6 1776.2
Monthly savings contributions to other groups
Midline Linkage treatment 0.13 -0.44 2.05 -0.61
(2.43) (4.53) (5.01) (4.36)
Control group mean 5.02 4.50 8.17 10.6
Endline Linkage treatment -8.34∗ -1.46 3.52 -0.0080
(3.80) (2.78) (3.38) (3.55)
Control group mean 18.2 2.76 5.95 8.34
Value of savings outside of savings groups
Midline Linkage treatment -35.1 0.72 63.2 -90.3
(58.81) (81.14) (89.09) (56.90)
Control group mean 182.0 320.2 190.0 305.5
Endline Linkage treatment 32.1 -69.3 52.4 -3.98
(37.07) (76.01) (67.21) (77.17)
Control group mean 131.7 348.1 220.7 254.6
Observations Midline 568 271 387 711
Observations Endline 747 373 533 941
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be
found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). Observations refer to total number of
observations available not accounting for missing values, thus actual number of observations
used varies with outcome. All outcomes in ZMW and winsorized at 1% and 99%.
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Table B.5: Details on components of the HH animals purchased index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH animals purchased -0.034+ -0.043 0.0097 0.065+
(0.018) (0.032) (0.021) (0.038)
Number of Cow purchased -0.0065 0.0025 -0.026∗ 0.0021
(0.012) (0.0027) (0.012) (0.0021)
Number of Bull purchased 0 0 0.0057 0.011
(.) (.) (0.0051) (0.011)
Number of Calf purchased 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Number of Horse purchased 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Number of Ox purchased 0.0044 0 -0.00079 0
(0.0044) (.) (0.0036) (.)
Number of Donkey purchased 0 0 0.0016 0
(.) (.) (0.0015) (.)
Number of Goat purchased -0.016 -0.042 0.012 0.069+
(0.027) (0.059) (0.021) (0.040)
Number of Sheep purchased 0 0 -0.0018 0
(.) (.) (0.0018) (.)
Number of Pig purchased -0.0072 -0.032 0.013 0.034
(0.025) (0.063) (0.022) (0.037)
Number of Chicken purchased -0.22 -0.17 -0.54 0.11
(0.24) (0.36) (0.86) (1.48)
Number of Gfowl purchased -0.046 -0.021 -0.0065 -0.0046
(0.035) (0.020) (0.0057) (0.0044)
Number of Ofowl purchased 0.0089 0 0 0
(0.0086) (.) (.) (.)
Number of Poultry purchased -0.013 -0.021 0.015 0.032
(0.0086) (0.017) (0.021) (0.043)
Number of Other purchased 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be
found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included.
Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. First outcome
refers to animals purchased index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is
comprised of, i.e. the number of various purchased animals in the last 12 months.
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Table B.6: Details on components of the HH animals owned index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH animals owned -0.013 -0.031 -0.0017 -0.0059
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.011)
Number of Cow owned -0.048 0.13+ -0.22+ 0.031+
(0.16) (0.077) (0.12) (0.016)
Number of Bull owned 0.0044 0.0054 0.021 0.043+
(0.0031) (0.0054) (0.032) (0.023)
Number of Calf owned 0 0 -0.045 0
(.) (.) (0.037) (.)
Number of Horse owned 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Number of Ox owned 0.0025 0 0.076+ 0
(0.0062) (.) (0.041) (.)
Number of Donkey owned 0.0020 0 0.0070 0
(0.0020) (.) (0.0048) (.)
Number of Goat owned -0.083 -0.23 0.0068 -0.026
(0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14)
Number of Sheep owned 0.013 0 -0.021 0
(0.013) (.) (0.029) (.)
Number of Pig owned 0.031 -0.14 -0.078 -0.13
(0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13)
Number of Chicken owned 0.42 0.34 -0.70 -0.15
(0.52) (0.89) (0.65) (0.99)
Number of Gfowl owned -0.081∗ -0.053 -0.14 -0.019
(0.039) (0.044) (0.093) (0.014)
Number of Ofowl owned -0.028 -0.032 0.0088 0
(0.022) (0.031) (0.0081) (.)
Number of Poultry owned -0.023 -0.19 -0.32∗ -0.27
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
Number of Other owned 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be
found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included.
Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. First outcome
refers to animals owned index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is
comprised of, i.e. the number of various animals owned.
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Table B.7: Details on components of the HH agricultural inputs index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH agricultural inputs
Linkage treatment -0.020 -0.041 -0.016 -0.050
(0.029) (0.050) (0.028) (0.043)
Seeds purchased (ZMW)
Linkage treatment -8.83 -29.8 -14.5 -19.5
(19.8) (34.6) (19.8) (34.7)
Control group mean 186.3 250.6 182.9 230.5
Chemical fertilizer used (ZMW)
Linkage treatment -31.9 -112.1 -51.4 -63.0
(55.7) (111.5) (58.7) (98.4)
Control group mean 560.0 885.0 574.4 777.9
Organic fertilizer used (ZMW)
Linkage treatment -1.78+ -1.84 1.29 0.14
(1.00) (1.20) (1.64) (0.98)
Control group mean 2.69 1.68 4.13 0.63
Insecticides used (ZMW)
Linkage treatment 4.09 -2.75 0.41 -5.65
(8.45) (6.44) (4.67) (8.03)
Control group mean 20.6 21.1 24.5 21.8
Use of paid field workers (ZMW)
Linkage treatment 2.96 -45.1 -10.3 -67.3
(45.5) (42.2) (34.3) (64.1)
Control group mean 248.3 370.6 253.9 331.0
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations
reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. First outcome refers to agricultural
inputs index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is comprised of, i.e. the
value of various agricultural inputs in ZMW.
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Table B.8: Details on components of the HH agricultural assets index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH agricultural assets -0.0060 0.016 -0.017 -0.0028
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
Number of trained oxen/cows -0.027 0.021 -0.12 0.027
(0.065) (0.042) (0.100) (0.042)
Number of ox-drawn plough -0.045 -0.00073 -0.015 0.013
(0.034) (0.017) (0.033) (0.014)
Number of disc plough 0.080∗ 0.17+ -0.0042 0.018
(0.036) (0.087) (0.015) (0.031)
Number of harrows -0.0037 0.0015 -0.013 0.013
(0.015) (0.0025) (0.014) (0.0087)
Number of cultivators -0.00087 -0.0013 0.0018 0.0017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.0028) (0.0019)
Number of rippers 0.0065 0 -0.0086 0
(0.0074) (.) (0.010) (.)
Number of ridger/weeder -0.095+ -0.27+ -0.012 0.0032
(0.055) (0.14) (0.021) (0.0039)
Number of planter -0.0072 -0.0096 -0.0013 0.0038
(0.011) (0.0088) (0.0037) (0.0029)
Number of fitarelli -0.0049 0 0.00040 0.0020
(0.0057) (.) (0.0093) (0.0037)
Number of hand driven tractor 0.00018 0.0026 0 0
(0.0016) (0.0025) (.) (.)
Number of scotch carts -0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0094 0.0019
(0.015) (0.0066) (0.015) (0.0073)
Number of wheel barrow -0.0088 0.0096 0.00037 -0.018
(0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.031)
Number of water or treadle pump -0.0069 0.00028 0.0081 -0.0068
(0.0058) (0.0089) (0.0094) (0.0063)
Number of other irrigation equipment -0.0019 0.0020 -0.014 -0.0089+
(0.0083) (0.0042) (0.0089) (0.0053)
Number of knapsack sprayer 0.027 0.041 0.017 -0.0054
(0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.028)
Number of boom sprayer 0.00070 0.0042 -0.013 -0.022
(0.012) (0.024) (0.0098) (0.016)
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations
reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. First outcome refers to agricultural
assets index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is comprised of, i.e. the number
of various agricultural assets.
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Table B.9: Details on components of the HH general assets index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH agricultural assets 0.0070 0.017 0.0075 0.014
(0.016) (0.028) (0.013) (0.019)
Number of trucks or lorries 0.0030+ 0.0024 -0.00022 0.0023
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0039)
Number of pick-ups, vans or cars -0.0069 -0.029+ -0.0041 -0.025
(0.011) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020)
Number of trailer 0.00085 0 0 0
(0.0017) (.) (.) (.)
Number of motorcycles -0.0053 -0.0069 -0.0094 -0.0052
(0.0095) (0.012) (0.0084) (0.012)
Number of bicycles 0.028 0.084 0.062+ 0.084
(0.036) (0.059) (0.035) (0.057)
Number of boats or canoes 0.0022 0.0095 -0.0025 0.0029
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0075) (0.0057)
Number of fishing nets 0.013 0.040 0.0045 0.049
(0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.041)
Number of cattle dip or crush pen -0.0020 0.0024 0.0094 0
(0.0028) (0.0024) (0.017) (.)
Number of hand mills -0.00047 0.0024 0.012 -0.0083
(0.018) (0.0024) (0.012) (0.0052)
Number of hammer mills -0.0051 -0.011 -0.0042 -0.0026
(0.0040) (0.0074) (0.0050) (0.0065)
Number of rump presses -0.0021 0 -0.00088 0
(0.0014) (.) (0.00088) (.)
Number of hand-operated maize sheller -0.0022 -0.0050 0.0065 0.0031
(0.0088) (0.017) (0.0069) (0.0027)
Number of motorized maize sheller -0.0045 -0.011 -0.000023 0
(0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0011) (.)
Number of improved brazier -0.017 -0.0021 0.092∗ 0.041
(0.040) (0.060) (0.046) (0.095)
Number of solar panel -0.020 -0.017 0.058 0.074
(0.054) (0.10) (0.045) (0.070)
Number of generator 0.0059 0.0043 0.0051 0.0031
(0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0056)
Number of cell phone 0.25 0.70 -0.012 0.029
(0.25) (0.77) (0.046) (0.070)
Number of radio 0.056+ 0.017 0.011 0.032
(0.032) (0.049) (0.028) (0.050)
Number of TV -0.011 -0.042 -0.024 -0.024
(0.027) (0.041) (0.022) (0.032)
Number of car battery 0.015 0.041 0.0089 0.015
(0.025) (0.038) (0.024) (0.035)
Number of sewing machine -0.032∗ -0.053∗ -0.029∗ -0.041∗
(0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.019)
Number of water tank 0.0031 -0.00077 -0.0018 -0.0046
(0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0032) (0.0046)
Number of standard well 0.011 0.020 0.0038 -0.0057
(0.020) (0.046) (0.012) (0.030)
Number of borehole 0.0090 0.023+ -0.0013 0.00070
(0.0078) (0.014) (0.0046) (0.0086)
Number of gas or electric stove -0.0040 -0.047+ 0.0019 -0.024+
(0.016) (0.028) (0.014) (0.014)
Number of electric iron 0.0088 0.0086 -0.0029 -0.020
(0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018)
Number of non-electric iron 0.033 0.061 0.017 0.0042
(0.028) (0.041) (0.027) (0.044)
Number of lounge suite or sofa -0.013 0.00015 0.0061 -0.010
(0.073) (0.12) (0.051) (0.073)
Number of houses 0 0 -0.044 -0.0047
(.) (.) (0.031) (0.037)
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covari-
ates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A).NGO fixed effects
are always included. Observations reflects maximum number not accounting
for missing values. First outcome refers to general assets index, the remaining
outcomes are the components the index is comprised of, i.e. the number of
various general assets.
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Table B.10: Details on components of the HH expenditure index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH expenditures
Linkage treatment 0.022 0.039 0.048 0.034
(0.029) (0.050) (0.036) (0.046)
Schooling expenditure
Linkage treatment -209.0 -386.5+ 137.5 -22.5
(191.8) (232.5) (143.6) (135.0)
Control group mean 1246.2 1415.7 851.4 927.6
Medical expenditure
Linkage treatment 28.2 70.1+ 24.6+ 34.4
(17.9) (42.4) (13.5) (22.8)
Control group mean 40.2 28.6 45.3 39.4
Funeral expenditure
Linkage treatment -21.2 -46.1 29.7 36.3
(32.7) (48.3) (45.7) (68.1)
Control group mean 164.2 152.3 215.1 181.7
Other expenditure
Linkage treatment 130.0 -62.1 -150.0 -204.1+
(101.4) (139.1) (137.3) (119.7)
Control group mean 860.1 982.7 885.0 739
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates
can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are
always included. Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing
values. First outcome refers to the expenditure index, the remaining outcomes are the
components the index is comprised of, i.e. the value of various types of expenditures
in the last 12 months in ZMW.
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Table B.11: Details on components of the HH food security index
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2 All NGOs NGOs 1 and 2
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Index HH food security index
Linkage treatment 0.033 0.027 -0.016 -0.014
(0.021) (0.030) (0.015) (0.023)
Issues covering needs at least monthly
Linkage treatment 0.00095 -0.0030 -0.032∗ -0.017
(0.018) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
Control group mean 0.14 0.095 0.17 0.11
Issues covering needs last 12 months
Linkage treatment 0.0063 0.016 0.013 0.0076
(0.025) (0.033) (0.021) (0.028)
Control group mean 1.59 1.60 1.68 1.72
Skipped meals at least monthly
Linkage treatment 0.0038 -0.0024 -0.019+ -0.013
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Control group mean 0.063 0.039 0.079 0.062
Skipped meals last 12 months
Linkage treatment 0.032+ 0.038 0.016 0.0027
(0.020) (0.028) (0.015) (0.022)
Control group mean 1.78 1.81 1.85 1.87
Observations 2076 895 2505 1052
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations
reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. First outcome refers to the food security
index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is comprised of, i.e. the value of various
sub-indices related to food security in the last 12 months.
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C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Table C.1: Various measures for social fund usage separately by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019 Phone surveys combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Any pay-outs from social fund
Social fund treatment -0.026 -0.024 0.019 -0.0030 -0.0088 -0.13+ 0.088 -0.023 0.041
(0.075) (0.10) (0.073) (0.089) (0.10) (0.073) (0.062) (0.070) (0.052)
Control group mean 0.70 0.34 0.37 0.65 0.50 0.45 0.81 0.82 0.83
Any grants from social fund
Social fund treatment 0.036 -0.052 -0.028 0.036 -0.0014 -0.097 0.069 0.014 -0.018
(0.082) (0.094) (0.054) (0.088) (0.10) (0.066) (0.067) (0.086) (0.060)
Control group mean 0.55 0.28 0.20 0.57 0.44 0.32 0.79 0.78 0.78
Any loans from social fund
Social fund treatment -0.040 0.063 0.063 -0.024 0.010 -0.013 -0.081 0.028 0.11+
(0.071) (0.060) (0.064) (0.077) (0.047) (0.051) (0.069) (0.075) (0.066)
Control group mean 0.27 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.16 0.36
Value of pay-outs from social fund
Social fund treatment 21.0 47.6 41.6 12.5 41.4 -47.0 181.4+ 53.6 -44.5
(51.6) (40.1) (25.3) (32.8) (30.8) (30.5) (104.7) (47.5) (119.8)
Control group mean 190.76 49.92 50.61 117.72 68.40 116.23 405.74 199.36 544.82
Value of grants from social fund
Social fund treatment 33.3 7.87 -4.19 26.5 41.1 -29.6+ 117.6 66.4 -36.4
(30.6) (15.9) (8.91) (23.6) (25.8) (16.0) (72.3) (41.1) (33.9)
Control group mean 83.45 30.72 25.43 71.25 46.40 57.30 315.22 145.86 196.54
Value of loans from social fund
Social fund treatment -16.7 37.3 40.5+ -11.1 1.81 -17.3 48.1 7.65 32.0
(32.2) (29.2) (21.9) (18.9) (16.8) (19.1) (55.3) (27.7) (100.2)
Control group mean 98.73 19.20 25.18 42.06 17.84 48.51 60.51 52.00 319.71
Observations 446 446 446 447 447 447 447 447 447
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes are accumulated over all reported pay-outs in a reference period of the last 12 months. For
phone surveys this is based on the report from several waves asking about each month separately for the period
of July 2019 to June 2020. Value outcomes are in ZMW and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimations are done
using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A).
For overall results refer to Table 3.3. For results related to the reported purpose of funeral or sickness, the target
purposes of the intervention, refer to Tables C.2 and C.3 in appendix C for aggregate and NGO specific results
respectively.
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Table C.2: Various measures for social fund usage related to funeral or sickness
(1) (2) (3)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019 Phone surveys combined
b/se b/se b/se
Any pay-outs from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -0.065 -0.024 0.0043
(0.043) (0.046) (0.041)
Control group mean 0.40 0.46 0.80
Any grants from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -0.036 -0.025 0.025
(0.041) (0.045) (0.038)
Control group mean 0.32 0.41 0.78
Any loans from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -0.024 0.00099 0.014
(0.029) (0.028) (0.035)
Control group mean 0.11 0.07 0.16
Value of pay-outs from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment 4.69 6.00 28.8
(14.6) (13.4) (27.0)
Control group mean 69.94 68.43 226.81
Value of grants from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment 8.67 5.38 11.3
(9.40) (11.7) (25.7)
Control group mean 38.91 55.29 190.06
Value of loans from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -1.85 0.052 9.96
(10.1) (4.20) (9.05)
Control group mean 30.02 11.00 31.00
Observations 446 447 447
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes are accumulated over reported pay-outs with reported purpose funeral or sickness in
a reference period of the last 12 months. For phone surveys this is based on the report from several
waves asking about each month separately for the period of July 2019 to June 2020. Value outcomes
are in ZMW and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata
(included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are
always included. For NGO specific results refer to Table C.3. For results related to any purposes, the
refer to Tables 3.3 and C.1 in appendix C for aggregate and NGO specific results respectively.
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Table C.3: Various measures for social fund usage separately by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019 Phone surveys combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Any pay-outs from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -0.029 -0.037 -0.072 0.044 0.011 -0.083 0.041 0.027 -0.0021
(0.076) (0.10) (0.058) (0.090) (0.10) (0.069) (0.067) (0.082) (0.061)
Control group mean 0.69 0.30 0.24 0.57 0.48 0.36 0.81 0.78 0.81
Any grants from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment 0.029 -0.032 -0.052 0.012 -0.0014 -0.070 0.060 0.034 -0.012
(0.084) (0.093) (0.053) (0.087) (0.10) (0.065) (0.067) (0.085) (0.061)
Control group mean 0.54 0.26 0.20 0.54 0.44 0.30 0.79 0.76 0.77
Any loans from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -0.023 -0.0049 0.011 -0.013 0.013 0.00069 -0.083 0.025 0.12∗
(0.071) (0.037) (0.030) (0.069) (0.040) (0.036) (0.063) (0.055) (0.055)
Control group mean 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.15
Value of pay-outs from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment 17.0 16.2 0.12 25.6 47.5+ -29.4+ 81.7 57.8 -18.1
(40.2) (23.3) (11.7) (25.6) (27.4) (17.5) (60.2) (40.3) (37.6)
Control group mean 151.46 33.80 31.49 80.59 55.16 67.30 304.85 148.96 206.81
Value of grants from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment 29.8 14.4 -6.42 23.0 40.9 -21.7 96.5 58.6 -44.8
(26.0) (13.5) (8.14) (22.0) (25.7) (14.6) (60.9) (38.0) (33.5)
Control group mean 72.51 22.80 23.30 65.37 45.40 53.57 256.40 131.46 175.48
Value of loans from SF for funeral or sickness
Social fund treatment -8.19 2.16 6.54 1.56 8.10 -4.40 -1.52 2.04 15.8
(26.2) (13.4) (9.48) (10.0) (6.22) (5.33) (18.0) (12.6) (15.6)
Control group mean 75.75 11.00 8.19 15.22 5.60 11.06 37.35 17.00 27.61
Observations 446 446 446 447 447 447 447 447 447
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes are accumulated over reported pay-outs with reported purpose funeral or sickness in a reference period of
the last 12 months. For phone surveys this is based on the report from several waves asking about each month separately for
the period of July 2019 to June 2020. Value outcomes are in ZMW and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Estimations are done
using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). For overall
results refer to Table C.2. For results related to any purposes, the refer to Tables 3.3 and C.1 in appendix C for aggregate
and NGO specific results respectively.
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Table C.4: SF used to finance various shocks by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 All NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Support from SF for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.024 0.027 0.028 -0.0015 -0.0049 -0.022 0.022+ -0.0069
(0.018) (0.050) (0.021) (0.024) (0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.017)
Control group mean 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.06
Observations 1094 304 331 459 1809 532 483 794
# Support from SF for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.013 -0.027 0.018 0.012 -0.012 -0.016 0.010 -0.015
(0.018) (0.048) (0.019) (0.027) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013) (0.020)
Control group mean 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.07
Observations 1069 292 327 450 1782 511 479 792
Support from SF for funeral costs
Social fund treatment 0.039+ 0.0060 0.0043 0.077∗ -0.00016 0.052 0.020 -0.014
(0.023) (0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.019) (0.058) (0.020) (0.030)
Control group mean 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.07
Observations 513 157 146 210 730 223 190 317
# Support from SF for funeral costs
Social fund treatment 0.043+ 0.0060 0.0043 0.086∗ -0.00051 0.045 0.031 -0.014
(0.024) (0.050) (0.036) (0.040) (0.020) (0.059) (0.026) (0.030)
Control group mean 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.07
Observations 513 157 146 210 730 223 190 317
Support from SF for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.026 0.093 0.074+ -0.047 0.014 0.11 0.068 -0.10+
(0.036) (0.097) (0.044) (0.049) (0.042) (0.089) (0.060) (0.060)
Control group mean 0.13 0.26 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.13
Observations 316 89 106 121 263 106 62 95
# Support from SF for medical costs
Social fund treatment -0.0096 -0.13 0.051+ -0.0069 -0.030 0.12+ -0.040 -0.12+
(0.036) (0.100) (0.029) (0.045) (0.033) (0.070) (0.038) (0.062)
Control group mean 0.08 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.14
Observations 291 77 102 112 236 85 58 93
Support from SF for business shocks
Social fund treatment -0.0044 -0.022 0.0067 -0.022 -0.0051 -0.040∗∗ 0.0038 0.0073
(0.010) (0.020) (0.0065) (0.015) (0.0084) (0.016) (0.0076) (0.013)
Control group mean 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03
Observations 794 153 276 365 1630 428 455 747
# Support from SF for business shocks
Social fund treatment -0.0069 -0.022 0.0067 -0.028 -0.0064 -0.040∗∗ 0.0038 0.0046
(0.011) (0.020) (0.0065) (0.018) (0.0086) (0.016) (0.0076) (0.013)
Control group mean 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03
Observations 794 153 276 365 1630 428 455 747
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes refers to support from social fund reportedly used to finance any shock such as funerals,
medical expenditures, or business related shocks. Observations refer to households that reported shocks such
as funerals, medical expenditures, or business related shocks. Estimations are done using pdslasso command
in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). For estimations on the
whole sample, NGO fixed effects are always included, but excluded for NGO specific estimations.
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Table C.5: Loans used to finance various shocks by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 All NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Loans for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.024 0.12∗∗ -0.013 -0.0095 0.017 -0.00098 -0.011 0.011
(0.024) (0.044) (0.046) (0.039) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028)
Control group mean 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.19
Observations 1085 302 329 454 1813 533 484 796
# Loans for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.029 0.14∗ 0.014 -0.031 0.044 0.034 0.020 0.016
(0.029) (0.058) (0.057) (0.044) (0.030) (0.041) (0.051) (0.037)
Control group mean 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.22
Observations 1059 292 324 443 1779 519 475 785
Loans from savings group for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.033 0.14∗∗ 0.027 -0.011 0.0071 0.020 -0.016 0.016
(0.022) (0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.017) (0.038) (0.038) (0.022)
Control group mean 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.06
Observations 706 214 211 281 882 277 229 376
# Loans from savings group for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.044+ 0.17∗∗ 0.023 -0.0083 0.0036 0.020 0.0090 -0.0066
(0.025) (0.057) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033) (0.080) (0.065) (0.046)
Control group mean 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.10
Observations 690 209 206 275 859 266 223 370
Loans for funeral costs
Social fund treatment 0.011 0.16∗ -0.0075 -0.048 0.016 -0.045 0.035 -0.0040
(0.032) (0.067) (0.058) (0.051) (0.025) (0.055) (0.052) (0.034)
Control group mean 0.14 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.10
Observations 513 157 146 210 730 223 190 317
# Loans for funeral costs
Social fund treatment 0.020 0.16+ 0.026 -0.048 0.024 -0.048 0.034 -0.0037
(0.041) (0.081) (0.080) (0.059) (0.032) (0.056) (0.068) (0.042)
Control group mean 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.11
Observations 513 157 146 210 730 223 190 317
Loans from savings group for funeral costs
Social fund treatment 0.030 0.15∗ 0.025 -0.024 -0.0015 -0.049 0.022 -0.011
(0.026) (0.060) (0.042) (0.039) (0.018) (0.042) (0.035) (0.026)
Control group mean 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.06
Observations 513 157 146 210 730 223 190 317
# Loans from savings group for funeral costs
Social fund treatment 0.037 0.18∗∗ 0.025 -0.024 -0.0060 -0.10 0.034 -0.023
(0.028) (0.067) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.087) (0.077) (0.051)
Control group mean 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.12
Observations 513 157 146 210 730 223 190 317
Loans for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.027 0.072 0.066 -0.028 -0.049 0.0046 -0.15 0.029
(0.038) (0.093) (0.047) (0.065) (0.048) (0.080) (0.091) (0.056)
Control group mean 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.35 0.14
Observations 317 87 107 123 270 99 67 104
# Loans for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.020 0.049 0.061 -0.031 -0.0067 0.075 -0.16 0.037
(0.034) (0.088) (0.046) (0.061) (0.049) (0.095) (0.15) (0.038)
Control group mean 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.28 0.05
Observations 291 77 102 112 236 85 58 93
Loans from savings group for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.0022 0.041 0.041 -0.019 -0.0028 0.073 -0.13+ 0.068+
(0.035) (0.078) (0.038) (0.066) (0.036) (0.070) (0.077) (0.041)
Control group mean 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.06
Observations 307 82 107 118 259 96 64 99
# Loans from savings group for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.012 0.018 0.034 -0.010 0.026 0.061 -0.053 0.061∗
(0.031) (0.084) (0.033) (0.057) (0.027) (0.046) (0.063) (0.029)
Control group mean 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.00
Observations 291 77 102 112 236 85 58 93
Loans for business shocks
Social fund treatment 0.0093 -0.0015 -0.0045 0.0011 0.026 0.029 0.00087 0.025
(0.024) (0.051) (0.029) (0.040) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023)
Control group mean 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.15
Observations 794 153 276 365 1630 428 455 747
# Loans for business shocks
Social fund treatment 0.00060 0.0043 -0.020 -0.0100 0.037 0.037 0.021 0.030
(0.027) (0.051) (0.033) (0.044) (0.026) (0.026) (0.038) (0.029)
Control group mean 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.18
Observations 794 153 276 365 1630 428 455 747
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes refers to loans reportedly used to finance any shock such as funerals, medical ex-
penditures, or business related shocks. Observations refer to households that reported shocks such
as funerals, medical expenditures, or business related shocks. Estimations are done using pdslasso
command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). For
estimations on the whole sample, NGO fixed effects are always included, but excluded for NGO specific
estimations.
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Table C.6: Sold agriculture assets or goods to finance various shocks by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 All NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Sold goods for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.030 0.00073 -0.0089 0.024 -0.011 -0.028 0.016 0.0019
(0.028) (0.058) (0.054) (0.046) (0.026) (0.046) (0.049) (0.034)
Control group mean 0.46 0.45 0.60 0.38 0.32 0.40 0.35 0.25
Observations 1137 328 339 470 1820 543 483 794
# Sold goods for any shocks
Social fund treatment 0.11 0.070 0.15 0.19 -0.018 -0.12 0.011 0.10
(0.097) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.052) (0.10) (0.11) (0.075)
Control group mean 0.77 0.68 1.11 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.53 0.37
Observations 962 274 277 411 1656 474 429 753
Sold goods for funeral costs
Social fund treatment -0.039 -0.029 -0.14+ 0.053 0.0091 0.038 -0.036 0.034
(0.045) (0.079) (0.075) (0.043) (0.034) (0.070) (0.070) (0.045)
Control group mean 0.36 0.34 0.51 0.29 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.34
Observations 514 157 146 211 730 223 190 317
# Sold goods for funeral costs
Social fund treatment -0.079 -0.058 -0.28+ 0.11 0.020 0.076 -0.079 0.068
(0.090) (0.16) (0.15) (0.086) (0.067) (0.14) (0.14) (0.090)
Control group mean 0.73 0.68 1.03 0.57 0.79 0.80 0.98 0.69
Observations 514 157 146 211 730 223 190 317
Sold goods for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.058 0.036 0.044 0.017 -0.016 -0.049 -0.034 -0.11
(0.043) (0.073) (0.065) (0.070) (0.047) (0.074) (0.082) (0.078)
Control group mean 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.64 0.63 0.71 0.67 0.51
Observations 466 131 164 171 400 154 112 134
# Sold goods for medical costs
Social fund treatment 0.37∗ 0.74∗ 0.51∗ 0.22 0.060 -0.36 0.28 0.27
(0.18) (0.31) (0.25) (0.35) (0.14) (0.26) (0.25) (0.22)
Control group mean 1.01 1.00 1.22 0.82 0.55 0.88 0.48 0.30
Observations 291 77 102 112 236 85 58 93
Sold goods for business shocks
Social fund treatment 0.00023 0.011 -0.0037 -0.0098 0.012 -0.0014 0.025 0.015
(0.032) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054) (0.015) (0.033) (0.026) (0.023)
Control group mean 0.21 0.09 0.28 0.21 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.10
Observations 794 153 276 365 1630 428 455 747
# Sold goods for business shocks
Social fund treatment 0.0068 0.013 0.0065 -0.012 0.013 -0.0041 0.027 0.022
(0.043) (0.052) (0.076) (0.073) (0.020) (0.050) (0.033) (0.031)
Control group mean 0.26 0.09 0.34 0.27 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.12
Observations 794 153 276 365 1630 428 455 747
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Outcomes refers to selling agricultural goods and assets reportedly used to finance any shock
such as funerals, medical expenditures, or business related shocks. Observations refer to households
that reported shocks such as funerals, medical expenditures, or business related shocks. Estimations
are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and
A.3 in appendix A).
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Table C.7: Knowledge and attitude outcomes by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Would participate in insurance scheme
Social fund treatment -0.0018 -0.041 0.048+ -0.019 0.020 -0.047+
(0.028) (0.040) (0.028) (0.039) (0.041) (0.028)
Control group mean 0.91 0.81 0.83 0.71 0.66 0.80
Observations 462 315 621 588 470 831
Level of trust in insurance companies
Social fund treatment -0.011 -0.093 -0.091 -0.12 -0.073 0.11
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.089)
Control group mean 1.92 2.27 2.51 2.41 2.27 2.12
Observations 223 160 365 384 379 687
Trust in insurance companies
Social fund treatment -0.081 0.054 0.047 0.088+ 0.026 -0.060
(0.060) (0.077) (0.051) (0.046) (0.049) (0.040)
Control group mean 0.60 0.44 0.39 0.48 0.51 0.62
Observations 295 213 443 473 426 716
Knowledge about insurance
Social fund treatment 0.015 -0.068 -0.014 0.0099 -0.028 0.023
(0.053) (0.049) (0.064) (0.056) (0.041) (0.045)
Control group mean 0.08 -0.14 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.05
Observations 555 384 701 696 512 906
Attitude towards insurance
Social fund treatment -0.037 -0.16∗ -0.027 0.095 -0.12 0.0040
(0.074) (0.075) (0.066) (0.079) (0.087) (0.049)
Control group mean 0.11 0.05 -0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.03
Observations 245 138 373 126 122 297
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. While the hypothetical participation in an insurance scheme and knowledge questions were
asked to everyone, the attitude and trust outcomes are asked conditional on the respondent being
familiar with the term insurance. Level of trust is on a 4 point scale (1=complete, 4=none at all).
Trust refers to the first two levels. Knowledge about and attitude towards insurance are indexes, i.e.
the mean of 5 and 8 items each of which is standardized to the control group. For overall results refer
to Table 3.5. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A).
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Table C.8: Reported economic impact of shocks and loci of control by NGO
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4 NGO 1 NGO 3 NGO 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Average economic impact across shocks
Social fund treatment 0.045 -0.037 -0.032 0.018 0.024 0.029
(0.13) (0.11) (0.074) (0.082) (0.073) (0.048)
Control group mean 1.86 1.83 1.87 1.92 1.57 1.57
Observations 261 315 425 509 477 786
# of shocks with serious economic impact
Social fund treatment 0.018 0.074 0.053 -0.046 -0.045 -0.010
(0.13) (0.15) (0.099) (0.099) (0.17) (0.11)
Control group mean 0.83 1.13 1.05 0.85 2.34 1.86
Observations 261 315 425 509 477 786
# of shocks with economic impact
Social fund treatment 0.010 -0.11 0.041 -0.16 -0.027 0.037
(0.13) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.13)
Control group mean 1.17 1.92 1.73 1.69 2.87 2.31
Observations 261 315 425 509 477 786
Average economic impact across business shocks
Social fund treatment 0.23 -0.11 -0.016 -0.029 -0.016 0.026
(0.16) (0.089) (0.080) (0.083) (0.078) (0.050)
Control group mean 1.60 1.71 1.67 1.91 1.58 1.55
Observations 153 276 365 427 452 746
# of business shocks with serious economic impact
Social fund treatment -0.15 0.082 0.025 -0.070 0.085 0.0074
(0.17) (0.13) (0.096) (0.079) (0.14) (0.086)
Control group mean 1.01 1.06 1.00 0.77 2.04 1.57
Observations 153 276 365 427 452 746
# of business shocks with economic impact
Social fund treatment -0.23 -0.12 0.023 -0.11 0.16 0.041
(0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11)
Control group mean 1.36 1.72 1.60 1.55 2.47 1.97
Observations 153 276 365 427 452 746
Average economic impact across funerals
Social fund treatment -0.21 0.033 -0.032 0.11 0.17 0.10
(0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.091)
Control group mean 2.20 2.09 2.34 1.92 1.58 1.53
Observations 156 149 215 216 190 316
# of funerals with serious economic impact
Social fund treatment 0.13 0.069 -0.012 0.015 -0.070 -0.077
(0.10) (0.11) (0.071) (0.10) (0.11) (0.082)
Control group mean 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.47 0.90 0.95
Observations 156 149 215 216 190 316
# of funerals with economic impact
Social fund treatment 0.15 -0.042 -0.023 -0.15 -0.15 -0.078
(0.11) (0.11) (0.088) (0.10) (0.12) (0.083)
Control group mean 0.72 0.88 0.66 0.89 1.16 1.13
Observations 156 149 215 216 190 316
Internal locus of control index
Social fund treatment -0.024 -0.11∗ -0.040 0.0056 0.19∗∗ -0.026
(0.056) (0.051) (0.045) (0.058) (0.060) (0.045)
Control group mean 0.20 -0.02 -0.13 0.35 -0.11 -0.19
Observations 555 384 701 696 512 906
External locus of control index
Social fund treatment -0.0053 0.058 -0.013 -0.016 0.13+ 0.052
(0.041) (0.076) (0.052) (0.055) (0.070) (0.046)
Control group mean -0.19 -0.08 0.18 0.07 -0.21 0.05
Observations 555 384 701 695 512 906
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Shocks comprises both business shocks and funerals. Impact was assessed on a
4 point scale (1=serious, 4=none at all). Serious economic impact refers to the first
level, economic impact refers to the first two levels. Locus of control indexes are the
mean of 5 items which are standardized to the control group. For details on the external
and internal locus of control indexes refer to Tables C.10 and C.9 in appendix C. For
overall results refer to Table 3.6. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata
(included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A).
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Table C.9: Details on components of the internal locus of control index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Internal locus of control index
Social fund treatment -0.055+ 0.031
(0.029) (0.030)
My life is determined by my own actions.
Social fund treatment 0.022 0.046+
(0.044) (0.028)
Control group mean 1.70 1.62
When I get what I want, it is usually because I worked hard for it.
Social fund treatment -0.10∗∗ 0.035
(0.038) (0.024)
Control group mean 1.54 1.56
I am usually able to protect my personal interests.
Social fund treatment -0.041 0.020
(0.045) (0.032)
Control group mean 1.76 1.74
I can mostly determine what will happen in my life.
Social fund treatment -0.063 0.020
(0.059) (0.052)
Control group mean 2.65 2.18
When I make plans. I am almost certain to make them work.
Social fund treatment -0.064 -0.0034
(0.042) (0.032)
Control group mean 1.77 1.76
Observations 1674 2231
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. ”Internal locus of control index” refers to an index based on the 5 items presented in the table.
Each of these items is on a 5-point scale from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree. It is constructed
by averaging over these items after they were standardized to the control group. Estimations are done
using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in
appendix A). Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. NGO fixed
effects are always included.
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Table C.10: Details on components of the external locus of control index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
External locus of control index
Social fund treatment 0.000017 0.036
(0.031) (0.032)
To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental/chance happenings.
Social fund treatment 0.0044 0.097+
(0.064) (0.052)
Control group mean 2.97 2.47
I feel like what happens in my life is determined by others.
Social fund treatment 0.048 0.045
(0.059) (0.056)
Control group mean 3.08 2.95
It is not always wise for me to plan too far ahead ...
Social fund treatment -0.057 -0.0068
(0.061) (0.056)
Control group mean 2.93 2.57
My life is chiefly controlled by other powerful people.
Social fund treatment 0.095 0.045
(0.072) (0.057)
Control group mean 3.01 2.79
People like myself have little chance of protecting personal interest.
Social fund treatment -0.074 0.052
(0.066) (0.055)
Control group mean 3.23 2.84
Observations 1674 2230
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. ”External locus of control index” refers to an index based on the 5 items presented in the table.
Each of these items is on a 5-point scale from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree. It is constructed by
averaging over these items after they were standardized to the control group. Estimations are done using
pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A).
Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. NGO fixed effects are always
included.
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Table C.11: Details on components of the HH animals purchased
index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH animals purchased 0.14 -0.014
(0.090) (0.016)
Number of Cow purchased -0.026 -0.0064
(0.064) (0.014)
Number of Bull purchased 0 -0.0042
(.) (0.0055)
Number of Calf purchased 0 0
(.) (.)
Number of Horse purchased 0 0
(.) (.)
Number of Ox purchased 0.0049 0.0027
(0.0049) (0.0040)
Number of Donkey purchased 0 0.0018
(.) (0.0017)
Number of Goat purchased 0.055∗ -0.0076
(0.022) (0.022)
Number of Sheep purchased 0 -0.0020
(.) (0.0020)
Number of Pig purchased 0.016 -0.014
(0.026) (0.024)
Number of Chicken purchased 0.090 -0.031
(0.23) (0.93)
Number of Gfowl purchased 0.044 0.011+
(0.035) (0.0060)
Number of Ofowl purchased 0.010 0
(0.0097) (.)
Number of Poultry purchased 0.0056 -0.0045
(0.0099) (0.022)
Number of Other purchased 0 0
(.) (.)
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included
covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO
fixed effects are always included. Observations reflects maximum number
not accounting for missing values. First outcome refers to animals pur-
chased index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is
comprised of, i.e. the number of various purchased animals in the last 12
months.
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Table C.12: Details on components of the HH animals owned
index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH animals owned 0.017 0.010
(0.022) (0.021)
Number of Cow owned 0.061 -0.15
(0.18) (0.14)
Number of Bull owned -0.0053 0.022
(0.0037) (0.037)
Number of Calf owned 0 -0.054
(.) (0.043)
Number of Horse owned 0 0
(.) (.)
Number of Ox owned -0.0024 0.023
(0.0071) (0.048)
Number of Donkey owned 0.0022 0.0061
(0.0022) (0.0055)
Number of Goat owned 0.16 -0.0053
(0.18) (0.12)
Number of Sheep owned 0.015 -0.033
(0.014) (0.033)
Number of Pig owned -0.053 0.084
(0.17) (0.17)
Number of Chicken owned 0.035 -0.83
(0.55) (0.68)
Number of Gfowl owned 0.043 0.031
(0.046) (0.11)
Number of Ofowl owned 0.025 -0.011
(0.026) (0.010)
Number of Poultry owned 0.18 0.045
(0.17) (0.13)
Number of Other owned 0 0
(.) (.)
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (in-
cluded covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix
A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations reflects max-
imum number not accounting for missing values. First outcome refers
to animals owned index, the remaining outcomes are the components
the index is comprised of, i.e. the number of various animals owned.
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Table C.13: Details on components of the HH agricultural inputs index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH agricultural inputs
Social fund treatment 0.018 -0.020
(0.030) (0.030)
Seeds purchased (ZMW)
Social fund treatment 20.4 5.75
(21.3) (21.9)
Control group mean 171.9 168.9
Chemical fertilizer used (ZMW)
Social fund treatment 82.1 -28.7
(60.6) (62.4)
Control group mean 467.6 526.0
Organic fertilizer used (ZMW)
Social fund treatment -0.94 -3.46+
(1.13) (1.80)
Control group mean 2.53 7.23
Insecticides used (ZMW)
Social fund treatment -4.50 -7.71
(9.00) (5.38)
Control group mean 24.8 30.9
Use of paid field workers (ZMW)
Social fund treatment 16.0 24.9
(52.7) (36.0)
Control group mean 224.5 214.1
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included
covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO
fixed effects are always included. Observations reflects maximum number not
accounting for missing values. First outcome refers to agricultural inputs
index, the remaining outcomes are the components the index is comprised of,
i.e. the value of various agricultural inputs in ZMW.
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Table C.14: Details on components of the HH agricultural assets index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH agricultural assets -0.013 0.016
(0.017) (0.024)
Number of trained oxen/cows 0.067 -0.071
(0.073) (0.11)
Number of ox-drawn plough 0.034 0.027
(0.038) (0.039)
Number of disc plough -0.082∗ 0.015
(0.035) (0.017)
Number of harrows 0.0026 0.016
(0.016) (0.016)
Number of cultivators 0.015 -0.0047
(0.018) (0.0031)
Number of rippers -0.0027 0.0040
(0.0081) (0.012)
Number of ridger/weeder -0.036 -0.0027
(0.044) (0.025)
Number of planter -0.0031 -0.0035
(0.012) (0.0044)
Number of fitarelli -0.0063 0.0082
(0.0066) (0.011)
Number of hand driven tractor -0.0025 0
(0.0017) (.)
Number of scotch carts 0.024 0.012
(0.016) (0.017)
Number of wheel barrow 0.00064 -0.0096
(0.019) (0.016)
Number of water or treadle pump -0.012∗ 0.0034
(0.0058) (0.010)
Number of other irrigation equipment -0.0022 -0.010
(0.0097) (0.010)
Number of knapsack sprayer -0.025 -0.011
(0.026) (0.027)
Number of boom sprayer -0.00046 -0.0017
(0.014) (0.0098)
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covari-
ates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects
are always included. Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for
missing values. First outcome refers to agricultural assets index, the remaining
outcomes are the components the index is comprised of, i.e. the number of various
agricultural assets.
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Table C.15: Details on components of the HH general assets
index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH agricultural assets 0.026 -0.0078
(0.016) (0.014)
Number of trucks or lorries 0.0023 -0.00014
(0.0016) (0.0013)
Number of pick-ups, vans or cars 0.015 -0.0023
(0.012) (0.0082)
Number of trailer 0.00090 0
(0.0020) (.)
Number of motorcycles 0.0071 -0.0041
(0.0097) (0.010)
Number of bicycles -0.0061 -0.014
(0.038) (0.039)
Number of boats or canoes 0.0032 0.0100
(0.0093) (0.0086)
Number of fishing nets 0.045+ 0.047
(0.025) (0.032)
Number of cattle dip or crush pen -0.00030 0.0086
(0.0034) (0.020)
Number of hand mills -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.020) (0.013)
Number of hammer mills 0.0015 0.0069
(0.0043) (0.0053)
Number of rump presses 0.000010 0.00089
(0.0017) (0.00089)
Number of hand-operated maize sheller 0.0082 -0.0074
(0.0065) (0.0073)
Number of motorized maize sheller -0.011+ -0.000047
(0.0063) (0.0014)
Number of improved brazier -0.082∗ -0.054
(0.041) (0.046)
Number of solar panel 0.026 -0.054
(0.058) (0.050)
Number of generator 0.00090 -0.0033
(0.0083) (0.0071)
Number of cell phone -0.012 -0.0099
(0.047) (0.047)
Number of radio 0.013 -0.020
(0.036) (0.030)
Number of TV 0.050 -0.046+
(0.037) (0.024)
Number of car battery 0.035 0.041
(0.027) (0.027)
Number of sewing machine -0.0098 -0.019
(0.012) (0.012)
Number of water tank -0.00014 0.000054
(0.0069) (0.0030)
Number of standard well -0.012 -0.0076
(0.022) (0.012)
Number of borehole -0.0098 -0.0014
(0.0074) (0.0040)
Number of gas or electric stove -0.019 -0.028
(0.017) (0.021)
Number of electric iron -0.028+ -0.040∗
(0.016) (0.018)
Number of non-electric iron 0.064∗ 0.0079
(0.029) (0.029)
Number of lounge suite or sofa -0.057 -0.014
(0.079) (0.053)
Number of houses 0 0.015
(.) (0.033)
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata
(included covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3
in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Ob-
servations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing
values. First outcome refers to general assets index, the remain-
ing outcomes are the components the index is comprised of, i.e.
the number of various general assets.
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Table C.16: Details on components of the HH expenditure
index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH expenditures
Social fund treatment 0.038 -0.042
(0.031) (0.033)
Schooling expenditure
Social fund treatment -191.0 -253.6
(207.4) (177.4)
Control group mean 1181.2 1050.6
Medical expenditure
Social fund treatment 17.6 -5.61
(12.2) (15.0)
Control group mean 37.6 62.1
Funeral expenditure
Social fund treatment 19.2 -39.2
(30.2) (50.2)
Control group mean 151.4 259.2
Other expenditure
Social fund treatment 33.6 -58.2
(113.1) (136.8)
Control group mean 942.3 906.8
Observations 1777 2170
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (in-
cluded covariates can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in ap-
pendix A). NGO fixed effects are always included. Observations
reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values. First
outcome refers to expenditure index, the remaining outcomes are
the components the index is comprised of, i.e. the value of various
types of expenditures in the last 12 months in ZMW.
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Table C.17: Details on components of the HH food security index
(1) (2)
Midline July 2018 Endline July 2019
b/se b/se
Index HH food security index
Social fund treatment 0.017 0.015
(0.022) (0.017)
Issues covering needs at least monthly
Social fund treatment -0.011 0.0062
(0.020) (0.017)
Control group mean 0.16 0.17
Issues covering food needs last 12 months
Social fund treatment 0.053+ 0.026
(0.028) (0.022)
Control group mean 1.56 1.66
Skipped meals at least monthly
Social fund treatment 0.0024 -0.00032
(0.014) (0.013)
Control group mean 0.072 0.076
Skipped meals last 12 months
Social fund treatment 0.0079 0.0060
(0.023) (0.018)
Control group mean 1.78 1.84
+ : p < 0.10; ∗ : p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01
Notes. Estimations are done using pdslasso command in Stata (included covariates
can be found in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in appendix A). NGO fixed effects are always
included. Observations reflects maximum number not accounting for missing values.
First outcome refers to food security index, the remaining outcomes are the components
the index is comprised of, i.e. the value of various sub-indexes related to food security
in the last 12 months.
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D. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
D.A. Questions and response distribution
Q1: How fair do you think it is that some respondents win 80 Kwacha in the lottery
while others do not?





Very unfair Unfair Neither Fair Very fair
Q2: How satisfied are you that you had/have a chance to win 80 Kwacha for your
participation in the interview?





Very dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neither Satisfied Very satisfied
134
Q3: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Survey respondents should
be compensated for their participation in a survey interview.





Strongly disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly agree
Q4: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Either all or none of the
respondents in a survey should be compensated.





Strongly disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly agree
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Q5: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: When there is a
compensation paid to a respondent for taking part in an interview about her/his
savings group, then the compensation should be shared with the group.





Strongly disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly agree
Q6: Assume a survey respondent is offered 80 Kwacha/40 Kwacha/no compensation for
participating in a survey. Judging the amount offered, do you think this is fair, or
unfair because it is too little, or unfair because it is too much?





Unfair, too low Unfair, too high Fair Neither fair nor unfair
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D.B. Survey experiment full model
In the following I present the analysis of the survey experiment based on the model which
is fully saturated with respect to the different randomized groups.
Yi =α0DBefore ×D0 + α40DBefore ×D40 + α80DBefore ×D80
+ β0DWon ×D0 + β40DWon ×D40 + β80DWon ×D80




where Yi is an indicator for whether the compensation is deemed fair, DWon and DLost
are indicators for whether they won or lost the lottery before answering the questions and
DBefore an indicator for being asked the question before the lottery, D0, D40 and D80 are
indicators for whether the question inquired about no compensation, 40 or 80 Kwacha, δj
refers to strata or interviewer fixed effects. The standard errors ϵi are Eicker-Huber-White
standard errors.30
As shown in Table D.1 I detect little if any differences with respect to whether they
lost or won the lottery. This is true for both the compensation levels of no compensation
and 40 Kwacha (αi = βi = γi), as well as the differences between the compensation
levels (αi − αj = βi − βj = γi − γj). I only find a statistically significant difference
for the compensation level of 80 Kwacha between whether questions are asked before
or after the lottery, which is not robust to the definition of Yi. Note however that
standard errors are quite large so this is not a finding of no effect. I further find no
difference with respect to whether they are asked about no compensation or 40 Kwacha
(α0 = α40 = β0 = β40 = γ0 = γ40), however a difference when asked about 80 Kwacha
which is considered to be more fair (α80 − αj = β80 − βj = γ80 − γj = 0).
30I used Stata’s (Version 16.0) reg command with the robust specification for standard errors.
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Table D.1: Full specification of survey experiment
Compensation is fair vs not fair Compensation is fair vs unfair
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
α0 0.59 0.33 0.70 0.38
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
α40 0.61 0.37 0.73 0.44
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
α80 0.95 0.72 1.01 0.71
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
γ0 0.53 0.26 0.64 0.33
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
γ40 0.51 0.23 0.62 0.28
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
γ80 0.80 0.57 0.89 0.62
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
β0 0.64 0.40 0.79 0.50
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
β40 0.58 0.32 0.74 0.42
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12)
β80 0.85 0.60 0.92 0.63
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
F-tests:
α0 = β0 = γ0 0.56 0.37 0.44 0.19
α40 = β40 = γ40 0.54 0.30 0.42 0.13
α40 − α0 = β40 − β0 = γ40 − γ0 = 0 0.94 0.83 0.95 0.68
α80 = β80 = γ80 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.22
α80 − α0 = β80 − β0 = γ80 − γ0 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.14
α80 − α40 = β80 − β40 = γ80 − γ40 0.76 0.82 0.62 0.56
α80 − α0 = β80 − β0 = γ80 − γ0 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
α80 − α40 = β80 − β40 = γ80 − γ40 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Model description:
Strata FE 3 3 3 3
Enumerator FE 7 3 7 3
Adj. R2 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.81
Observations 490 490 448 448
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) refer to specifications with an outcome that is 1 if the compensation is deemed
fair and 0 otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) refer to specifications with an outcome that is 1 if the compensation
is deemed fair and 0 if it is deemed unfair, omitting respondents that deem it neither fair nor unfair. Specifi-
cations differ depending on whether interviewer fixed effects are included. αX , βX and γX are estimates for
the mean conditional on a compensation level of X Kwacha when asked before the lottery, having lost or won
the lottery respectively. Rows under F-tests display the corresponding p-values.
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E. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
E.A. Interventions in Detail
Consent Form
[This is an example, wording depends on whether the potential respondent is an adult or not.]
TO ENUMERATOR: Please let the parent (and child together) read the text on the next
screen. If they are not able to read, please read the text to the parent (and child together).
If they have questions, answer them to your best knowledge or direct them to your super-
visor.
Hello,
I am [name] conducting a survey for [information of who the principal investigators are].
We conduct a research study about [topic of survey or research]. We are interested in
your opinions and general information about you, your family and your household. Your
household was randomly selected for an interview. First we would like to ask you about
your household and then interview your child about his/her life. The interview with you
will take about 40 minutes to complete, the interview with your child will take about 60
minutes to complete.
[Goal of the study]
We would be glad if you would support our study with your participation in the inter-
view. We do not expect any negative consequences for you or your family from this study.
[Data protection]
The study is for research purposes only. During the interviews personal data about you,
your child and your family is collected and stored for several years until the completion of
this study. All responses will be treated strictly confidential by the researchers. The data
will only be used for this study. For the analysis of the survey all identifying information
(such as names and identification numbers) will be replaced with numbers. We keep this
information only in case we are interested in following-up with an interview in the future.
Any results from this survey will only be reported in aggregate terms and no personal
data will be revealed in any of our reports. Third parties and public institutions will not
receive access to any personal information. Your name and your family member’s names
will not be passed on to anyone and will not be made public. All of your data will be
deleted upon request.
[Rights of the respondent)]
Your and your child’s participation in this research study is fully voluntary. If you choose
to continue with the interview, you and your child can choose not to respond to any or
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all of the questions we ask. You can withdraw your consent for participation in the
study at any time, without the need to mention any reasons and without any negative
consequences for you or your family. In case you withdraw your consent, all personal
data which was collected will be erased. Let me assure you again that all the information
provided by you will be kept strictly confidential.
If you want to withdraw your consent, get further information about the survey, or are
interested in the results of the study, please contact the person listed on the business card.
Do you have any questions?
Video for ACF and ASCF
TO ENUMERATOR: Please show the respondent the video on the next screen.
Tell them they can pause or re-watch the video at any time.
Script
Hello! We are conducting a survey for [information of who the principal investigators
are]. We conduct a research study about [topic of survey or research]. We are interested
in your opinions and general information about you, your family and your household.
We would like to ask you about your household and your life. The interview will take
about 60 minutes to complete. We would be glad if you could support our study with
your participation in the interview. We do not expect any negative consequences for
you or your family from this study. During the interview personal data about you and
your family is collected and stored for several years until the completion of the study
All responses will be treated strictly confidential by the researchers. This means after
the interview is done, the information is send to the data collection company. At the
data collection company all information from all the interviews is collected. Then all
identifying information (such as names and identification numbers) will be replaced with
new numbers. We keep the personal information only in case we are interested in following
up with an interview in future. It is stored for several years until the completion of the
study. The rest of the information is used for research . The information from all the
interviews is then analyzed and reported in aggregated terms, such that no personal data
will be revealed in any of the reports. The aggregated information is then shared but third
parties and public institutions will not receive access to any personal information. Your
name will not be passed onto anyone and will not be made public. Your participation in
this research study is fully voluntarily. If you choose to continue with the interview, you
can choose not to respond to any or all the questions we ask. You can withdraw your
consent for participation at this study anytime, without the need to mention any reasons
and without any negative consequences for you and your family. If you want to withdraw
your consent, get further information about the survey, or are interested in the result of
the studies please tell the enumerator or contact the person listed on the business card.




Scripted Interactive Part of ASCF
[This is an example, wording depends on whether the potential respondent is an adult or not.]
TO ENUMERATOR:
On the following screens, there will be either text or questions displayed. If there is text
displayed, please read it to the respondent. If a question is displayed, please ask the re-
spondent for an answer. DO NOT READ OUT THE CHOICES, but select all choices
which reflect the respondent’s answer. There are no right or wrong answers.
Hello,
I am [name] conducting a survey for [information of who the principal investigators are].
We conduct a research study about [topic of survey or research]. We are interested in
your opinions and general information about you, your family and your household. Your
household was randomly selected for an interview. We would like to ask you about your
household and your life. The interview will take about 100 minutes to complete.







• Other, please specify
In case of incorrect response31: We are conducting the survey for researchers from
the University of Mannheim in Germany.
We would be glad if you would support our study with your participation in the inter-
view. We do not expect any negative consequences for you or your family from this study.
The study is for research purposes only. During the interview personal data about you
and your family is collected and stored for several years until the completion of this study.
What will the information you provide be used for?
[multiple responses possible]





• Other, please specify
31Correct responses are emphasized in this illustration
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In case of incorrect response: The study is for research purposes only.
All responses will be treated strictly confidential by the researchers. The data will only
be used for this study. For the analysis of the survey all identifying information (such
as names and identification numbers) will be replaced with numbers. We keep this in-
formation only in case we are interested in following-up with an interview in the future.
Any results from this survey will only be reported in aggregate terms and no personal
data will be revealed in any of our reports. Third parties and public institutions will not
receive access to any personal information. Your name and your family member’s names
will not be passed on to anyone and will not be made public. All of your data will be
deleted upon request.






• Data collection company
• Other private companies
• Don’t know
• Other, please specify
In case of incorrect response: Only the researchers and the data collection company
have access to your personal information. Third parties and public institutions will not
receive access to any personal information. Your name and your family member’s names
will not be passed on to anyone and will not be made public.
Your participation in this research study is fully voluntary. If you choose to continue with
the interview, you can choose not to respond to any or all of the questions we ask. You
can withdraw your consent for participation in the study at any time, without the need
to mention any reasons and without any negative consequences for you or your family.
In case you withdraw your consent, all personal data which was collected will be erased.
Let me assure you again that all the information provided by you will be kept strictly
confidential.
If you want to withdraw your consent, get further information about the survey, or are
interested in the results of the study, please contact the person listed on the business card.
What happens if you give consent?
[multiple responses possible]
• I will be interviewed
• I will receive money and / or compensation for the interview
• My (and my child’s) responses will be send to the researchers
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• A NGO will help me, my family, or my community
• My (and my child’s) information will be saved for a potential new inter-
view
• Don’t know
• Other, please specify
What happens if you do not give consent?
[multiple responses possible]
• I will be declined services in the future
• I will lose existing benefits
• The interview stops immediately
• Someone will punish me
• Don’t know
• Other, please specify
In case of incorrect response: Your participation in this research study is fully vol-
untary. If you choose to continue with the interview, you can choose not to respond to
any or all of the questions we ask.
In case you withdraw your consent, all personal data which was collected will be erased.
TO ENUMERATOR: On the next screen, the whole text is displayed in case the respondent
wants to read it for themselves. Please ask them if they have any further questions.
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E.B. Questionnaire Modules
Objective Measure of Understanding of Consent
In the following you can find the questions used to assess the understanding of the re-
spondent. Correct answers are emphasized in bold font. Questions A1 and A6 relate to
the rights of the respondent, question A2 relates to purpose of the study and benefits
from participating, questions A3 and A4 relate to the voluntary nature of the respondent,
and question A5 relates to confidentiality.
Please indicate whether the statements are true or false.



























Alternative version of objective measure
Since we detected a tendency of respondents to assess statements as true, regardless of
whether they were, we plan to introduce an alternative version of each statement for
which the opposite assessment is correct in the second part of the data collection. This
allows us to take this default response behavior into account to improve our analysis.
Please indicate whether the statements are true or false.
B1: Once I provided any information, I cannot tell the researchers or data collection

















B5: My responses, together with my name and other identifying information, will be










Subjective Measure of Understanding of Consent
We only focus on three aspects which seem to be the most relevant in this context.
In the following, you will be presented three aspects related to this survey.
Please indicate how well you understood each of these aspects. There are no right or
wrong answers.
C1: The purpose of this study.
– I didn’t understand this at all
– I didn’t understand much of it
– I understood this to some extend
– I understood this well
– I understood this fully
C2: My participation in the interview being fully voluntary.
– I didn’t understand this at all
– I didn’t understand much of it
– I understood this to some extend
– I understood this well
– I understood this fully
C3: How the confidentiality of my information is ensured.
– I didn’t understand this at all
– I didn’t understand much of it
– I understood this to some extend
– I understood this well
– I understood this fully
C4: My rights with respect to data protection and storage.
– I didn’t understand this at all
– I didn’t understand much of it
– I understood this to some extend
– I understood this well
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